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The dissertation examines the question of why political authorities assign different 
powers to courts during political transitions through the cases of Egypt and Tunisia following the 
2011 uprisings.  In Egypt, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces allowed the Supreme 
Constitutional Court (SCC) to continue exercising its power of constitutional review throughout 
the transition.  In Tunisia, the transitional Ben Achour Commission dissolved the Constitutional 
Council and suspended constitutional review for the duration of the transition.  The dissertation 
argues that the formal powers of courts after 2011 were determined by a two step process that 
hinges on ideas about the judicial role: first, relations between the courts and the old regime 
produced a set of ideas about the judicial role; second, these ideas constrained the political 
authorities that designed the transitional institutions following the 2011 revolutions. 
The dissertation considers two alternative explanations.  First, the powers of courts may 
have been determined by the interests of political authorities for or against majority rule. 
Second, courts may have drawn support from civil society.  If courts have allies in civil society, 
they are more able to claim additional formal powers.  The dissertation rejects these explanations 
based on evidence from interviews with judges, lawyers and political parties, and a study of 
judicial decisions and transitional documents.  Instead, studies of the behavior of the Tunisian 
Administrative Tribunal, the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional court, and of the incorporation of 
the shariah into the two countries’ legal systems demonstrate the plausibility of the judicial role 
hypothesis.  
The dissertation contributes to a debate about how to conceive of democratic transitions. 
Against the voluntarist account presented by Philippe Schmitter and Guillermo O’Donnell, the 
dissertation argues that the institutional legacy of the judiciary provides a real constraint on 
decision makers during the transition.   It also contributes to a debate about what role courts can 1
play in democratization.  Scholars of democratization, such as Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, 
argue that strong courts aid democratization.  Scholars of courts in authoritarianism, such as 
Nathan Brown, see courts as part of the regime.   The dissertation emphasizes the particular 2
characteristics of national legal systems that determine whether courts will act as holdovers from 
the old regime or as agents of democratization.  
 
Chapter 1: History and Institutional Choices 
 
The chapter introduces the legal history of Egypt and Tunisia and excludes explanations 
1 ​Schmitter and O’Donnell (1978) 
2 ​Linz and Stepan (1996), Brown (2006) 
based on an early divergence of the cases before the reform era of the 1970’s.  Legal 
development followed similar trajectories in Tunisia and Egypt.  Both countries began legal 
reforms during the era of pre-colonial state-building.  Although Egypt was colonized by Britain 
and Tunisia by France, both countries retained a civil law system with strong French influences. 
Both countries were governed by leftist nationalist regimes in the middle of the twentieth 
century.  An important divergence occurred in the reform era.  Egyptian president Sadat 
(1970-1981) established the Supreme Constitutional Court as the centerpiece of his legal reforms 
and a guarantor of the liberal rights granted by the 1971 Constitution.  Tunisia reached the same 
goal by establishing the Administrative Tribunal.  A constitutional court occupied the center of 
Egypt’s legal system.  In Tunisia, this role was filled by an administrative court with comparable 
political influence but no power of constitutional review.  
 
Chapter 2: Countermajoritarian Interests and Judicial Power 
 
The chapter examines implications of the countermajoritarian hypothesis for the design 
of the transitional institutions, the stances of political parties on the question of interim 
constitutional review, and the outcome of elections in both countries.  The design of the 
transitional institutions is not fully countermajoritarian in Egypt or fully majoritarian in Tunisia. 
Electoral rules in Egypt amplified the vote share of the Muslim Brotherhood’s “Freedom and 
Justice Party”.  Electoral rules in Tunisia limited the number of seats won by the Islamist party 
Ennahda.  Parties from across the spectrum supported interim constitutional review in Egypt, and 
opposed it in Tunisia.  All of these findings undermine the countermajoritarian hypothesis.  They 
also highlight the constraints on the drafting bodies. 
 
Chapter 3: Civil Society and Judicial Power 
 
The civil society hypothesis argues that either civil society was weaker in Tunisia, or that 
it was unable to influence the transitional institutions, or it could not as effectively engage with 
the courts because of the form of constitutional review exercised by the Tunisian Constitutional 
Council.  Civil society did engage with the courts in Tunisia, but exclusively through 
administrative review rather than through administrative review and constitutional review as in 
Egypt.  Civil society was able to influence the design of the transitional institutions in Tunisia 
through representation in the Ben Achour Commission and through popular protest.  In Egypt, 
civil society became increasingly co-opted by political forces over the course of the transition. 
The finding undermines the civil society hypothesis and sets the stage for the discussion of the 
Administrative Tribunal in Chapter 4. 
 
Chapter 4: The Administrative Tribunal and the Judicial Role 
 
The activity of the Tunisian Administrative Tribunal provides an illustration of the 
impact of ideas about the judicial role.  The Administrative Tribunal was willing to rule against 
the Troika government.  It was not willing to decide cases through which it might claim 
additional powers, including interim constitutional review.  The Tribunal declined to decide the 
question of the Assembly’s mandate or to intervene in the summer 2013 crisis, when protesters 
called for the dissolution of the Assembly.  The actions of the Tribunal are explained by ideas 
expressed by the judges.  Moreover, these ideas reflect the experiences of the Tribunal during the 
Ben Ali era when the Tribunal maintained its independence by avoiding politicization.  
 
Chapter 5: The Incorporation of the Shariah and the Judicial Role in Egypt and Tunisia 
 
The chapter establishes the plausibility of a link between the constitutional status of 
shariah and the role of courts in transitional politics through a study of judicial politics in these 
two cases, especially since 2011.  The context of the 2011 transitions gave courts in both 
countries an opportunity to claim greater powers, but the courts responded differently.  The 
SCC’s role as an interpreter of Islamic law has increased its legitimacy and allowed it to rule 
against the government. Tunisia’s Personal Status Code reinforced a legal positivist ideology that 
favored judicial deference to the legislative and executive.  Furthermore, the political imperative 
of protecting the Personal Status Code made secular opposition parties, and even judges, more 
skeptical of constitutional review.   The incorporation of the shariah is an example of the 
mechanism linking judicial activity before 2011 to ideas about the judicial role to positions on 
the formal powers of courts after 2011.  
 
Chapter 6: Judicial Politics and the Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt 
 
The chapter traces the process leading from judicial activity to ideas in Egypt.  The 
Supreme Constitutional Court and the ordinary judiciary acted in tandem, even though, like the 
Tunisian judiciary, the Egyptian judiciary was initially suspicious of constitutional review.  The 
activity of the SCC legitimized constitutional review in the eyes of ordinary judges.  Judges on 
the SCC imported new constitutionalist ideas that modified the strict legal positivism of the 
Egyptian judiciary.  The SCC’s rulings benefited the ordinary judiciary.  The disputes 
surrounding the 2005 elections solidified an alliance between the ordinary judiciary and the SCC 
and legitimized the role of the judiciary as a political arbiter. 
 
Chapter 7: Institutional Choices, 2011-2014 
 
The chapter outlines possible alternative designs for the courts and the broader 
transitional institutions and shows how considerations of the judicial role led to the rejection of 
these alternatives.  The normative component of the judicial role influenced the drafting bodies 
directly, and the judicial role also acted as a guide for the drafting bodies' expectations about 
how courts would act during the transition.  Extensive judicial powers were never an option in 
Tunisia because the courts would likely refuse to exercise them.  Egyptian courts interpreted the 
formal powers granted to them by political authorities  in a way that was compatible with their 
previous practices.  At each turning point of the transition, considerations of the judicial role 
trumped considerations of the countermajoritarian impact of greater judicial powers. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The dissertation highlights an unusual feature of the judiciary - the durability of ideas 
about the judicial role - and explains why this features is especially relevant in transitions.  The 
voluntarist account of transitions proposed by Schmitter and O’Donnell works well for most 
actors, such as individuals, political parties, or some state institutions ​.  In contrast, the 3
dissertation shows how the judiciary in both countries was bound by conceptions of its role that 
were formulated during the previous regime.  Features of the judiciary provide a real constraint 
on the actions of individual judges and on the powers that the drafting bodies could assign to the 
judiciary. 
 
 
 
3 ​Schmitter and O’Donnell (1978) 
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1. The Judicial Role in Egypt and Tunisia 
 
   
On February 5, 2011 at the height of the protests in Cairo, two liberal activists, Hossam 
Bahgat and Soha Abdelaty, published an op-ed in the Washington Post to lay out their vision of a 
post-Mubarak Egypt1,  
As Egyptian citizens and human rights defenders, we have been on the streets here, including in 
Tahrir Square, since Jan. 25 to demand dignity and freedom for all Egyptians.  There is nothing 
we want more than an immediate end to the Mubarak era...But for a real transition to democracy 
to begin, Mubarak must not resign until he has signed decrees that, under Egypt's constitution, 
only a president can issue. This is not simply a legal technicality… 
 
This is a remarkable statement for revolutionaries to make in the middle of a revolution.  In 
Egypt, liberal activists clung to a notion of legality that seems to be at odds with the revolution 
that they had just brought about.   
In Tunisia, such an attachment to legal continuity was absent, even among jurists.  Habib 
Koubaa, former Secretary General of the Constitutional Council, argued that “the revolution 
created a political void….The parties exploited this situation to concentrate power in their own 
hands [by creating the National Assembly].”2  Koubaa’s opinions reflect Tunisian judges’ 
acceptance of an interpretation of the revolution as a period of constitutional hiatus.  Koubaa 
opposes the Assembly on political grounds but accepts the premise that a “political void” existed 
after January 2011.  Koubaa’s stance against legal continuity is especially remarkable because he 
held an important post in the dissolved Constitutional Council during the Ben Ali era.  
These attitudes were accompanied by a sharp contrast between powers granted to the 
                                               
1 Hossam Bahgat and Soha Abdelaty. “What Mubarak must do before he resigns,” Washington Post, 5 February 
2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/04/AR2011020406548.html 
2 Interview with Habib Koubaa 
2 
high courts inherited from the old regime in each country.  In Egypt, the Supreme Council of the 
Armed Forces confirmed the SCC’s power of constitutional review in 2011, and granted it 
additional powers in 2012.  The SCC exercised these powers vigorously by dissolving the House 
of Representatives and the Constituent Assembly3.  In Tunisia, the Ben Achour Commission 
suspended the Constitutional Council for the duration of the transition.  The Tunisian 
government did not create an alternative means of constitutional review until the adoption of the 
2014 Constitution4.  The main question addressed by the thesis is why the transitional regimes in 
Egypt and Tunisia gave such different powers to their constitutional courts.   
 
The Judicial Role  
 
The dissertation answers this question by proposing a three step process that hinges on 
ideas about the judicial role: first, different judicial institutions produced different patterns of 
judicial behavior; second, judicial behavior produced ideas about the judicial role; third, these 
ideas influenced the drafting bodies’ design of the formal powers of courts after 2011.  Egypt 
and Tunisia share a set of legal influences, but their judicial systems diverged after the 1970’s, 
when Egypt created the Supreme Constitutional Court and Tunisian created the Administrative 
Tribunal.  This divergence created a different pattern of judicial activity in each country.  In 
Tunisia, the Administrative Tribunal exercised administrative review of legislation without a 
                                               
3 David Kirkpatrick, “Blow to Transition as Court Dissolves Parliament,” New York Times, 14 June, 2012. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/15/world/middleeast/new-political-showdown-in-egypt-as-court-invalidates-
parliament.html?module=ArrowsNav&contentCollection=Middle%20East&action=keypress&region=FixedLeft&p
gtype=article 
4 “Constitutional Declaration 2011,” Egypt State Information Service, 30 March 2011. 
http://www.egypt.gov.eg/english/laws/constitution/default.aspx 
“Decree--law n° 2011-14 dated 23 March 2011, relating to the provisional organization of the public authorities,” 
World Intellectual Property Organization, http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=245403  
“Tunisia’s Constitution of 2014,” Constitute Project. 14 January 2014. 
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Tunisia_2014.pdf 
3 
power of constitutional review.  This activity favored an ideology of legal positivism among 
Tunisian judges, political parties and civil society.  In Egypt, the Supreme Constitutional Court 
exercised constitutional review.  This activity favored an ideology of new constitutionalism 
among Egyptian judges, political parties and civil society.  After the 2011 revolutions, the 
drafting bodies had to consider these ideas when deciding what powers to grant the courts during 
the transition.  Tunisian legal positivism had implications for how actors interpreted the 
transitional situation.  The constitution could be suspended.  It also implied that courts would 
remain outside of the political process of drafting a new constitution.  Egyptian new 
constitutionalism stressed the status of the constitution as a higher law that could not be 
suspended.  It also implied a role for the judiciary as a political arbiter.  Hossam Bahgat and 
Soha Abdelaty’s acceptance of legal continuity and Habib Koubaa’s acceptance of a “political 
void” are examples of the force of such ideas.   
The conclusion in favor of the judicial role hypothesis has implications for the role that 
courts might play in democratization.  Like the categorization of cases as military, single party or 
personalist regimes, a categorization based on ideas about the judicial role can give some 
indication of how the transition process is likely to unfold in a given country, even if it does not 
determine the success or failure of democratization5.  The dissertation argues that ideas about the 
judicial role are not reducible to other factors.  This argument counters two alternative ways of 
characterizing the relationship between the judiciary and broader transitional politics.  The first 
alternative is that the judicial powers can be explained only by political interests of power 
holders.   Contrary to this alternative argument, ideas about the judicial role are not produced by 
                                               
5 Geddes (2003), Bratton and Van de Walle (1994) 
4 
transitional politics but instead are relatively fixed6.  The second alternative is that the judiciary 
is simply the product of political development.  For Linz and Stepan, countries that have a well-
developed “legal society” have a better chance at democratization than those that do not7.  
However, Linz and Stepan cannot account for differences between national legal systems other 
than their extent of legal development.  The dissertation shows how one such difference, in 
conceptions of the judicial role, produced different results in Egypt and Tunisia.  
In the first section of the introduction, I look at different theoretical perspectives on 
judicial politics and transitions.  I narrow down the outcome of interest to the formal powers 
assigned to courts in Tunisia and Egypt after 2011.  In the second section, I present three 
explanations for this outcome, including the judicial role hypothesis described above.  In the 
third section, I describe the methodology that I use to test these explanations.   
 
2. Judicial Power in Transitions: Three Perspectives 
 
Three differences between the Egyptian and Tunisian cases suggest three possible 
explanations for the divergent outcomes.   
First, the transitional documents were drafted by two bodies, the Supreme Council of the 
Armed Forces (SCAF) in Egypt and the Ben Achour Commission in Tunisia, that had very 
different political interests.  The interests of the SCAF are countermajoritarian and the interests 
of the Ben Achour Commission are majoritarian.  Courts are countermajoritarian institutions 
because they are rarely elected and enforce a set of largely stable laws.  Constitutional review is 
particularly countermajoritarian because it can block actions by a majority in the legislature.  As 
                                               
6 Ginsburg (2003) argues that the composition of drafting bodies can explain the powers granted to constitutional 
courts in new democracies.  The past history of the judiciary and judicial ideology are largely irrelevant.  
7 Linz and Stepan (1996), Schmitter, O’Donnell and Whitehead (1986) 
5 
a result, the SCAF would favor strong courts and the Ben Achour Commission would favor weak 
courts.  This explanation assumes that political authorities can assign powers to courts at will, 
that the interests of the drafting bodies can be described as majoritarian or countermajoritarian 
and that these interests motivated the drafting bodies design of the courts.   
Second, the Egyptian and Tunisian constitutional courts exercised different forms of 
constitutional review.  The Egyptian SCC exercised a posteriori concrete review, while the 
Tunisian Constitutional Council exercised a priori abstract review.  Both forms of review can act 
as a countermajoritarian veto, but they have very different implications for relations between the 
courts and litigants.  Ordinary litigants could not bring cases to the Tunisian Constitutional 
Council.  On the other hand, the activism of the SCC before 2011 is largely the result of cases 
brought by ordinary litigants.  Moreover, litigants formed what Moustafa calls a ‘judicial support 
network’ of civil society organizations8.   
Third, the Egyptian and Tunisian constitutional courts had different levels of activity 
before 2011.  The Egyptian SCC was both more active, in terms of number of cases decided, and 
more assertive, in terms of the number of decisions issued against the government, than the 
Tunisian Constitutional Council.  This pattern might imply that law and courts are simply less 
important in Tunisia than in Egypt.  However, the activity of the Tunisian Administrative 
Tribunal both before and after 2011 argues against such a sweeping statement9.  The activity of 
the SCC and the inactivity of the Constitutional Council before 2011 might affect the outcome 
after 2011 by creating expectations of proper judicial behavior.  These expectations combine 
with legal theory to produce a conception of the judicial role that guides the drafting bodies 
design of the courts’ formal powers.   
                                               
8 Moustafa (2007), Epp (1998) 
9 Tribunal Administratif: Le nombre des affaires a evolue a 2694 contre 1965 en 2010” 
http://www.tunisienumerique.com/tribunal-administratif-le-nombre-des-affaires-a-presque-double-en-2011/57505 
6 
Each of these explanations has different implications for the role of courts in democratic 
transitions.  The countermajoritarian function can be a barrier to democratization or it can aid 
democratization by allaying the fears of old regime elite10.  This function is necessary for courts 
to enforce elite pacts, as the transitions literature suggests.  The second explanation is the most 
optimistic about the role of courts in democratization.  It argues that courts can only be effective 
if they have support from civil society, so courts are natural allies of both liberalization and 
democratization.  If the judicial role explanation is correct, courts either help or hinder 
democratization depending on how they conceive of their role.  In either case, actors must take 
into consideration ideas about the judicial role when designing the transitional institutions.  
Each explanation focuses on a specific actor: the drafting bodies (including the political 
forces that these bodies represent), civil society or the courts themselves.  At the broadest level, 
any actor could fall into at least one of these categories, and any explanation could fall into these 
three categories.  The dissertation narrows down these explanations, and excludes some 
variations on these explanations in the process.  In section 6, I derive a hypothesis from each of 
these three perspectives. 
 
3. Contributions 
 Beyond answering the question of why Tunisian and Egyptian courts had different formal 
powers, the dissertation looks at two broader issues.  First, the Tunisian and Egyptian cases 
suggest different roles that courts can play in democratization.  Second, the Tunisian and 
Egyptian cases are part of the larger context of constitutional change after the Arab Spring.   
 
 
Towards a Theory of Judicial Politics and Democratization 
                                               
10 Ginsburg (2003) 
7 
 
The rule of law upheld by an independent judiciary is an essential part of any 
consolidated democracy.  However, the legal institutions that support a consolidated democracy 
may not be the same as the legal institutions that can democratize an authoritarian regime or 
consolidate democracy during a period of transition.   
Scholars note the connection between the expansion of judicial review and democracy11.  
However, it is not clear whether strong courts cause democratization.  Ginsburg argues that 
governments empower courts to deal with the potential downsides of democracy12.  In other 
words, strong courts are a response to democratization.  Linz and Stepan suggest that courts aid 
democratization by brokering and enforcing elite pacts.  The South African Constitutional Court 
provides an example of this process.  It reviewed the 1994 draft constitution for compatibility 
with a set of principle agreed upon by the political parties earlier in the transition13. 
Strong courts might actually hinder democratic revolution.  The global expansion of 
judicial power has extended to authoritarian regimes, without democratizing these regimes14.  
The suspension of the old legal system is often necessary to deal with crimes committed under 
the old regime.  Transitional justice retroactively punishes acts that were not illegal under the old 
regime, and as a result poses a dilemma for the rule of law.  Transitional justice often occurs 
through exceptional institutions, which poses a threat to the established court system15.   
The outcomes of Tunisian and Egyptian cases - democratization and low judicial power 
in Tunisia, authoritarianism and high judicial power in Egypt - are an exception any theory 
                                               
11 Ackerman (1994), Shapiro (1992), Tate and Vallinder (1995) 
12 Ginsburg (2003) 
13 Linz and Stepan (1996), Gloppen (1997) 
14 The articles collected in Ginsburg and Moustafa (2008) and Ginsburg and Simpser (2012) outline the many ways 
that courts can buttress authoritarian regimes. 
15 Teitel (2000), Radbruch (2006) 
8 
connecting democracy to strong courts.  The processes that led to these outcomes provide further 
opportunities to study the roles that courts might play in democratization.  Depending on which 
hypothesis is correct, it is possible that courts could broker elite pacts or that they could alleviate 
the elite’s fears of democratization.  It is also possible that the existing court system could stand 
in the way of transitional justice or otherwise act to cement the old regime. 
 
Judicial Power in the Arab Spring 
 
Apart from Tunisia, the prospects for democratization or even liberalization after the 
Arab Spring are bleak.  Yet the prospects for the judicialization of politics, defined by the 
expanding formal powers and activity of constitutional courts, are looking brighter16.  The Arab 
Spring launched a wave of constitutional reform in countries, like Tunisia and Egypt, that 
experienced uprisings and regime change, as well as those that did not, like Morocco and Jordan.  
In all of these countries, the new constitutions grant greater powers to the constitutional court17.  
In Tunisia, Morocco and Jordan, it is too early to know whether the courts in these countries will 
exercise these new powers.  However, in Egypt, the Supreme Constitutional Court has used its 
powers in a series of crucially important judgements on the legitimacy of the parliament and the 
Constitutional Assembly.  Unfortunately this unprecedented exercise of judicial power occurred 
in the midst of the breakdown of Egyptian democracy.  Judging from the constitutions issued by 
                                               
16 Shapiro (1992) 
17 “Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt, 2014,” State Information Service. January 18, 2014. 
http://www.sis.gov.eg/Newvr/Dustor-en001.pdf  
“Tunisia’s Constitution of 2014,” Constitute Project. 14 January 2014. 
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Tunisia_2014.pdf 
“Law No. 15 of 2012 (Jordan) Issued on 16/06/2012 CONSTITUTIONAL COURT LAW,” Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan Constitutional Court,  
http://cco.gov.jo/en-us/documentsofthecourt/thelawoftheconstitutionalcourt.aspx 
“Morocco: Draft Text of the Constitution” tr. Jefri Ruchti in Ruchti (2011) 
9 
the kings of Morocco and Jordan and the Egyptian military, the rulers of these countries seem set 
to judicialize their regimes without democratizing them.  On the other hand, the suspension of 
constitutional review during the Tunisian transition was an attempt at democratization in the 
absence of judicial restraints.   
These outcomes are surprising because the assumed connection between democracy and 
courts, or more generally the rule of law, is cut.  These cases raise the question of what role 
constitutional courts and judicial might play in cementing authoritarian regimes.  An answer to 
the main question posed by the thesis - why Tunisian and Egyptian constitutional courts had 
different formal powers during the transition - would help answer the question of why the Arab 
Spring has seen an expansion of judicial power across these cases, even as authoritarian regimes 
have entrenched themselves in Morocco, Jordan and Egypt.    
  
4. The Tunisian and Egyptian Transitions 
 
From the beginning of the protests in Tunisia and Egypt, the protesters demanded the 
adoption of a new constitution.  As a result, law was at the center of the revolutions.  The cases 
followed parallel paths from 2011 to 2014.  In the first stage, in the spring of 2011, the drafting 
bodies issued interim constitutional documents outlining the powers of different state 
institutions, including courts.  In the second stage from 2011 to 2012, these institutions redefined 
their powers.  In the third stage in 2013, a political crisis forced the reorganization of the 
transitional institutions of both countries.  In the fourth stage in 2014, both countries adopted 
new constitutions.    
 The issue of courts was first addressed by the drafting bodies - the SCAF and the Ben 
Achour Commission - which were charged with designing the transitional institutions in the 
spring of 2011.  After the fall of Mubarak, the military originally hoped to organize quick 
10 
elections that would bring Omar Suleiman, Mubarak’s vice president, to power.  The protest 
movement rejected this plan, so the military convened the SCAF to govern the country until 
elections could be held.  The SCAF issued a Constitutional Proclamation calling for the election 
of a parliament and president and the drafting of a new constitution by a Constituent Assembly.  
The Proclamation confirmed the powers of the SCC and formed the basis of the SCC’s decisions 
during the transition18. 
Immediately after the fall of Ben Ali, Tunisia was governed by a transitional government 
headed by figures from the old regime.  The transitional government convened the Ben Achour 
Commission in response to the Kasbah protest movement.  The Commission brought together 
opposition parties and civil society figures with the sole purpose of designing the transitional 
institutions.  The Commission issued the transitional Decree on March 23, 2011.  The Decree 
called for the election of a National Assembly and dissolved most other state institutions, 
including the presidency, the parliament and the Constitutional Council19. 
The framework created by the SCAF and the Ben Achour Commission still allowed 
courts some opportunities to redefine their own formal powers.  The SCC issued decisions 
dissolving the House of Representatives and the Constituent Assembly on the grounds that their 
election was illegal.  Following the election of Muhammad Mursi in June 2012, the SCAF issued 
amendments to the Constitutional Proclamation, which gave the SCC control over its own 
appointments and gave it the power to review the draft constitution for conformity to “any 
                                               
18 “Constitutional Declaration 2011,” Egypt State Information Service, 30 March 2011. 
http://www.egypt.gov.eg/english/laws/constitution/default.aspx 
19 “Decree--law n° 2011-14 dated 23 March 2011, relating to the provisional organization of the public authorities,” 
World Intellectual Property Organization, http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=245403 
11 
principle agreed upon in all of Egypt’s past constitutions.”20  Mursi responded by issuing his own 
decrees annulling the SCAF’s amendments and insulating the Constituent Assembly and the 
president from constitutional review until the adoption of a final constitution.  The SCC resisted 
these measures until a compromise allowed the adoption of the new constitution in December 
201221. 
In Tunisia, the first phase of the transition, from the election of the Assembly in October 
2011 through the spring of 2013, saw the Administrative Tribunal rise to prominence.  The 
Tribunal is the highest public law court in Tunisia charged with reviewing the legality of 
government acts.  The Tribunal ruled against the Troika government on a large number of 
cases22.  However, this activity did not lead the Tribunal to claim a formal power of 
constitutional review.   
Both Tunisia and Egypt went through a crisis in the summer of 2013.  In spring 2013, the 
Mursi government considered legislation to reform the judiciary, which the opposition believed 
would threaten judicial independence.  The Tamarod protest movement organized protests to call 
for Mursi’s resignation, culminating in the June 30, 2013 protests23.  The military removed Mursi 
from office on July 3, and General Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi seized control of the government.  The 
                                               
20 “English Text of SCAF Amended Constitutional Declaration,” Al-Ahram, 18 June 2012. 
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/45350/Egypt/Politics-/URGENT-English-text-of-SCAF-amended-
Constitutional.aspx 
21 “English text of President Morsi’s new Egypt Constitutional Declaration.” Ahram Online, 12 August 2012. 
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/140/50248/Egypt/First--days/English-text-of-President-Morsis-new-
Egypt-Constit.aspx 
“English Text of Morsi’s Constitutional Declaration.” Ahram Online, 22 November 2012. 
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/58947/Egypt/Politics-/English-text-of-Morsis-Constitutional-
Declaration-.aspx 
22 “Tribunal Administratif: Le nombre des affaires a evolue a 2694 contre 1965 en 2010” 
http://www.tunisienumerique.com/tribunal-administratif-le-nombre-des-affaires-a-presque-double-en-2011/57505 
Interviews with Hichem Hammi, Mohamed Bennour, Samir Taieb, Fatma Bouraoui and Walid ben Omrane. 
http://www.lapresse.tn/18042015/80788/des-decisions-inconstitutionnelles.html for further information about the 
number of cases decided by the Tribunal. 
23 Sabry, Bassem. “Eight Questions on ‘Purging’ Egypt’s Judiciary,” Al-Monitor April 23, 2013. http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/04/eight-questions-purging-egyptian-judiciary.html# 
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SCC endorsed these moves, and Adly Mansour, the president of the SCC, served as interim 
president until Sisi was formally elected in June 201424.   
The Arrahil protest movement called for the resignation of the Troika government, the 
dissolution of the Assembly and the drafting of a new constitution by a council of experts.  The 
National Dialogue Quartet - the Union Generale des Travailleurs Tunisiens (UGTT), the Union 
Generale de la Commerce et de l’Artisanat (UTICA), the Organisation Nationale des Avocats 
Tunisiens (ONAT), and the Ligue Tunisienne des Droits de l’Homme (LTDH) - formed to 
mediate these disputes.  The parties agreed on a compromise.  The Troika resigned and was 
replaced by the technocratic government of Mehdi Jomaa.  The Assembly remained in place and 
drafted a new constitution. 
By 2014, both countries adopted new constitutions, bringing the transitions to a close.  In 
Egypt, Sisi convened a council of experts to draft a new constitution, which was adopted in 
2014.  The new constitution confirmed the extensive powers of the SCC25.  In Tunisia, the 
Assembly adopted the new constitution on January 14, 2014.  The 2014 Constitution called for 
the creation of a new constitutional court exercising a posteriori concrete review.  However, the 
creation of this institution was delayed by disputes over the Supreme Council of the Judiciary.  
In the interim, the constitution created a special non judicial body - the Instance Provisoire pour 
le Controle Constitutionnel des Projets de Loi (IPCCPL) - to exercise a priori review of 
legislation26. 
 
 
                                               
24 “Profile: Interim Egyptian President Adly Mansour,” BBC, 4 July, 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
middle-east-23176293 
25 Muhammad Mansour, “Members of Constitutional Committee of 50 Announced,” Egypt Independent, 1 
September 2013.  http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/members-constitutional-committee-50-announced 
26 “Tunisia’s Constitution of 2014,” Constitute Project. 14 January 2014. 
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Tunisia_2014.pdf 
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5. Theories of Judicial Power in Transitions  
 
 The transitions literature suggests that the role of courts in democratization is a unique 
topic distinct from the study of courts in consolidated democracies.  However, the exact role that 
courts might play in transitions is under theorized in this literature, and the conclusions of this 
literature may not apply to the Tunisian and Egyptian cases.  The judicial politics literature 
provides several models of judicial behavior, judicial power and relations between courts and 
political authorities that can be imported to the study of transitions. 
 
The Judiciary in Transitions 
 
 The transitions literature recognizes that different regime types have different odds of 
successful democratization.  These regime types often imply a status for courts.  For example, 
Linz introduces a distinction between totalitarian and post-totalitarian regimes27.  Totalitarian 
regimes are defined by the control of the regime over all institutions and all areas of life.  
Independent courts are impossible in such a situation.  Totalitarian regimes are also less likely to 
democratize successfully.  Post-totalitarian regimes are defined by the presence of some 
institutions that are beyond the control of the regime, perhaps including courts.  Neo-patrimonial 
regimes are defined by an absence of strong institutions, including courts.  They are also least 
likely to democratize.  Bratton and Van de Walle contrast these regimes with the corporatist 
regimes of Latin America and Southern Europe28.  In these examples, the presence of strong 
courts is one aspect of the regime types that are most likely to democratize, but there is no reason 
to believe that courts cause these outcomes.  Courts form part of the institutional background of 
                                               
27 Linz (2000) 
28 Bratton and Van de Walle (1994) 
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some regimes, but their role in the actual transitional period is minimal.  On the other hand, 
O’Donnell emphasizes the rule of law as an aspect of the consolidation of democracy or of the 
quality of democracy.  Ginsburg interprets constitutional courts as a means of guaranteeing 
minority interests during a transition to democracy.  In both of these perspectives, courts become 
relevant only after the transition to electoral democracy29.   
Studies of the process of democratization suggest some role for courts in successful 
democratization.  Linz and Stepan argue that democratization depends on the negotiation and 
maintenance of an elite pact.  Courts can broker and enforce elite pacts, although many other 
actors could do so too30.  Another means that courts might influence transitional politics is 
through the process of constitutions drafting, which accompanies many but not all transitions.  
The authors of national constitutions claim to act in the name of the people, but in practice courts 
are needed to interpret and elaborate the constitution after it is adopted.  In some cases, courts 
have themselves been involved in drafting constitutions or in supervising constitutional 
amendments during transitions.  The South African Constitutional Court reviewed the 1994 draft 
constitution.  The Conseil d’Etat, the highest public law court in France, was largely responsible 
for drafting the 1958 constitution31.   
This pathway raises two questions.  Does the process of constitution drafting matter for 
democratization?  Do courts matter for the process of constitution drafting?  To answer these 
questions, it is necessary to develop a theory of the status of courts in the regime and a theory of 
judicial power.  The next two sections deal with these issues in the context of the Tunisian and 
Egyptian cases. 
 
                                               
29 O’Donnell (2010), Ginsburg (2003) 
30 Stepan in O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead (1986) 
31 Duverger (1958), Gloppen (1997) 
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Constitutional Authoritarianism 
 
 Moustafa argues that the Egyptian revolution was “defined by a struggle over constitution 
and the rule of law….this intense focus on law and legal institutions is a legacy of the prominent 
role that law plays in maintaining authoritarian rule in Mubarak’s Egypt.”32  Writing in 2011, 
Moustafa was cautiously optimistic that this legacy could result in democratization.  Events since 
then confirm Moustafa’s claim that law, courts and the constitution would play a central role in 
Egypt’s transition, but they also show the challenges of this legacy.  I develop a category of 
constitutional authoritarian regimes that generalizes the characteristics identified by Moustafa in 
Egypt to a broader range of cases. 
Both Egypt and Tunisia are examples of constitutional authoritarian regimes.  The 
category has two defining characteristics: the regime must write the constitution, and a 
constitutional court must have the power to interpret the constitution.  I contrast constitutional 
authoritarian regimes with two other ideal types: exceptional regimes and non-constitutional 
regimes.  Constitutional authoritarian regimes challenge the assumptions of the transitions about 
how courts are likely to behave during an era of democratization. 
 Constitutional authoritarian regimes differ from non-constitutional regimes in that they 
have written constitutions and constitutional court with the power to interpret the constitution.  
The constitutional court is not necessarily important or powerful in such regimes.  In such 
regimes, inactive constitutional courts like the Tunisian Constitutional Council are probably 
more common than active constitutional courts like the SCC.  The categorization is more about 
ideology than institutions.  Despite the global consensus in favor of constitutional review, non-
constitutional regimes have declined to create even a facade constitutional court.  Constitutional 
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authoritarian regimes are open to international models of constitutional review.  The act of 
drafting a constitution and creating a constitutional court is best understood as an attempt to 
institutionalize the regime for the long term, not a step towards democratization.      
Constitutional authoritarian regimes differ from exceptional regimes in that the regime 
has written the constitution and guided the development of the legal system.  The categorization 
is also more about constitutional history than the text of the constitution.  Certain regions - those 
with little history of democratic rule and relatively recent independence from colonial rule - are 
more likely to contain regimes that meet these conditions33.     
The characteristics of constitutional authoritarian regimes pose several problems for the 
transitions paradigm relating to sequencing, the mode of constitution drafting, and the role of 
courts in transitional politics.  The transitions paradigm envisions a sequence of opening or 
liberalization, elite pact and constitution drafting34.  Tunisia and Egypt had been liberalizing for 
decades without democratizing.  The popular uprisings forced the drafting of a new constitution 
before an elite pact could be negotiated.  The transitions literature deemphasizes constitution 
drafting as a means of democratization.  The constitutional framework of these regime may 
require more reworking than the transitions paradigm envisions.  Of course, many of the classic 
cases of the transitions literature did write new constitutions.  What is necessary in constitutional 
authoritarian regimes is not just a new constitutional text, but an era of extra-constitutional rule, 
in which the state institutions can be rearranged.  The Assembly system or revolutionary rupture 
fulfills this requirement, but the Convention system or legal continuity does not.  In the 
                                               
33 Whether a country has a previous era of democratic constitutional rule can be a difficult question to answer.  
Egypt is the paradigmatic constitutional authoritarian regime, but even in that case there are some deviations from 
the type.  Egypt did have a brief era of liberal constitution drafting that resulted in the 1921 constitution, although 
Egypt was never a consolidated democracy.  Nineteen years of non-constitutional rule under Nasser marks a break 
in Egypt’s constitutional development.  Turkey had periods of democratic rule, but only in the context of the 
military-drafted constitutions of 1960 and 1982. 
34 Schmitter, O’Donnell and Whitehead (1986) 
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transitions literature, courts form part of the class of institutions that can broker elite pacts and 
guarantee their enforcement.  In constitutional authoritarian regimes, courts are part of the 
regime and their willingness to broker such agreements cannot be assumed. 
In constitutional authoritarian regimes, the source of judicial power is a key question for 
democratization.  If courts act as agents of the regime, they would oppose democratization.  
However, the liberalized aspect of such regimes and the possibility of popular contestation 
through legal means give courts other avenues to act in support of democratization.  A closer 
look at the sources of judicial power is necessary to determine how courts are likely to act in 
democratizing constitutional authoritarian regime.  The next section looks at theories of judicial 
power that may help answer this question. 
 
Judicial Power 
  
 Past decades have seen a renewed interest in the study of judicial power, founded on the 
belief that the political role of law and courts has expanded into new policy areas in established 
democracies and into authoritarian regimes that were previously hostile to law.  Tate and 
Vallinder’s The Global Expansion of Judicial Power sums up this trend.  Scholars have 
suggested several explanations for this process of judicialization.  These theories may focus on 
relations among state actors, the role of courts in policing bureaucracies, the expansion of civil 
society legal activism and the legal profession, ideas about the judicial role.  I draw on these 
theories in formulating the hypotheses addressed by the dissertation. 
 One prominent school of thought attributes the existence of strong judicial institutions to 
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the fragmentation of political authority35.  The more divided power is among different political 
factions or branches of government, the smaller the risk of retaliation by political authorities 
against judges and the greater the scope for judicial assertiveness.  This theory can apply to 
liberalized authoritarian regimes, transitional regimes and democracies.  Ginsburg argues that 
during the founding of new democracies in Asia, parties that held only a tenuous majority 
created strong constitutional courts as a way to entrench their preferred policies.  Helmke applies 
this approach to Argentina to explain the assertiveness of the country’s courts during times of 
political instability as the country transitioned from authoritarian rule.   
 Peerenboom, Landry, and Rosberg compare courts to other means of control available to 
authoritarian regimes36.  In the cases of China and Egypt, courts have gained importance as other 
means of control, such as party organizations or the Chinese system of complaints and petitions 
have declined.  One of the prerequisites of a functioning court is independence from the parties 
whose disputes it adjudicates.  In disputes between private citizens, authoritarian regimes can 
guarantee this sort of independence as well as democracies.  Even in disputes between a private 
citizen and the state, authoritarian regimes may still provide a fair trial in situations where the 
actions of a state agent are at odds with the will of the leadership of the regime as expressed by 
the law.  Typically, authoritarian regimes maintain broad emergency powers or, as in the case of 
Egypt, a parallel system of military courts to limit the scope of judicial independence.   
 In The Rights Revolution, Charles Epp argues that the expansion of the judicial power 
into new policy areas is closely tied to the rise of rights litigation.  Rights litigation depends on a 
judicial support structure of civil society groups and lawyers who use courts to achieve their 
goals.  The rights revolution required an independent judiciary with the power of constitutional 
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36 Peerenboom (2002), Landry in Ginsburg and Moustafa (2008), Rosberg (1995).   
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review as a prerequisite, but only the growth of the judicial support structure made it possible for 
individuals to claim their rights in court.  The growth of a judicial support structure is a process 
that takes a long time to unfold because it depends on the institutionalization of civil society 
groups and the rise of repeat player litigants.  Epp’s concern is with the expansion of judicial 
power into new issue areas, such as police procedure, women’s rights or workplace safety, not 
the high politics of the Supreme Court and the President.  In the United States, the Supreme 
Court has always been the final arbiter of constitutional disputes among the branches of 
government, but it is only after the rights revolution that its power has extended to a wide range 
of policy areas37. 
 Works on the rule of law in the Middle East, especially Egypt, have emphasized the 
growth of a professional judiciary as the prerequisite for judicial power.  Ziadeh argues that 
Western legal training and the development of the legal profession as the basis for rule of law in 
Egypt.  The traditionalism of the Islamic shariah and the lack of professional organization for the 
ulema preventing the rule of law from taking hold in Egypt before the introduction of Western 
models.  The autonomy of professional organizations for judges and lawyers were threatened by 
Nasser’s party state, as was Egypt’s orientation towards Western culture.  Reid makes a similar 
argument about other about other Arab countries.  The liberal age of the Arab World in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was a good environment for the development of the 
legal profession and the judiciary.  This development was cut short by the rise of Arab 
nationalism in the middle of the twentieth century.  Nathan Brown’s The Rule of Law in the Arab 
World draws on this tradition and updates it to take into account Egypt’s liberalization since 
197038.  For Brown, the Egyptian judiciary owes its existence to the ambitions of the country’s 
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rulers towards centralization and modernization, but the judiciary has become genuinely 
independent and can impose at least modest restraints on the regime. 
 A comparison between American constitutional review and the thought of Hans Kelsen, 
architect of Europe’s first constitutional court, shows how different theories of the judicial role 
can result in different powers for constitutional courts.  Kelsen as concerned with limiting 
judicial power as they were with subordinating the executive and legislative branches to 
constitutional review.  As Kelsen argues, the design of the Austrian constitutional court must 
take into consideration the hierarchical nature of the judiciary in civil law countries39.  A system 
that, as in the United States, gave the power of constitutional review to all courts, included 
fundamental rights as a grounds for constitutional review and included the constitutional court as 
part of the judicial branch would give judges too much power, while at the same time politicizing 
the judiciary.  Kelsen made sure that the Austrian constitutional court was insulated from the 
ordinary judiciary.  These measures were intended to ensure that the Court acted as a neutral 
mediator among other state institutions, not as a representative of an independent judicial power.    
 In “Origins of Positive Judicial Independence” and Judges beyond Politics in Democracy 
and Dictatorship, Hilbink argues argues that ideas about the judicial role as well as the internal 
organization of the judiciary can account for variation in judicial activism across cases40.  In the 
Chilean case, the centralization of power in the hands of senior judges, who controlled decisions 
regarding the promotion of junior judges, made the Chilean judiciary independent of other 
branches of government.  However, this independence did not translate into judicial activism 
either during or after the Pinochet period because of the conservative views of senior judges and 
a judicial ideology that stressed a strict separation of judging from politics.  In contrast, the 
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diffusion of ideas drawn from the new constitutionalism to the Spanish judiciary made them 
more likely to challenge the Franco regime. 
 
Outcomes: Power and Formal Powers 
 
 The description above show that, in addition to disagreeing about the origins of judicial 
power, authors can also conceive of the outcome of judicial empowerment in quite different 
terms.  Some authors define it as the formal powers enumerated in constitutions, as the 
willingness to challenge political authorities, or as the extension of judicial decision making to 
new policy areas.  Of these conceptions, formal powers is the most useful for the Egyptian and 
Tunisian cases and for the study of the questions raised above. 
Dahl’s definition of power as the ability of one actor to compel another is difficult to 
apply to courts41.  The US Supreme Court claims to have this sort of judicial power; it is the head 
of an autonomous branch of government with the power to check the actions of the other 
branches.  The subordination of all branches of government to the constitution, as interpreted by 
the Supreme Court, is at the center of American constitutionalism and the rule of law.  The 
power of Supreme Court to compel other actors should manifest itself most clearly in periods of 
constitutional crisis such as Watergate, when the Supreme Court asserted its power against the 
president’s claim of executive prerogative in United States v. Nixon.  Yet this example also 
shows the weaknesses of this conception of judicial power.  Watergate was a highly exceptional 
situation which may reveal little about the operation of judicial power in other situations.  
Moreover, the Supreme Court clearly had the backing of Congress, public opinion, and a host of 
other actors in its confrontation with the president.  Empirical studies of constitutional courts 
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often find that they challenge power holders only when they have the backing of powerful 
opposition parties or the support of public opinion42. 
Given these problems, it makes sense to focus on the formal powers of courts rather than 
on their power to compel other actors.  Formal powers are enumerated in constitutional 
documents and are easy to observe.  The question to be answered by the hypotheses is not why 
the courts act or not, but why other actors assigned such different formal powers to the 
constitutional courts in Tunisia and Egypt.  The question of constitutional review has come up 
more than once in each of the countries, although the initial decision to either retain or abolish 
the constitutional court in 2011 certainly shaped later decisions.  In Tunisia, the Ben Achour 
Commission made the first decision to dissolve the Constitutional Council and establish the 
Assembly system.  Once the Assembly was in session, it could have recreated the Constitutional 
Council through an organic law.  It could also have granted a power of constitutional review to 
the Administrative Tribunal.  Since the adoption of the 2014 constitution, the Assembly has 
granted a limited power of constitutional review to the IPCCPL.  At each of these junctions, 
political authorities limited the formal powers of Tunisian courts.  In Egypt, the SCAF confirmed 
the powers of the SCC in the Constitutional Proclamation of 2011.  It added to these powers 
through the June 2012 amendments to the Proclamation.  The 2012 constitution drafted by the 
Mursi government confirmed the powers of the SCC.  At each of these junctions, political 
authorities either maintained or increased the formal powers of the SCC.   
Each of the hypotheses highlights one important difference between Egypt and Tunisia 
that might lead the authors of the transitional constitutional documents to grant different formal 
powers to the constitutional court.   
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6. Hypotheses 
 
 
Hypothesis 1: Majoritarian and Counter-majoritarian Interests 
 The constitutional decree, which governed the Egyptian transition from February 2011 
until the adoption of a new constitution in November 2012 was issued by an actor, the military, 
which feared majority rule.  According to this hypothesis, the SCAF wanted to give the SCC 
extensive powers so that it could check the actions of the elected parliament and president. 
The failure of opponents of majority rule to institute similar measures in Tunisia can be 
attributed to the strength of Tunisian political parties during the transition and to the weakness of 
the Tunisian military and other institutions of the old regime.  The coalition of political parties 
and civil society groups represented by the Ben Achour Commission, favored the establishment 
of a National Assembly with both the power to legislate and to draft a constitution.  Supporters 
of the old regime remain a potent force in Tunisia, but they are led by political parties grouped in 
the Nidaa Tounes coalition, not by the military.  Like Egypt, the pre-2011 Tunisian regime was 
dominated by a ‘repressive apparatus,’ the collection of military, police, secret police, and 
intelligence agencies charged with regime security.  However, Tunisia’s repressive apparatus 
differed greatly from Egypt’s military43.  The secret police lacked the popular legitimacy of the 
Egyptian or Tunisian military, and, as a secret organization, it lacked the corporate identity that 
allowed the military to intervene in politics as an institution.    
 
Hypothesis 2: Civil Society and Judicial Support Networks  
 The constitutional courts of Tunisia and Egypt were based on different models.  The SCC 
resembles the constitutional courts of Germany and Austria, which have several defining 
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features: the court can both hear appeals of concrete cases and answer petitions brought by the 
president or other officials concerning the constitutionality of legislation.  The Tunisian 
Constitutional Council is modelled after the French Constitutional Council.  In the French model, 
the Council exercises only abstract review of legislation.  It can review legislation only at the 
request of government officials, not through appeal of cases from lower courts, and only before 
the law has been promulgated.  
As a result of these institutional differences, the SCC is able to interact with civil society 
in a way that the Tunisian Constitutional Council could not.  During the Mubarak period, the 
SCC was at the center of what Moustafa calls a ‘judicial support network’ of NGO’s, opposition 
parties and reformist lawyers who saw constitutional litigation as a means of challenging the 
regime44.   
The support that the SCC enjoys from civil society may be crucial for its continued 
influence during the transition.  The decision of the SCAF to include the SCC in the 
constitutional decree is a concession to a broad group of civil society actors that support 
constitutional review.  Such a concession would gain at least some support for the SCAF and 
provide a forum, the courts, where civil society could air its grievances with relatively little 
danger to the core interests of the military.   
Tunisia had a strong civil society and a constitutional court during the Ben Ali period.  
However, its constitutional court was limited to abstract review of legislation, it lacked strong 
connections with civil society that would produce judicial power.  In Tunisia, legal activism had 
to focus on other avenues, including the Administrative Tribunal, the highest court dealing with 
disputes between citizens and the state in Tunisia. Administrative courts are intended to check 
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from serving as a check on democratic rule, courts depend on popular mobilization for their power. 
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abuses of state power, but they do not have the power to overturn laws.  As a result, the impact 
of even a powerful high administrative court is more limited than that of a powerful 
constitutional court.   
 
 
Hypothesis 3: The Judicial Role 
 The SCC decided more cases than the Tunisian Constitutional Council and it ruled 
against the government far more frequently.  The judicial role hypothesis argues that the formal 
powers of the courts after 2011 are the result of normative ideas about the judicial role, but these 
ideas in turn are the result of judicial activity in the decades before 2011.  The hypothesis posits 
a three step process from judicial practices before 2011 to ideas about the judicial role to formal 
powers after 2011.  A purely ideational argument would look at judicial ideology or popular 
opinion about the judicial role, but not judicial practices.   
 This hypothesis could be falsified by the total absence of one of the steps, or by a clear 
contradiction between ideas about the judicial role and the formal powers granted to courts.  The 
absence of such evidence does not exclude other explanations.  Each of the links in this three 
step process produces observable implications for the impact of judicial practice on ideas up until 
2011, the content of the transitional documents, and the activity of courts after 2011.    
The judicial role hypothesis assumes that courts act according to a logic of 
appropriateness, rather than a logic of consequentiality45.  For courts, the bounds of what is 
appropriate and what is feasible are closely related.  Unlike armies, political parties or trade 
unions, courts have few means of applying pressure46.  Moreover, judges are professionals who 
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46 Judges can persuade other actors to apply such pressure.  Egypt saw numerous popular protests in support of the 
judiciary both before and after 2011 for example.  Judges can also go on strike.  In Egypt, a strike was a serious 
threat because the absence of judicial supervision would make the election results invalid.  Still, this depends on a 
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gain their status from holding an office.  Their self interest is closely aligned with the standing of 
the judiciary as a whole.  As a result, judges believe that acting according to the judicial role is 
also in their own self interest.  In designing the formal powers of courts, the drafting bodies may 
act according to a logic of appropriateness or a logic of consequentiality that takes into account 
the limits that the judicial role imposes on the judiciary’s activity. 
 
 
7. Methodology 
 
The dissertation is a comparative study of qualitative data from within the two cases, 
Egypt and Tunisia.  I chose this approach over several alternatives, including a large-n study of 
all transitions, a different selection of cases or a most-similar case design.  The outcome - the 
formal powers of high courts - is fairly easy to measure across different cases.  However, the 
independent variables - interests of the drafting bodies, connections between the courts and civil 
society, and ideas about the judicial role - are harder to measure across different cases.  This 
makes it difficult to design a large-n study to determine which of these variables affects the 
outcome.   
Although there are many examples of transitions, the Arab Spring cases are the best to 
examine the specific problem of democratization in constitutional authoritarian regimes that I 
outlined above.  The cases are selected from a smaller population of transitions in constitutional 
authoritarian regimes.  A different selection of cases would not take into account the unique 
characteristics of this population.  Despite broad similarities between Egypt and Tunisia, there 
                                                                                                                                                       
belief that judicial supervision is essential for legitimate elections.  A judicial strike could make it difficult to 
maintain social order and resolve disputes.  However, the effects of a judicial strike are not as immediate as those of 
many other kinds of workers, such as transport workers, garbage collectors or police.  In Tunisia, the UGTT’s 
general strike proved more effective than any of the judicial strikes organized by the judicial syndicates, the SMT 
and AMT.  In Egypt, the disappearance of the police during the Mursi presidency made daily more difficult and 
dangerous in a way that a judicial strike never could.  Political authorities often resist implementing judicial 
decisions even in established democracies.  This problem was especially acute in both Tunisia and Egypt both 
before and after 2011. 
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are too many differences, such as different colonial legacies and different roles for the military, 
for a most similar case design47.  Testing the hypotheses requires gathering data from within each 
of the cases using interviews and written sources. 
 In the following sections, I look at different criteria for selecting cases.  I then outline the 
process of data collection from each of the cases. 
 
Case Selection: Judicial Power in Transitions 
 
Tunisia and Egypt since 2011 belong to a larger set of cases; they are examples of 
transitional regimes, situations where the basic structures of the regime are in flux.  Such periods 
are usually periods of constitutional politics, in which a new constitution is in the process of 
being written or an old constitution is being substantially revised.  The transition can also be 
thought of as a movement from one regime type to another or a period when the fundamental 
character of the regime is in doubt.  This intermediate phase can last anywhere from a few 
months to a few decades.  For example, Turkey and Pakistan have oscillated between democratic 
and authoritarian regimes for much of the last fifty years.  Uncertainty remains about the form 
that these countries’ regimes will take.  Other countries have had more clearly defined transitions 
from authoritarianism to democracy.  For example, the transitions in most Central European 
countries lasted only a few years after 1989.  By the middle of the 1990’s, these countries had 
finished the process of constitutional reform and had already gone through several competitive 
elections. 
The category of transitional regimes is not the same as hybrid regimes or competitive 
authoritarianism.  What is important is uncertainty about the constitutional structure of the 
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regime, not its combination of democratic and nondemocratic elements.  Many hybrid regimes 
have shown themselves to be quite stable.  For example, Iran has retained its system of an 
elected president and an unelected Supreme Leader since 1979.  For decades before 2011, Egypt 
had combined relatively free elections for parliament with an essentially unelected executive. 
Several authors have produced lists of transitional regimes, usually in the context of a 
measure of democracy.  Using an ordinal scale, such as the Polity score, and coding any country 
that passes through or near zero, would not be appropriate for this study because such a list 
would include hybrid and competitive authoritarian regimes as well.  It would also exclude 
transitions from one kind of authoritarianism to another.  More suitable would be Gasiorowski’s 
Political Regime Change dataset, which explicitly attempts to limit the universe to countries that 
have transitioned from one of four regime types, democracy, authoritarianism, semi-democracy 
(competitive authoritarianism) and transitional democracy or Geddes, Wright and Frantz’s 
Autocratic Regime Data, which includes a coding of all regimes since 1945 as democratic or as 
one of several varieties of authoritarianism.  Like the Political Regime Change dataset, this data 
has the advantage of identifying authoritarian to authoritarian regime changes.  Their data 
include 340 observations of regime change since 194548.      
Judicial power in these transitions can be gauged by looking at a constitutional court’s de 
jure powers.  A court’s de jure powers, may be reduced, kept the same, or expanded during a 
transition.  A numerical scale could give zero, one or two points for each of these scenarios 
respectively.  The SCC has taken on additional powers since the beginning of the transition.  The 
South African Constitutional Court’s power to rule on the validity of the draft constitution is an 
example of another kind of extraordinary power granted to a constitutional court for a limited 
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time during a transition.  The Tunisian Constitutional Council’s powers were completely 
eliminated.  During most transitions, the constitutional court has retained its de jure powers.  
Most transitions in Latin America have not coincided with the drafting of a new constitution.  As 
a result, the de jure powers of the court, which are defined in the constitution, remained the 
same.   
 The literature on transitions attributes an important role to the judiciary in liberalizing 
authoritarian regimes and consolidating emerging democracies.  The transitions literature 
assumes that an active judiciary will help a transitional regime move towards democracy49.  In 
fact, courts have played varying roles in transitions.  Some have exercised high levels of judicial 
power.  In South Africa, the constitutional court rejected the first draft of the constitution.  In 
Hungary, the parliament created a new constitutional court in the early stages of the transition, 
which quickly began overruling legislation.  In Pakistan, the Supreme Court and the lawyers 
movement has been a major force in politics as the country has transitioned from military rule.  
The Turkish constitutional court has played a prominent role in the serial crises that have 
accompanied the country’s transitions between military and civilian rule.  Other transitional 
regimes have had inactive courts.  Hilbink highlights the surprising lack of judicial activism in 
Chile during and after the Pinochet years.  After World War II, the constitutional courts of 
Germany and Italy rapidly rose to prominence as democracy was consolidated in these countries.  
In Japan, a constitutional court was established in 1947, but it was notoriously inactive during 
the first decades of Japanese democracy.  In most of the Eastern European transitions occurred in 
countries that did not have constitutional courts or whose constitutional courts had only been 
recently established.  With the exception of Hungary, courts established in these countries since 
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1989 have been slow to exercise their authority50.  Tunisia is particularly pronounced case of low 
judicial power.  The situation of Tunisia, where the Constitutional Council was consciously 
dissolved, is rare.  More common are cases where a constitutional court did exist, but was largely 
inactive during the transition.   
These data are sufficient to gain a general understanding of the level of judicial power in 
the universe of cases.  Ginsburg suggests that constitutional courts can have either a high activity 
or a low activity equilibrium51.  If Ginsburg is correct then the distribution of judicial power in 
the universe of cases would be bimodal.  Tunisia is an example of the low activity equilibrium.  
Egypt is an example of the high activity equilibrium.  It is likely that the low activity equilibrium 
is more common.  The data overestimate the importance of the low activity equilibrium.  
Chronically unstable countries produce more transitions and thus more observations.  Some 
countries experienced many transitions within a short period of time, such as Benin in the 1960’s 
or Syria in the 1950’s.  These separate observations could be considered part of a single era of 
transition.  On the other hand, the literature focuses disproportionately on cases of high activity.  
Many of the cases in which judicial activism has not been studied would be examples of weak 
judicial power because courts that played an important role in transitional politics would be more 
likely to attract scholarly attention.  However, there are enough examples of the high equilibrium 
in the literature to show that this outcome is not simply an outlier.  The Egyptian case is 
representative of this larger phenomenon.   
 Egypt and Tunisia are extreme cases in that they represent very high and very low levels 
of judicial power in transitional regimes52.  The de jure suspension of judicial review in Tunisia 
makes it a case of very low judicial power.  In the scale described above, Tunisia would receive 
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zero points because the constitutional court was suspended de jure and thus was unable to 
exercise any influence on the transition.  The prominent role of the Egyptian SCC, culminating 
in the interim presidency of Adly Mansur, is also unusual.  Using the scale described above, 
Egypt would receive full points because its constitutional court was granted additional powers 
during the transition and it made extensive use of these powers.  Tunisia and Egypt fall in the 
extremes of the range of judicial power in transitional regimes, but neither case is unique in its 
level of judicial power 
Each case is puzzling on its own, even without the comparison between the two, and a 
single extreme case can be used to generate hypotheses.  A paired comparison of these two cases 
can be used to generate generalizable hypotheses.  A hypothesis generated by a study of these 
cases could be tested using a broader range of cases, including those discussed above.  It can also 
be tested using additional data from within the Tunisian and Egyptian cases.  Each of the 
hypotheses has implications in a number of areas including the timing of constitutional court 
decisions, the procedural history of decisions, the activity of lower courts, and the positions of 
judges, political parties, lawyers and civil society on the question of constitutional review.   
 
Case Selection: Transitional Models and Constitutional Authoritarianism 
 
Tunisia and Egypt after 2011 can each be seen as a typical case of two different models 
for democratization: revolutionary rupture and legal continuity.  These models are reflected in 
the form of constitution drafting adopted by each country.  Revolutionary rupture takes the form 
of constitution drafting by a sovereign legislative-constituent assembly.  Legal continuity may 
take a variety of institutional forms.  A special constitutional convention may operate alongside 
existing institutions.  A country may amend its constitution through ordinary procedures rather 
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than writing a new constitution. These cases are selected as too examples of these models, not as 
examples of high and low judicial power.  Many countries have gone through transitions that 
correspond to these models.   
To qualify as an example of revolutionary rupture, a country must suspend its 
constitution and draft a new one through a special legislative-constituent assembly.  Blount, 
Elkins and Ginsburg list five constitutional design processes: constituent assembly (what I refer 
to as the convention model - the constituent assembly has no legislative powers), constituent 
legislating assembly (what I refer to as the assembly model), constituent legislature, executive, 
and other.  For the purposes of this study, the constituent legislature approximates the assembly 
model because the parliament wields both legislative and constituent powers.  Of the cases listed 
by Blount, Elkins and Ginsburg, 204 are examples of the assembly model (26 constituent 
legislating assembly and 178 constituent legislature), 103 are examples of the convention model 
(constituent assembly), and 104 fall into other categories53. 
Why study judicial power in the context of each of these two models for the transitional 
regimes?  Both models agree that law and courts are essential to the transition.  However, they 
have different explanations of what courts should do during the transition.  The legal continuity 
models rests on the assumption that a legal system inherited from the old regime can help the 
democratization process.  The revolutionary rupture assumes that the legal order can be 
suspended without the country falling into anarchy.  Both of these assumptions are problematic.  
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Each assumption may hold in certain conditions but not in others.  As described above, Tunisia 
and Egypt are examples of a certain set of conditions typical of liberalized authoritarian regimes.  
Such a study focuses on processes as much as outcomes.  Both of the models depend on these 
processes unfolding in a particular way.  In contrast, the first approach assumes that high levels 
of democracy will go along with high levels of judicial power, without deciding on an 
explanation for why they are connected.  A small-n study of two cases can show whether these 
processes are taking place.   
Why focus on the Arab Spring out of all of these cases?  Other waves of democratization 
in other regions have included examples of each model.  For example, Arato divides the Eastern 
European transitions into examples of legal continuity and revolutionary rupture54.  Each wave of 
democratization occurs in a specific time period and region.  The Mubarak and Ben Ali regimes 
are examples of constitutional authoritarianism.  Both regimes created constitutional courts and 
made widespread use of ordinary courts.  Such regimes differ from both the post-totalitarian 
regimes of Eastern Europe, which did not have legal opposition parties or constitutional courts.  
They also differ from the exceptional military regimes of Latin America, which typically 
suspended existing civilian institutions and justified themselves only as “transitional powers.”55  
A comparison of Tunisia in 2011 and Hungary in 1989 for example, or a large-n study of all of 
the transitions listed by Blount, Elkins and Ginsburg could not answer these questions.      
 
 
Testing Hypotheses: Interviews and Written Sources 
 
 I conducted fieldwork in Tunisia and Egypt in the 2014-2015 academic year with judges, 
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lawyers and political party representatives.  In the interviews with Tunisian political party 
representatives, I asked about their stances on the dissolution of the Constitutional Council, 
interim constitutional review by the Administrative Tribunal and the IPCCPL, and the formal 
powers of the new Constitutional Court described in the 2014 Constitution.  Some of the 
interviews also addressed specific issues such as the removal of sitting judges by the Minister of 
Justice Noureddine Bhiri in 2012.  In the interviews with Tunisian legal professionals, I asked 
the same questions about interim constitutional review.  I also asked about issues such as the 
Assembly’s mandate, interactions between the courts and civil society, and the resolution of 
electoral disputes by the Administrative Tribunal.  The interview with Egyptian lawyer Ahmed 
Eid focused on the design of the Egyptian legal system and Mr. Eid’s perception of different 
parts of the court system.  The interviews are listed in the appendix. 
 Written sources supplement the interviews.  The positions of political parties can also be 
found in written sources such as platforms, or in op-eds by political figures56. 
 Written sources are also an independent source of data.  Constitutions, transitional 
documents and judicial decisions trace the basic outline of the transitions.  The transitional 
documents include the outcome of interest - the formal powers of courts - but also a variety of 
other information about the transitional regime.  The timing of these documents is often of 
critical importance.  Taken together, these data can be used to build a narrative about the 
transitions.  These documents are usually readily available57.  These documents are 
supplemented by the writings of judges and legal professionals.  Judges write academic works 
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and commentary on cases, as well as op-eds in newspapers58. 
 
 
8. Plan of the Dissertation 
 
 The book is split into two parts of approximately equal length.  The first part falsifies the 
first two hypotheses.  The second part establishes the plausibility of the judicial role hypothesis. 
 Chapter 1 narrows down the range of possible explanations.  It excludes explanations that 
depend on a divergence between the cases sometime early in their history.  The chapter shows 
that the legal institutions of the two countries developed in parallel from the pre-colonial period 
until the reform era in the 1970’s.  In 1971, the new Egyptian constitution created the SCC as a 
result of the convergence of economic reform and Sadat’s reworking of the Nasser regime’s 
constitution and ideology.  This contingent event marks a key divergence between the two cases. 
 Chapter 2 rejects the countermajoritarian hypothesis.  The transitional institutions 
designed by the SCAF are not completely countermajoritarian, and the transitional institutions 
designed by the Ben Achour Commission are not completely majoritarian.  The stances of 
political parties of the question of interim constitutional review contradict the predictions of the 
hypothesis.  Both government and opposition parties share a broad consensus about the status of 
courts in each country.  In Tunisia, both government and opposition parties support the 
dissolution of the Constitutional Council and oppose constitutional review by the Administrative 
Tribunal.  In Egypt, both sides supported interim constitutional review by the SCC, except for a 
brief period after Mursi’s November 2012 Constitutional Decree.   
 Chapter 3 rejects the civil society hypothesis.  Egyptian civil society was not able to 
influence the drafting of the transitional documents, which was controlled by the military.  In 
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contrast, the Tunisian system gave ample opportunity for involvement by civil society.  The 
connections between civil society and the courts that Moustafa and El-Ghobashy identify in 
Egypt were severely strained by the transition59.  Tunisian civil society did build connections 
with the Administrative Tribunal.  Yet these connections did not result in expanded powers for 
the Tribunal. 
 Chapter 4 looks at the activity of the Tunisian Administrative Tribunal during the 
transition as an example of the judicial role trumping the political interests of the judges.  The 
judges of the Tribunal opposed the Islamist-led Troika government and supported the secular 
opposition.  The Tribunal enjoyed widespread popularity.  The crisis of the Assembly system in 
2012-2013 gave the Tribunal an opportunity to intervene in politics.  Despite these conditions, 
the Tribunal rejected political involvement.  Interviews with Tunisian judges establish the 
importance of the judicial role for the Tribunal’s activity. 
Chapter 5 looks at the incorporation of the shariah into the legal systems in both 
countries.  The different stances taken by these regimes towards the shariah had implications for 
other questions of legal theory.  The shariah forms part of a body of super-constitutional norms 
in Egypt.  The SCC’s role in defining these norms made it contradictory to suspend 
constitutional review in Egypt, even temporarily.  Constitutional review poses a danger to the 
Personal Status Code, which even more than the 1959 Constitution, formed the basis of Tunisia’s 
secular republican ideology. 
Chapter 6 looks at politics within the Egyptian judiciary.  This chapter addresses the 
objection that the judicial role is simply the product of the political interests of judges.  Initially, 
ordinary judges were suspicious of the SCC and its model of constitutional review.  The activity 
of the SCC gradually brought the SCC and the ordinary judiciary closer together.  The disputed 
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elections of 2005 were particularly important for expanding the political role of the SCC and its 
connections with the ordinary judiciary.  The contingent event identified in Chapter 1, the 
creation of the SCC, furthered a new conception of the judicial role. 
Chapter 7 outlines the different options for the design of the transitional institutions that 
were proposed in 2011 to 2012.  Many of the designs would have similar implications for the 
interests of the drafting bodies and civil society.  In contrast, the judicial role hypothesis can 
distinguish between different options.  
   
 
CHAPTER 1: HISTORY AND INSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 
 
Introduction 
 
 This chapter includes an outline of Tunisian and Egyptian legal history and a description 
of the countries’ legal systems in 2011.  The chapter provides background for the later chapters, 
but it also uses a study of Tunisian and Egyptian legal history to exclude arguments based on an 
early divergence between the two cases.  These explanations focus on the longer development of 
legal institutions, or the use of different legal models in the two countries during the 2011 
transitions.  These arguments link these features to greater judicial power, and assume that Egypt 
exhibits these features to a greater extent than Tunisia.  The failure of these explanations justifies 
the focus on the status of courts as an important part of transitional politics.   
38 
These arguments might depend on stateness or ‘degree of government’ or on deeply 
seated cultural differences that could explain the differing status of courts in Tunisia and Egypt60.  
What unites these different arguments is a focus on factors that must have a long historical 
development.  These arguments imply that the two cases diverged at some point early in their 
history.  The first section examines the history of constitutional development in Egypt and 
Tunisia during four periods - pre-colonial, colonial, nationalist, and reform eras - and tries to 
identify a critical juncture at which the two countries diverged.  The literature on Egypt has 
suggested that each of these periods could mark the beginning of Egypt’s distinctive 
development.  However, this literature does not explicitly compare Egypt with Tunisia61.  I 
conclude that a substantial divergence occurred only in the last period, the era of liberalization 
from the 1970’s until 2011, with the establishment of the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC).  
Moreover, this divergence was the result of three factors - economic reform, constitution 
drafting, and the diffusion of the a posteriori model of constitutional review - that overlapped in 
Egypt during the presidency of Anwar Sadat.  The comparison with Tunisia highlights the 
contingent nature of these factors.  Nothing in Egypt’s earlier history determined that it would 
create a constitutional court exercising a posteriori review.  If the factors of economic reform, 
constitution drafting and diffusion of the a posteriori model had come together in Tunisia at the 
same time, Tunisia might also have created a similar court.  
A further implication of the early divergence explanation is that courts should draw their 
strength from broad social forces and from a legalized political culture.  In other words, it is not 
just courts that are important, but law in general.  The section concludes with an outline the 
Tunisian and Egyptian legal systems as they existed immediately before the 2011 revolutions, 
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with special attention to connections between constitutional review, other areas of the judiciary 
and the legal profession.  This outline assesses the importance of law, rather than just courts or 
constitutional review, in both of the cases.  I conclude that the legal system as a whole was not 
more developed or independent in Egypt than Tunisia.  The factors identified by the other 
hypotheses - the interests of the drafting bodies, connections between civil society and the courts, 
or conceptions of the judicial role - are needed to explain the outcome. 
 
History of Constitutional Development in Egypt and Tunisia 
 
 Much of the literature on law and courts in Egypt treats the country as exceptional among 
Arab states, authoritarian regimes, or the developing world generally.  Rosberg writes that in 
terms of “the institutionalization of the judiciary, it seems that Egypt is uniquely advanced in the 
developing world.”  Brown emphasizes the diffusion of legal models from Egypt to other Arab 
countries.  Moustafa’s work starts from the assumption that the exercise of constitutional review 
by the SCC is unusual in the Arab World and authoritarian regimes generally.  Moustafa extends 
this exceptionalism to the 2011 revolution when he writes that “among the protest movements 
sweeping the region in the Arab awakening of 2011, the Egyptian revolt is the movement that is 
perhaps most defined by a struggle over the Constitution and the rule of law more generally”.  
He attributes the prominence of law and legal issues in the 2011 revolution to the prominence of 
law in the Mubarak regime62.   
 These different authors all suggest that a divergence in Egypt’s historical development 
can account for unusual aspects of its modern legal and political system, but they disagree about 
when this divergence occurred.  For Brown and Ziadeh, the unusual features of the Egyptian 
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system date to the colonial or the period of pre-colonial state building in the nineteenth century.  
Ziadeh contrasts the modern Egyptian legal system with its Islamic predecessor “there was very 
little in the course of Egyptian history from the early Islamic period up to the accession of 
Isma’il Pasha in 1863 that was conducive to the emergence of an independent legal system with 
a vigorous body of men capable of establishing and maintaining a rule of law”63.  Writing during 
the Nasser period, Ziadeh expresses skepticism that these features could survive authoritarian 
rule.  Moustafa focuses on the economic crisis of the 1970’s as the impetus for the creation of the 
SCC and brackets Egypt’s earlier history.  Rosberg argues that the failure of the single party state 
and bureaucracy of the Nasser regime forced Sadat to adopt legal reforms.  The outcome of these 
reforms in turn depends on a pervasive bureaucracy and a highly institutionalized military, two 
features which might distinguish Egypt from other Arab states. 
 In fact, Tunisia closely paralleled Egypt’s development in all four periods.  These 
features distinguish both Tunisia and Egypt from many other Arab states.  The parallel 
development of the two countries undermines arguments based on stateness or the early 
divergence of the two cases.  However, the creation of the SCC in 1979 did mark an important 
divergence between the two countries. 
 
Constitutionalism and State-Building (Tunisia 1860-1881, Egypt 1867-1882) 
 
 Both Tunisians and Egyptians often cite geography and a long political history as features 
that distinguish their countries from other parts of the Arab World64.  The early development of 
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modern legal institutions in either of these countries could explain the more expansive power of 
courts after 2011.  If this history can explain the outcomes after 2011, there should be some clear 
divergence between the two cases that favored the development of legal institutions in Egypt 
over Tunisia.  In fact, the two countries had a similar pattern of state building during this period. 
By the nineteenth century, Tunisia and Egypt had a similar relationship with the Ottoman 
Empire.  Both countries were on the periphery of the Ottoman Empire.  Although Egypt had 
once been under direct control by the Ottomans, by the eighteenth century, the Mamluks had 
asserted their autonomy65.  In both countries, a local ruler, Muhammad Ali (r. 1805-1848) in 
Egypt and Hussein bin Ali (r. 1705-1740) in Tunisia, secured the right to pass on their office to 
their heirs, instead of accepting a replacement appointed by the Ottoman sultan.  Both countries 
were influenced by reforms within the Ottoman Empire, but the local dynasty was able to select 
reforms from Ottoman and European sources.  The dynasties founded by these two rulers formed 
the basis for the growth of the national state.  In Egypt, Muhammad Ali began a program of 
modernization.  The Beys of the Husseinid dynasty, especially Ahmed Bey (r. 1837-1855), 
initiated a similar program in Tunisia66.   
The rulers of Tunisia and Egypt adopted some of the earliest constitutional documents in 
the Arab World.  Tunisia adopted the fundamental pact in 1857 and a full constitution in 1861.  
Brown argues that rulers adopted these documents to strengthen their administrations rather than 
to limit their own power67.  As in contemporary Europe, courts were not considered the final 
interpreters of these documents, and there was no constitutional review by courts68.  Tunisia had 
two short periods of constitutional rule, first immediately after the adoption of the Fundamental 
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Pact, and then again under the leadership of Kheireddine Pasha, prime minister from 1873-1877.  
Despite this mixed record, the Pact remained an important symbol of Tunisian nationalism 
through the colonial period69.  In Egypt too, periods of constitutional rule alternated with periods 
of autocratic rule.  The first constitutional document was adopted in 1879 but quickly became 
irrelevant.  As in Tunisia, the constitution lived on as a national symbol.  
Both countries began to codify their laws and establish new court systems before the 
beginning of colonialism.  Muhammad Ali commissioned legal codes based on European and 
Ottoman models, with the first penal code adopted in 1829.  This effort coincided with the 
drafting of the Majalla code in the Ottoman Empire.  The Egyptian legal system at the beginning 
of Muhammad Ali’s reign consisted of shariah courts and a variety of secular ‘courts’ operated 
by administrative officials rather than strictly judicial personnel.  Muhammad Ali and his 
successors established several varieties of courts, including commercial courts, councils of first 
instance, and appellate councils, which judicialized this area of administrative dispute resolution.  
Peters considers the staff of these courts the first modern judicial professionals in Egypt70.  These 
new courts complemented the existing shariah courts.  
In Tunisia too, legal reform took the form of codification, and Ottoman and European 
civilian models predominated.  At the beginning of the period, Tunisia had parallel Islamic 
courts and administrative justice exercised by a variety of officials.  Both of these systems were 
reformed and centralized by the Beys.  An 1876 decree created a shariah court of appeals in 
Tunis, formalizing a hierarchy among the religious courts.  Before the establishment of the 
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protectorate, consular courts handled all cases between Tunisians and Europeans.  Like the 
Mixed Courts in Egypt, the consular courts led to the growth of a modern legal profession71. 
 
Constitutionalism and Colonialism (Tunisia 1881-1956, Egypt 1882-1952) 
 
 Increasing foreign influence in Egypt culminated in the British occupation of the country 
in 1882.  The British faced rival claims from France and the Ottoman Empire, as well as a well-
entrenched Egyptian elite and monarchy.  As a result, they did not annex Egypt as a formal part 
of their empire, instead declaring a protectorate over the country.   
This indirect colonialism had important implication for the content of Egypt’s laws.  The 
British imported a few aspects of British law, but for the most part, they left the civilian model in 
place.  The Egyptian civil code adopted in 1871 was influenced by French civilian models, and 
this code remained in force until the adoption of Sanhuri’s code in 1948, which was also heavily 
influenced by French law.  Cromer, the British Consul-General in Egypt from 1883 to 1907, 
intended to import a common law system similar to those used in other British colonies, such as 
India or the Sudan.  However, he found that French civil law influence was already entrenched in 
the Egyptian legal system and the Egyptian state generally.  Many institutions of the Egyptian 
state, such as the Mixed Courts and the Caisse de la Dette Publique, were already staffed with 
French advisors and judges when the British occupied the country.  Cromer spend much of his 
tenure in Egypt struggling against French influence72.   
Further legal development during the colonial period looked to French models more than 
British models.  Most Egyptians who studies law abroad during the colonial period studied in 
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France rather than Britain.  Sanhuri, who completed a doctorate in law at the University of Lyon 
in 1926, is a prominent example.  As a result, Egypt is one of only a handful of British colonies 
that did not receive a common law legal system.  Other examples, such as Quebec and South 
Africa also had previous development of a civil law system through French or Dutch influence 
respectively.  Even in these cases, the British were able to import more of the common law than 
in Egypt73. 
The colonial period was defined by the coexistence of parallel court systems, such as the 
Consular and Mixed Courts used for cases involving foreigners, and parallel sources of law, 
including international treaties, uncodified Shariah as well as state legislation.  The last years of 
the monarchy saw the consolidation of the court system through the elimination of the Mixed 
Courts and the Shariah Courts.  These developments were a victory for the ordinary judiciary, 
which was able to concentrate the jurisdiction for different kinds of cases in its own hands74. 
Nathan Brown argues that the conditions of indirect colonialism also aided the 
development of legal institutions and made Egyptian lawyers and judges act more assertively 
against political authorities75.  The need to adjudicate cases involving multiple nationalities 
required the creation of the Mixed Courts.  Because the Mixed Courts were the result of 
international agreements and treaties, their independence could not be easily compromised by 
either the Egyptian government or the British colonial authorities.  As a result, they formed an 
island of judicial independence, which individuals could use to challenge state authority in 
certain cases.    
The ambiguous relationship of Egypt to both the British Empire and the Ottoman Empire 
gave nationalist lawyers a means of couching issues surrounding Egypt’s sovereignty in 
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international legal terms.76  Unlike Tunisia, Egypt does not have a clear independence day.  
Instead, British influence gradually receded from the 1919 revolution until Nasser expelled the 
last British troops from Suez canal zone in 1956.  This twilight period of colonialism provided 
additional opportunities for nationalist lawyers to challenge the colonial state.  The 1919 
revolution focused on the issue of a new constitution.  Nationalists often couched their 
grievances in constitutional terms during this period.  The 1923 constitution also gave rise to a 
few instances of constitutional review by ordinary courts in Egypt in the 1920’s and 30’s, 
although this power was not widely recognized77. 
 This depiction contrasts Egypt with countries that were not colonized or were only briefly 
colonized, such as Syria, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, and countries that were colonized directly, 
such as Algeria.  Tunisia could fall into the category of direct colonization, like its neighbor 
Algeria.  Like Algeria, Tunisia had a large European settler population.  However, in terms of its 
domestic and international legal status, Tunisia more closely resembled indirect colonization 
along the same lines as Egypt.  The French incorporated Tunisia into their empire much later 
than Algeria.  The French army invaded Tunisia in 1881 and forced the Bey to accept a 
protectorate, while the French colonization of Algeria began in 1830 with the occupation of 
Algiers.  Moreover, the process of colonization was far more violent in Algeria, with numerous 
rebellions followed by repression and the mass confiscation of Algerian land.  Partly this is due 
to the different forms of political organization that the French found in the two countries.  In 
Algeria, the French faced numerous independent rulers and tribes, whereas Tunisia had already 
established a relatively strong centralized state under the Beys78. 
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In legal terms, Tunisia more closely resembled the indirect colonialism of Egypt than the 
direct colonialism of Algeria.  Despite the presence of the settler population, Tunisia was never 
annexed to France.  The protectorate system allowed the continued operation of the Bey’s 
administration79.  Like the British in Egypt, the French initially faced rival claimants to 
sovereignty over Tunisia, including the Ottoman Empire, Italy and Britain.  The European 
powers agreed that the European population in Tunisia would be represented by the French 
government, with the exception of the Italians, who would have their own litigation.  The Italians 
were the largest single foreign nationality in Tunisia80.  As in Egypt, the colonial period in 
Tunisia was defined by parallel legal institutions.  The consular courts established to deal with 
cases involving foreigners were analogous to the Mixed Courts in Egypt81. 
Although Tunisia did not have a revolutionary uprising comparable to the events of 1919 
in Egypt, constitutional issues were at the center of nationalist concerns during the colonial 
period.  The Destour, or constitution party, was founded on the twin principles of restoring 
constitutional government and abolishing the French protectorate over Tunisia82. 
 
Constitutionalism and Nationalism (Tunisia 1956-1987, Egypt 1952-1970)  
 
 In both countries, colonialism produced a nationalist response that extended to the legal 
realm, and the rise of the Nasser and Bourguiba regimes set the stage for legal reforms.  This era 
of legal change was threatening to the established judiciary.  Especially in Egypt, this era is 
remembered for conflicts between the regime and the judiciary and for the erosion of judicial 
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independence.  Rosberg identifies the problems of the Nasser era as the impetus for the rise of 
the Egyptian judiciary during the subsequent reform era. 
The Nasser regime’s treatment of Abd al-Razzaq Sanhuri, the most famous modern Arab 
jurist, is emblematic of its attitude toward law.  Soon after the Free Officers’ Coup, the Nasser 
regime suppressed Sanhuri’s plan to establish constitutional review in Egypt by the Majlis al-
Dawlah and eventually exiled Sanhuri from Egypt.  The Nasser regime also clashed with the 
ordinary legal professionals represented by the Judges’ Club and the Lawyers’ Club.  This 
conflict culminated in the “massacre of the judiciary” in 1969, in which Nasser removed 
hundreds of judges from their position.  The Nasser regime also created a series of exceptional 
measures through which the government could intervene in the legal order.  These include the 
socialist prosecutor, the revolutionary courts, the military courts, and the constitutional state of 
emergency83.  The Nasser regime did not shy away from asserting a norm superior to positive 
legislation, which they described as national security or the aims of the revolution, but it gave 
judges no role in defining this norm. 
Nationalism and independence raised the question of the role of Islam in the Egyptian 
and Tunisian nation states.  Sanhuri grappled with this question throughout his career from the 
1920’s to the 1950’s.  Sanhuri produced a code that he believed to be ‘one-hundred percent 
Islamic,’ although it also borrowed heavily from Western civil law.  The influence of Islamic law 
in Sanhuri’s code was most noticeable in personal status.  Sanhuri laid the foundation for the 
view that the shariah could provide an inspiration or ‘source’ for legislation.  Sanhuri also 
pioneered constitutional review in Egypt.  In his academic work, he argued that the caliphate 
could be revived as a sort of international Islamic legal body.  Egypt adopted Sanhuri’s code in 
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1948 and remained in effect even after Sanhuri himself had fallen out of favor with the Nasser 
regime84.   
 In Tunisia, the adoption of new legal codes coincides with independence.  Bourguiba 
associated himself closely with the personal status code, which he used to establish an image of 
himself as a lawgiver, even claiming the title of mujtahid.  Positive legislation is venerated over 
constitutional norms, and the president, rather than judges, defines the law85. 
 The exceptional institutions of the Bourguiba regime did not extend as far as their 
Egyptian equivalents.  Although Article 46 of the 1959 constitution contained provisions for 
declaring a state of emergency, Tunisia did not experience extended periods of emergency rule.  
The Bourguiba and Ben Ali regimes used exceptional courts or military courts for some cases.  
However, Tunisia never developed a vast network of exceptional courts comparable to Egypt’s.  
The Tunisian government continues to face these issues in the recent debate over counter-
terrorism and national security laws86.   
 
Constitutionalism and Liberalization (Tunisia 1987-2011, Egypt 1970-2011) 
 
 This era is of critical importance for the theories of Brown, Rosberg and Moustafa.  All 
of these authors wrote during the ‘golden age’ of the SCC, although Moustafa notes signs of 
authoritarian retrenchment after 2005.  Judges of the SCC themselves played a major role in 
defining scholarship on the Egyptian judiciary during this period, both as informants to academic 
researchers and as the authors of academic works in Arabic and English.  On the other hand, 
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Bernard-Maugiron, and especially Shalakany, present a skeptical view of the Egyptian judiciary 
in this period.  For Shalakany, the Egyptian judiciary and legal profession never really recovered 
from the 1952 coup87. 
 In light of the comparison with Tunisia, I conclude that three factors contributed to the 
establishment of the SCC and the divergence with Tunisia: economic reform, the drafting of a 
new constitution in 1971, and the diffusion of the model of a posteriori review exemplified by 
the German Constitutional Court.  Broad political and economic conditions were similar in both 
cases.  Tunisia certainly went through economic reform in this period, and it was influenced 
global trends toward the new constitutionalism.  However, these trends did not coincide with the 
adoption of a new constitution or the creation of a new constitutional court in Tunisia. 
 Sadat used legal reforms and the adoption of a new constitution to mark a break with the 
Nasser period.  The 1971 constitution is a much more liberal document that the constitutions of 
the Nasser period.  The preamble asserts the democratic and republican nature of the regime.  
The constitution created the SCC, the first court charged with constitutional review in Egypt’s 
history.  It contains a set of fundamental rights that have formed the basis for much of the SCC’s 
activity.  On the other hand, the constitution also concentrates power in the hands of the 
president and justifies emergency rule88. 
 The SCC model of a specialized constitutional court exercising a posteriori review won 
out over several alternative possibilities for constitutional review.  Sadat could have chosen a 
priori constitutional review like France after 1958 or Tunisia after 1989.  He could have chosen 
decentralized review by all courts, as in the United States.  This model is rare internationally, but 
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does have a precedent in the activity of Egyptian courts under the 1923 constitution89.  Sadat 
could have granted a power of constitutional review to the Majlis al-Dawlah, the highest 
administrative court.  Sanhuri tried to claim such a power for the Majlis al-Dawlah in the early 
1950’s.  Either of the last two choices would have empowered the judiciary as a whole more than 
review by a specialized constitutional court like the SCC. 
 The SCC played an important role in Egypt’s economic liberalization.  Moustafa argues 
that it guaranteed private property and investment against the sort of appropriations that had 
often occurred in the Nasser period.  The SCC’s power of a posteriori review was also essential 
for repealing laws from the Nasser period that were at odds with economic liberalization.  
Moreover, popular opposition to liberalization made it politically difficult for the regime to 
address these issues through legislation90. 
 The beginning of Tunisia’s reform era is harder to pinpoint.  Bourguiba began economic 
reforms in the early 1970’s, which backed away from the efforts at centralized planning and land 
reform in the 1960’s.  The 1970’s saw the repeal of Tunisia’s socialist economic laws by 
legislation.  Economic liberalization also had the support of many of the opposition parties.  For 
example, According to Mohamed Bennour, the Ettakatol Party “began as the economically 
liberal opposition to Bourguiba’s nationalization programs in the 1960’s and 70’s.” 91  As a 
result, there was no need for a posteriori constitutional review to remove these laws.  In 1972, 
Bourguiba established the Administrative Tribunal, which quickly became the centerpiece of the 
Tunisian court system, with a reputation for independence unequalled by any other Tunisian 
court.  Like the SCC, the Administrative Tribunal was established in the midst of economic 
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liberalization.  Its power to review the acts of government officials, although not legislation, 
could play a similar role in protecting private property and investment.   
 Ben Ali’s coup d’etat in 1987 initially raised hopes of further reforms.  At first, Ben Ali 
did move against the one-party state of the neo-Destour party.  In the first post-coup election, 
opposition parties were allowed to participate.  By the 1990’s, restrictions made it nearly 
impossible for opposition parties to compete in Tunisian elections.  As a result, Tunisia from the 
1990’s to 2011 qualified as an electoral autocracy, but just barely.  Despite liberalization in other 
areas, Tunisia remained close to the model of the single party state.  Its elections and political 
parties were more restricted than Egypt’s during the same period92. 
 Ben Ali’s reforms also had legal and constitutional aspects.  The creation of the 
Constitutional Council in 1987 was one of his first reforms.  He sponsored amendments of the 
1959 constitution but did not introduce a new constitution.  However, as with the reforms of the 
electoral arena, the results were disappointing, and the Constitutional Council remained a hollow 
institution 
 The reforms in Tunisia and Egypt had similar causes, the failure of the nationalist 
economic model and single party state, and a similar goal, the consolidation of a liberalized 
authoritarian regime.  However, these reforms had different results for the legal system and 
judicial politics in the two countries, which are described in the following section.   
 
Table of Legal History 
 
 The previous four sections on legal history are summarized in the table below. 
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Table 1: Legal history of Tunisia and Egypt 
 Egypt Tunisia 
Pre-Colonial Era: Politics 1805-1848 Muhammad Ali 1837-1855 Ahmed Bey 
Constitutions and Legislation 1829 First Penal Code  
187 Constitution 
187 Civil Code 
1857 Fundamental Pact 
1861 Constitution 
Judiciary Judicial Councils 
1875 Mixed Courts 
1876 Shariah Court of 
Appeals 
Colonial Era: Politics 1882 British occupation 
1919 Revolution 
1922 Nominal Independence 
1881 French protectorate 
1946 Establishment of UGTT 
Constitutions and Legislation 1923 Constitution 
1948 Sanhuri Code 
1883 Marsa Accords 
Judiciary 1946 Sanhuri heads Council 
of State 
1884 French Tribunals 
replace Consular courts 
Nationalist Era: Politics 1952 Free Officers’ Coup 1956 Independence 
Constitutions and Legislation 1956, 1964 Constitutions 1959 Constitution 
1956 Personal Status Code 
Judiciary 1937 Abolition of Mixed 
Courts 
1952 Abolition of Shariah 
Courts 
1957 Abolition of Shariah 
Courts 
Reform Era: Politics 1970 Nasser-Sadat transition 1969 End of Land Reform 
1987 Ben Ali’s coup 
Constitutions and Legislation 1971 Constitution 1989 Constitutional 
Amendments 
Judiciary 1979 Establishment of SCC 1972 Establishment of TA 
1987 Establishment of CC 
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 The design of the Tunisian and Egyptian legal systems in 2011 provides an opportunity to 
test two implications of explanations based on an early divergence between the cases.  First, an 
implication of stateness arguments is that all aspects of the legal system - including lawyers, law 
schools and professional organizations, as well as courts - should be less important in Tunisia 
than in Egypt.  The section focuses on three areas typically considered to be outside the core of 
the judiciary - the administrative courts, exceptional courts, and lawyers and professional 
organizations.  Each of these areas contradicts the view that law is less important in Tunisia.  The 
Egyptian administrative courts, and especially exceptional courts, show the deep influence of the 
regime over the judiciary, even if the SCC and the ordinary judiciary retained a certain degree of 
independence and professionalism.  There is an important difference between the status of judges 
and the status of lawyers in each country.  In Egypt, the social status of lawyers declined since 
the beginning of the Nasser period, even after the establishment of the SCC in 1979.  Since 2011, 
Tunisian lawyers and the the Tunisian lawyers’ syndicate, which was part of the National 
Dialogue Quartet, have played an important role in transitional politics, even as courts remained 
marginal. 
  
Ordinary Courts and Administrative Courts 
 
Like many civil law systems, both Tunisia and Egypt have separate ordinary and 
administrative courts.  Apart from Rosberg, most scholars of the Egyptian judiciary have focused 
on either the ordinary courts or the SCC rather than the administrative courts93.  The role played 
by these different jurisdictions is different in the two countries.  The Tunisian Administrative 
Tribunal resembles the SCC in its reputation for independence and in its design - it is a unique 
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jurisdiction without any lower courts.  These differences reflect the influence of the SCC and the 
Administrative Tribunal on the rest of their legal systems. 
 Egypt has three tiers of ordinary courts, headed by the Court of Cassation94.  Egypt also 
has three tiers of administrative courts.  At the top of the hierarchy is the High Administrative 
Court in Cairo.  The Egyptian administrative court system traces its origins to Sanhuri’s Majlis 
al-Dawlah, which was founded in 1946, and to earlier administrative courts established after the 
adoption of French style civil code in 1883.  Rosberg argues that the renewed prominence of the 
administrative courts dates to Sadat’s presidency95. 
 The political implications of the split jurisdiction are a matter of debate in Egypt.  Judges 
of the Egyptian ordinary courts often consider the administrative courts to be close to the 
regime96.  Several features of the administrative courts make this claim plausible, even if it is 
hard to verify.  The split jurisdiction could be an example of the parallel surveillance structures 
described by Rosberg.  It could also be useful to the regime because the regime could shift 
important cases to a more favorable venue.  These attitudes echo criticism of the split jurisdiction 
in other countries97.  In contrast, Ahmed Eid, an Egyptian lawyer with opposition political views, 
stated that before the 2011 revolution, the administrative courts were known for their relative 
independence and that they “would often issue decisions releasing prisoners who were held 
illegally”98.  
In Tunisia, the administrative jurisdiction does not parallel the ordinary jurisdiction 
because the Administrative Tribunal is the only administrative court in the country.  The 
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Tribunal has a reputation for independence while the ordinary courts were considered corrupt, 
unprofessional and close to the regime.  Samir Annabi, head of the Tunisian anti-corruption 
agency, estimated that “a majority of cases” in the ordinary judiciary were subject to interference 
from the regime or other interests.  Annabi estimated that “90% of [ordinary] judges do not have 
adequate training.”  In contrast, he stated that the Administrative Tribunal “recruited judges and 
civil servants of the highest professional quality”99.  Still, the absence of local administrative 
courts limited the role that Tribunal could play.  The Tribunal was an elite institution in the sense 
that its judges formed an elite class within the judiciary and it the sense that it handled elite cases 
dealing with state administration.  Hichem Hammi, a judge of Tribunal, stated that the Tribunal 
“remained alone” since its establishment and that the administrative judicial system is 
“extremely centralized”100.  Tunisian administrative judges also lacked any form of professional 
organization analogous to the SMT before the establishment of the Union des Magistrats 
Administratifs (UMA) in 2011. 
There were important differences between the Tunisian and Egyptian court systems in 
2011, but these differences cannot be described as the absence of a developed court system in 
Tunisia.  Tunisia has at least one area of the judiciary that is known for its independence and 
capacity to rule against the regime - Administrative Tribunal.  The split jurisdiction that has been 
criticized in Egypt and other countries as a threat to judicial independence allowed the 
Administrative Tribunal to carve out a limited sphere of autonomy101.  The view that Egypt’s 
judiciary as a whole is more independent than Tunisia’s is complicated further by the exceptional 
courts, which are described below. 
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Ordinary Courts and Exceptional Courts 
 
The importance of exceptional courts in Egypt is recognized throughout the literature.  
Brown, Moustafa, and Bernard-Maugiron all have some description of the exceptional courts.  
However, given the sensitive nature of the subject there is relatively little scholarship focusing 
on the exceptional courts102.  The exceptional courts include military courts, which try both 
military officers and civilians in cases relating to national security, as well as State Security 
courts, which in turn are divided into “regular” and “emergency” sections103.  What cases qualify 
for the exceptional courts has varied over time.  Indeed, the lack of a clear rule governing which 
cases should be tried in which court is essential to the exceptional system.  The regime can 
decide to redefine a case as a national security or military issue as it sees fit.  Such redefinitions 
can occur on a case by case basis or through legislation.  In 2014, the Sisi regime issued a decree 
defining all cases dealing with public infrastructure as cases falling under the jurisdiction of the 
military courts, making nearly any crime committed on a public street or in public institutions 
such as universities a matter of national security104. 
 The Egyptian ordinary courts’ reputation for independence obscures the role played by 
exceptional courts.  The regime can allow the ordinary courts and the SCC to operate 
independently because the truly sensitive cases could be removed from their jurisdiction.  The 
ordinary courts would only hear a case if the regime had decided that the case did not fall into 
any of the exceptional categories, and therefore was not of direct interest to the regime.  During 
the Mubarak period, the Judges’ Club would sometimes issue statements against the emergency 
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law and in favor of restoring ‘right to the natural judge,’ that is the right to try cases in their 
original jurisdiction rather than in the emergency courts.  These moves had little effect either 
before or after 2011.  In fact, the months immediately after the 2011 revolution saw a rapid 
increase in the number of cases tried by the emergency courts.  The SCC did not make even 
limited criticism of the the emergency system in its decisions.  It has upheld the validity of the 
exceptional courts, the emergency law, and a broad scope for executive action or “acts of 
sovereignty”105.   
 Some aspects of the Egyptian emergency regime also undermine the professionalism of 
the judiciary, rather than just limiting the scope of its jurisdiction.  The judiciary jealously guards 
access to judicial appointments to both the SCC and the ordinary courts.  The emergency system 
allows military officers to take on judicial functions, effectively undermining the procedures for 
selecting judges.  Police officers are allowed to become judges, blurring the distinction between 
judicial and law enforcement functions106. 
  
Lawyers and Judges 
 
 Both countries follow the civilian practice of sharply dividing lawyers and judges into 
two career paths.  Judges are state employees, but lawyers are paid by private clients.  In this 
system, lawyers and judges can end up with very different relations with regime, political 
importance, and social status.  In Egypt, the rise of courts and judges after 1970 did not also 
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mean the rise of lawyers.  In Tunisia, the marginalization of courts and judges after 2011 did not 
mean the marginalization of lawyers. 
 Ziadeh’s 1968 description of the “total eclipse” of law in Egyptian politics after the 1952 
coup seems premature if we focus on courts and judges as representatives of the law107.  The 
1971 constitution would grant courts a power of constitutional review that they had never 
enjoyed before.  The Judges’ Club, the most powerful professional organization representing the 
Egyptian judiciary, continued to operate throughout the Nasser era.  On the other hand, Ziadeh’s 
pessimism about the future of Egyptian lawyers seems justified.  Brown notes a rapid increase in 
the number of lawyers as the barriers to entering the profession were lowered during Sadat’s 
presidency.  From being a cosmopolitan elite before the Free Officers’ coup, lawyers became one 
of the least prestigious professions.  Law schools had among the lowest admission standards of 
any academic department.  The political complexion of the profession changed as middle class 
Islamists joined the profession.  By the 1990’s, the Lawyers’ Syndicate was known for its pro-
Brotherhood sympathies108.   
Tunisian lawyers saw a similar decline in status.  Ben Ali’s reforms lowered the barriers 
to entry to the legal profession by requiring only an undergraduate degree to practice law and 
founding a new school of law separate from existing universities.  In an interview, Samir Annabi 
argued that these changes “flooded [the profession] with 3,000 new lawyers”109.  As a result, the 
number of lawyers increased, and the average standard of living of lawyers decreased.  In 
contrast, the salaries of judges increased during the same period, making them among the highest 
paid officials.  On the other hand, lawyers retained greater autonomy from the regime than 
judges.  The leaders of the lawyers’ professional organization, the Ordre Nationale des Avocats 
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Tunisiens (ONAT), were elected by members of the organization throughout the Ben Ali period, 
despite occasional interference by the regime.  According to Annabi, these elections made the 
ONAT “an outpost of democratic practices”110.  As a result their professional organization 
retained greater credibility than the judicial syndicate.  The Tunisian professional organizations 
for the ordinary judiciary - the Syndicat des Magistrats Tunisiens (SMT) and the Association des 
Magistrats Tunisiens (AMT) - lack the long institutional history and political influence of the 
Egyptian Judges’ Club.  Even after the 2011 revolution, the influence of the judicial syndicates 
has been limited.  The SMT and AMT did organize judicial strikes to pressure the transitional 
government, but they never won an official role comparable to the ONAT’s membership in 
Quartet.111. 
 The role of lawyers and the ONAT following the 2011 revolution reveal the enduring 
importance of law and lawyers in Tunisian politics, despite years of cooptation by the regime.  
The ONAT formed one of the four members of the National Dialogue Quartet, which brokered 
the deal leading to the resignation of the Troika government and the adoption of the 2014 
constitution.  The leadership of the Ligue Tunisienne des Droits de l’Homme (LTDH), another 
member of the Quartet, also includes many lawyers112.  Even as courts and judges were sidelined 
during the transition, lawyers and their professional organizations became more prominent.  This 
pattern contradicts the claim that law was not important in the Tunisian transition and that 
Tunisia lacked a legalized political culture. 
 
Conclusion 
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 This chapter has rejected several categories of explanations that rely on a divergence 
between Tunisia and Egypt early in their histories, some time between the beginning of modern 
state building in the nineteenth century and the beginning of the reform era in the 1970’s and 
80’s.  Such explanations might include a focus on early state development, indirect colonialism, 
or the nature of the post-independence regime to explain the different status of courts in the two 
countries after 2011.  An important implication of these explanations is that law in general would 
be more important in Egypt than in Tunisia in the decades before 2011.  An examination of the 
legal professions in both countries shows that this is not the case.  
How then are the different aspects of the Tunisian and Egyptian transitional regimes 
connected?  Each of the other hypotheses offers a different answer to this question, but they 
agree that the divergence is located in recent history.  Each of the other three hypotheses implies 
a divergence between Tunisia and Egypt sometime after the beginning of reforms in the 1970’s.  
The countermajoritarian hypotheses focuses on politics during and after the 2011 revolutions, but 
it also builds on an interpretation of the SCC as a countermajoritarian institution during the Sadat 
and Mubarak regimes.  The civil society hypothesis looks at the forms of legal activism that 
resulted from the establishment of the SCC in Egypt as opposed to the Tunisian system that 
lacked constitutional review.  The judicial role hypothesis also considers the establishment of the 
SCC (and the Tunisian Administrative Tribunal) to be a turning point.  These institutions defined 
relations between the judiciary and the regime and ultimately the judges’ conception of the 
judicial role as well.  The following chapters examine each of these explanations in turn. 
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CHAPTER 2: COUNTERMAJORITARIANISM AND JUDICIAL POWER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction: Majoritarian and Countermajoritarian Interests  
 
 
When I asked Habib Koubaa, former Secretary General of the Constitutional Council, 
why the Ben Achour Commission created the Assembly and dissolved the Constitutional 
Council, he said, “the revolution created a political void...the parties took advantage of this 
situation to concentrate power in their own hands”113.  Behind this polemic is a majoritarian 
explanation of the creation of the Assembly and the dissolution of the Constitutional Council.  
The groups that dominated the Commission knew that they would dominate the Assembly as 
well, so they gave the Assembly as much power as possible and dissolved other institutions, such 
as the Constitutional Council and the elected presidency that might have checked the Assembly.  
For the Egyptian opposition, the judiciary and the military represent two sides of a single deep 
state, especially after the SCC’s endorsement of the Sisi regime.   As Ahmed Eid, an Egyptian 
lawyer with anti-military views, put it, “Egyptian courts can only be understood as agents of the 
regime.”114  According to this argument, the Egyptian courts have extensive powers because the 
military empowered them.   The military empowered the courts because the courts can be 
counted on to rule against the opposition. 
These explanations presented by Koubaa and Eid are examples of the countermajoritarian 
hypothesis, which states that the formal powers of the high courts of Tunisia and Egypt are the 
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result of the political interests of the SCAF and the Ben Achour Commission, the bodies charged 
with drafting the transitional documents in 2011, for or against majority rule.  Subsequent 
amendments to the formal powers of the courts by the Assembly in Tunisia, or the SCAF and the 
Mursi government in Egypt are also the result of these actors’ majoritarian or 
countermajoritarian interests115. 
  This explanation has two implications.  First, if the empowerment of courts is the result 
of the countermajoritarian interests of the drafters of the transitional documents, the other state 
institutions described in these documents should also be designed to restrain the majority.  I 
assess this implication through an examination of the provisions of the transitional documents in 
both countries and their operation from 2011 to 2014.  Second, parties that are part of a majority 
coalition should oppose constitutional review and minority parties should support it.  I assess this 
implication based on the actions taken by Tunisian and Egyptian political parties on issues 
related to judicial power during the course of the transition and by interviews with Tunisian 
political parties and judges. 
I conclude that the interests of the drafting bodies did play a major role in the design of 
the transitional institutions, but their interests are not simply majoritarian or countermajoritarian.  
Rather the interests of the drafting bodies are defined by their ability to intervene in later politics, 
which is limited by the drafting bodies’ sources of legitimacy and the status of the judiciary in 
Tunisia and Egypt.  This reflected in the design of the transitional institutions, which contain 
majoritarian and counter majoritarian elements in each country.  The options open to the drafting 
                                               
115 This explanation draws on a large body of literature that sees constitutional review as primarily a means of 
limiting a majority rule.  Ginsburg describes constitutional review as an insurance policy that parties use to protect 
themselves from future periods of rule by a rival party.  Ginsburg argues that parties that expect to lose power in the 
future will empower constitutional courts.  Hirschl argues that a broader social and economic elite empowers courts 
to enforce fundamental rights, especially property rights, against the majority.  This literature is informed by the 
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branch charged with constitutional review in the US Constitution restrains the excesses of majority rule.  Ginsburg 
(2003), Bickel (1959), Elster in Smith (1995), Hirschl (2004), Ackerman (1994), Rossiter (1961). 
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bodies and political parties charged with granting formal powers to the courts were limited by 
characteristics of the judiciary and the judicial role in each country.  This is reflected in the 
consensus among different political parties within each country about the proper role of courts. 
 
Implication 1: The Transitional Documents 
 If the empowerment of courts is the result of the countermajoritarian interests of the 
drafters of the transitional documents, the other state institutions described in these documents 
should also be designed to restrain the majority.  As Ginsburg notes, there are many mechanisms 
other than constitutional review by courts that can limit the power of an electoral majority116.  
Ginsburg lists bicameralism, proportional representation, and strict requirements for 
constitutional amendment.  Separate legislative and executive branches and government 
accountability to the legislature could be added to this list.  Constitutional amendment is not 
applicable in the transitional context, but the relationship between the constituent power and the 
other branches is of critical importance.  If the designers of a transitional regime are primarily 
concerned with limiting the power of the majority, there is no reason that they would not adopt 
these other strategies as well.  More generally, the transitional institutions as a system, and not 
simply the courts, should be designed to constrain the majority. 
 I examine the provisions of the Tunisian and Egyptian transitional documents in the 
categories of state institutions, electoral rules and the role of courts to see if these different areas 
reflect a logic of majoritarianism and counter-majoritarianism respectively117.  I conclude that 
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117 These documents include first and foremost the SCAF’s February 13, 2011 Constitutional Proclamation and the 
Ben Achour Commission’s March 23, 2011 Decree on the Provisional Organization of Public Powers, which created 
the basic outline of both countries’ transitional institutions.  The SCAF also proposed amendments to the 1971 
Constitution, which formed the basis of the March 30, 2011 Constitutional Declaration.  On June 18, 2012, the 
SCAF issued amendments to the Constitutional Proclamation.  At nearly the same time the SCAF also reformed the 
internal procedures of the SCC through a decree law in the summer of 2012.  The Ben Achour Commission 
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the transitional documents in both cases contain a mixture of majoritarian and counter-
majoritarian elements.  I then examine the activity of the transitional institutions after they were 
created.  I conclude that the design of the transitional institutions is better explained by certain 
characteristics of the bodies charged with drafting these documents, the Ben Achour 
Commission in Tunisia and the SCAF in Egypt, and by certain characteristics of the judiciary in 
each country.  The SCAF designed the transitional institutions to allow future interventions by 
the military and the judiciary.  The Ben Achour Commission recognised that it could not 
intervene in future politics, with or without the assistance of the judiciary, and so designed a 
system that concentrated power in an elected Assembly but also ensured that no single party 
could dominate the Assembly.  The results are summarized in this table: 
Table 2: Design of the Transitional Institutions 
 Egypt Tunisia 
State Institutions separate branches Constituent Assembly (majoritarian) 
Electoral Rules complicated - first past the 
post, presidential appointments, 
staggered elections (results are 
majoritarian) 
PR (countermajoritarian) 
Role of Courts constitutional review 
(countermajoritarian) 
no constitutional review (majoritarian) 
 
 
The SCAF represented the Egyptian military, which had long played a central role in 
Egyptian politics.  The members of the SCAF knew that the military would still be able to 
intervene in the political arena in the future, even if the SCAF or its individual members were 
                                                                                                                                                       
dissolved itself soon after issuing the March 2011 Decree.  Interim constitutional issues were again addressed by the 
National Assembly in the December 2011 Provisional Organic Law, which confirmed the basic features of the 
Commission’s Decree, including the abolition of the Constitutional Council.  
“Constitutional Declaration 2011,” Egypt State Information Service, 30 March 2011. 
http://www.egypt.gov.eg/english/laws/constitution/default.aspx 
“Decree-­law n° 2011­14 dated 23 March 2011, relating to the provisional organization of the public authorities,” 
World Intellectual Property Organization, http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=245403  
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removed.  The existence of the SCC, its high degree of popular legitimacy, and Egypt’s long 
tradition of an activist judiciary gave the SCAF a means of intervening in politics without 
launching a coup or governing the country directly.  The Ben Achour Commission in contrast 
was a temporary gathering of political and civil society figures that drew its legitimacy from 
Tunisia’s constitutional crisis following the 2011 revolution.  Although many members of the 
Commission have continued to influence Tunisia politics, the Commission itself could not last 
beyond the immediate post-revolution period.  In theory, the judiciary could provide a means of 
entrenching the Commission’s decisions even after it had disbanded.  However, the Tunisian 
judiciary was unsuited to such an active role in politics.  As a result, the Commission had no 
means to entrench its decisions against future actions by the Assembly, even if it had wanted to 
do so. 
This conclusion has important implications for the larger study because it suggests that 
the formal powers of courts were not determined by the majoritarian or counter-majoritarian 
interests of the drafting bodies.  Rather, the SCAF and the Ben Achour Commission each 
inherited a judicial system that lent itself to a different role in transitional politics.  The drafting 
bodies were limited in the powers that they could assign to the courts. 
 
Checks and Balances among State Institutions 
 State institutions are bodies that derive their authority directly from a constitution.  They 
are analogous to the branches of government in the US Constitution.  The main decision is 
whether to concentrate power in a single state institution, like the British parliament, or disperse 
it among several, like the three branches of US Constitution.   
 The SCAF’s February 2011 Constitutional Proclamation created an elected presidency, a 
bicameral legislature consisting of the Shura Council and the House of Representatives, and a 
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Constitutional Assembly to be elected by the House of Representatives and charged solely with 
drafting a new constitution118.  The Decree also allowed the Supreme Constitutional Court to 
continue exercising constitutional review during the transition.  The existence of these separate 
branches of government created multiple checks and balances.  Moreover, each branch was 
elected according to a different procedure.  As a result, the odds of a single party winning a 
majority through each of these procedures were reduced. 
 The SCAF also granted itself extensive powers in the transitional Decree and subsequent 
amendments, effectively making itself another constitutional institution.  According to the 
Decree, the SCAF would exercise full legislative and executive powers until the parliament and 
president could be elected.  Even after the elections, the SCAF would still have important powers 
related to military affairs.  The June 2012 amendments to the Constitutional Declaration 
extended the SCAF’s legislative powers after the elections119.   
The design of Egypt’s transitional state institutions is clearly countermajoritarian, but the 
major role of the SCAF raises questions about how this system would operate.  If the SCAF 
could veto actions itself, why create other countermajoritarian features?  The SCAF may have 
thought of these powers as a last resort to be used only in extraordinary circumstances.  The 
SCAF may have considered the use of its powers to be politically costly, so it would be 
preferable to create a system in which its veto would be used only rarely. 
 In terms of state institutions, the design of the Tunisian Assembly is highly centralized, or 
centripetal, to use Gerring and Thacker’s phrase120.  Gerring and Thacker list numerous 
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119 “English Text of SCAF Amended Constitutional Declaration,” Al-Ahram, 18 June 2012. 
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characteristics of centripetal government, some of which fall into the category of institutional 
choice open to decision by the Ben Achour Commission, such as electoral system, and others 
into secondary effects of these choices, such as party system.  Of the issues that were open to 
decision, the Ben Achour Commission always selected the centripetal option.  It chose a 
unicameral legislature, an executive accountable to the legislature, party list PR electoral system, 
an ambiguous constitutional framework, few elective offices, congruent election cycles, no 
referenda, and a restrained judiciary.  With the exception of the party list PR electoral system, 
these features defined by Gerring and Thacker as centripetal overlap with the features defined by 
Ginsburg and Elster as majoritarian121.  A majority in the Assembly could pass laws, appoint the 
president, and draft the constitution without any formal check.  It could alter its own procedures 
and the procedures for ratifying the new constitution.  It could extend its own mandate without 
new elections, as it did on October 23, 2012.   
 The Ben Achour Commission did create an independent elections committee, the ISIE, 
and it gave responsibility for resolving electoral disputes to the Administrative Tribunal.  
However, once the Assembly was elected, it could change the organic laws governing the ISIE 
and the Administrative Tribunal.  As Stepan writes the Commission made only “decisions that 
were indispensable (emphasis in original) to the creation of a democratic government”122.  The 
ISIE and the Administrative Tribunal’s power to decide electoral disputes were intended to allow 
an orderly election of the Assembly, not to limit its power once it had been elected.  The Ben 
Achour Commission’s decree expired after the election of the Assembly, which was free to 
change the provisions governing the ISIE and the Administrative Tribunal. 
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Electoral Rules 
 The most well-known types of electoral rules are first-past-the-post, which has 
majoritarian implications, and proportional representation (PR), which has countermajoritarian 
implications.  Staggered elections and different electoral rules for different offices can have 
countermajoritarian effects. 
 The rules for the election of Egypt’s House of Representatives and Shura Council 
included a mixture of PR seats and single member districts, as well as additional rules and 
requirements for some seats.  Egypt’s use of different electoral rules for the two houses of 
parliament, the Constituent Assembly and the presidency can be seen as a part of a 
countermajoritarian strategy because these different rules could cause the different branches to 
be controlled by different parties.  Unusual aspects of Egypt’s electoral laws, such as the rules 
reserving seats in the parliament for independents or for workers and peasants, could also be seen 
as limitations on the ability of any one party to win a majority.  However, the actual effect of 
these rules in the 2011-2012 elections proved to be highly countermajoritarian.   
The House of Representatives was elected in three phases from November 2011 to 
January 2012.  Two-thirds of the seats were elected by proportional representation by party lists 
and one third by plurality voting in single member districts.  Initially, only independents were 
allowed to run for the single member district seats.  However, the SCAF abolished this rule.  In 
the House of Representatives, the FJP-led Democratic Alliance for Egypt received 37.5% of the 
votes, but 235 out of 498 elected seats (47.2%).  The Democratic Alliance won 108 out 166 
(65%) of the single member district seats.  The Democratic Alliance and FJP benefited 
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enormously from the existence of the single member districts and from the SCAF’s abolition of 
the independents-only rule123. 
The Shura Council was elected in two phases in March 2012, according to a complicated 
set of rules that assigned 120 seats to proportional representation, 60 to majority voting in single 
member districts, and 90 additional seats to presidential appointment.  In the Shura Council, the 
FJP received 45.04% of the votes, but 105 out of 180 elected seats (58.33%).  Furthermore, 90 
additional seats were to be appointed by the president.  Given Mursi’s election earlier that year, 
FJP control of the Shura Council was nearly inevitable124.   
The electoral rules designed by the SCAF also allowed Mursi to win the presidency.  
Mursi won 25% of the vote in the first round, the highest share of any candidate, and 51% in the 
run-off against Shafik.  A different method of electing the president, such as a national first past 
the post election without a run-off, may not have led to a different result, but Mursi’s victory 
reveals the majoritarian side of presidential systems.  As Linz points out, presidential systems 
can be particularly damaging to minorities.  The presidency cannot be divided, so even a small 
majority wins total control of the executive125.  Aspects of the Egyptian system of 
presidentialism, such as the president’s role in appointing members of the Shura Council, 
magnified these problems.  The presidential system meant that Mursi could concentrate power in 
his hands and that he could not be removed by the legislature.  Under Mubarak, Egypt did not 
have a strong legislative branch or strong political parties.  Even if the presidency and the 
legislature were controlled by different parties, Egypt’s history suggests that the legislature 
would not be able to provide a meaningful check on the president. 
                                               
123 “Egyptian Elections: Preliminary Results,” www.jadaliyya.com 
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/3331/egyptian-elections_preliminary-results_updated- 
124 Supreme Committee for Elections, https://www.elections.eg/  
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Egyptian_Shura_Council_election,_2012#cite_note-official-election-website-1 
125 Linz (1990) 
70 
The operation of Egypt’s electoral rules in 2011-2012 poses a problem for the 
countermajoritarian explanation.  At least in hindsight, it is clear that the Egyptian electoral rules 
can only restrain a majority in the legislature if the president is not also of the same party.  Many 
of these rules were inherited from the Mubarak period when there were semi-free elections for 
the legislature but no real elections for the presidency.  It is possible that the SCAF simply 
neglected to adjust these rules to a system of free presidential elections.  It is also possible that 
they accepted the Muslim Brotherhood’s promise not to field a presidential candidate and 
assumed that the new president would be pro-military.  However, neither of these explanations is 
very compelling.  The electoral rules were subject to intense debate in 2011.  The SCAF had 
unchecked legislative power to change these rules.  The SCAF did make some changes to the 
electoral laws, such as removing the independents only rule for one third of the seats in the 
House of Representatives, which was a major demand of the Muslim Brotherhood.   At the very 
least, the electoral rules suggest that the transitional institutions are not solely the result of a 
master plan devised by the SCAF. 
 In Tunisia, the electoral rules complicate the picture of the majoritarian Assembly 
system.  Stepan writes that the electoral rules adopted by the Ben Achour Commission were 
“correctly understood to have crucial antimajoritarian, democracy-facilitating, and coalition-
encouraging implications.  Had a Westminster-style ‘first-past-the-post’ system of plurality 
elections in single member districts been chosen, Ennahda would have won almost nine out of 
every ten seats, instead of the slightly more than four in ten it was able to win under PR”126.  The 
Ben Achour created a system in which a majority in the Assembly held nearly unlimited powers, 
but it also made it as hard as possible for any one party to gain such a majority.  Establishing 
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these electoral rules was one of the main decisions of the Commission.  These rules mark a break 
from the electoral system of the Ben Ali era. 
The contradiction between majoritarian state institutions and countermajoritarian 
electoral rules can be explained by a more nuanced understanding of the interests of the members 
of the Commission.  Between revolutionaries and remnants, the Commission would side with the 
revolutionaries.  Among revolutionaries, the Commission would side with the small secular 
parties against Ennahda.  However, any electoral system that empowered these small secular 
revolutionary parties would also open the door to the numerous parties representing former 
members of Ben Ali’s RCD party that appeared from 2011 to 2013. 
 Once one accepts a disconnect between the interests of the Commission and the interests 
of the main parties in the Assembly, the lack of restraints on the Assembly is puzzling.  If the 
Commission’s goal was to ensure that Ennahda could not govern alone, why did it not add 
restraints on the Assembly?  After all, Ennahda was able to form a coalition government that 
gave it a degree of control over the government and the constitution drafting process.  Moreover, 
the outcome of founding elections is often very uncertain.  In the Tunisian case, the secular 
parties and former RCD supporters were known to be in disarray after the revolution.  The 
Commission had no way of knowing that Ennahda could not attain a simple majority in the 
Assembly.  This situation would seem to necessitate additional rules, such as requiring a two 
thirds majority for approval of the constitution, or creating a bicameral legislature, that might 
contain a majority in the Assembly.  At the very least, a narrow set of procedural rules for the 
Assembly enforced by the Administrative Tribunal should have seemed attractive to the 
Commission, and might have made the Assembly system less alarming to its opponents. 
  
The Role of Courts 
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 The main theoretical issue facing the transitional regimes was whether a constitutional 
document, either an old constitution or a provisional constitutional document, would remain in 
force during the transition.  The following question was whether a court could use such a 
document to review actions by other state institutions.  However, the scope of options open to 
both the Ben Achour Commission and the SCAF was much broader than the choice of 
maintaining or abolishing judicial review.  If a court is to be an effective countermajoritarian 
institution it must be able to act independently of the other branches.  The terms of its members 
must be long, and the procedures of the court must be protected from interference.  Especially in 
a system of concrete constitutional review like Egypt’s, the constitutional court can only be 
effective if the lower courts are able to refer cases to it without interference.  The Ben Achour 
Commission and the Assembly made few changes on these points.  The SCAF’s March Decree 
simply confirmed the organization of the SCC, but a later Decree greatly increased the SCC’s 
autonomy from the presidency. 
A focus on the formal powers of high courts, especially constitutional review, suggests a 
highly majoritarian impulse behind the Commission’s Decree.  Even if the dissolution of the 
Constitutional Council could be explained by other factors, the Commission did not try to 
replace the Council with some other means of judicial review.  Several options for judicial 
review of the Assembly remained open.  That the Ben Achour Commission did not pursue any of 
these options supports the majoritarian explanation.  The inclusion of the Administrative 
Tribunal in the Commission’s Decree, like the creation of the ISIE, can be seen as indispensable 
for the operation of the election of the Assembly.   
Despite the absence of any form of constitutional review, Tunisian courts, especially the 
Tribunal, were still able to check actions of the government in some cases.  The Tribunal can, 
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and did, rule that actions taken by the government were contrary to the law.  As of 2015, internal 
reform of the Tribunal and the ordinary courts has still not been carried out127.  They still operate 
with the personnel and regulations of the Ben Ali period.  If the Commission had truly wanted to 
remove every restraint from the Assembly, it could have pushed through reforms of the Tribunal 
and the ordinary courts.  In this light, the Tunisian courts still had a countermajoritarian role even 
though they could not overturn legislation.  The Commission did not seek to empower the 
Assembly and disempower the courts across the board, rather it marked a limit for judicial 
activity by placing constitutional questions beyond the jurisdiction of the courts.     
 The SCAF’s Proclamation gave the SCC the same powers it had before the revolution, as 
well as an additional power of a priori review of electoral laws.  Even this confirmation of the 
SCC’s powers had important countermajoritarian implications.  As Ginsburg argues, 
constitutional review by a court is among the most effective countermajoritarian strategies.  
Judges are usually not elected, so they are insulated from popular opinion.  Judges serve long 
terms, so they are an effective means of entrenchment.  The empowerment of the SCC in the 
SCAF’s decree could be seen as a desire for continuity with the pre-revolutionary system, the 
need to decide possible disputes between the separate legislative, executive and constituent 
institutions, or as a check on legislative and executive actions.  All of these interpretations are 
compatible with the countermajoritarian explanation, although the last interpretation is the most 
direct.   
In summer 2011, the SCAF issued a decree law giving the SCC the power to appoint its 
own justices128.  Brown notes that total autonomy of judges to choose their own replacements is 
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nearly unique among high courts anywhere in the world.  At least in theory, these reforms 
insulated the SCC from any changes to its composition by future governments.  These measures 
ended presidential control over SCC appointments, perhaps in anticipation of the election of an 
Islamist president.    
 The SCAF’s next amendment to the SCC’s formal powers came in June 2012, 
immediately before the election of Mursi to the presidency.  The SCAF’s June 18 amendment to 
the Constitutional Declaration granted itself continued legislative powers even after the election 
of a president and asserted the autonomy of the military.  The amendment also added a procedure 
for the SCC to veto provisions of the draft constitution found to be in contradiction to the ‘goals 
of the revolution’ or ‘any principle agreed upon in all of Egypt’s previous constitutions’.129  The 
SCAF added these powers when it became clear that the Muslim Brotherhood would be able to 
dominate the constitution drafting process.   
The SCAF’s reform of the SCC’s formal powers can be seen as a direct response to the 
threat of Muslim Brotherhood control of executive, legislative and constituent bodies.  Such an 
interpretation would be consistent with the countermajoritarian hypothesis.  The SCAF ensured 
that the SCC would be able to block legislative and executive actions, that it would be able to 
retain its institutional autonomy against the Mursi presidency, and finally that it could veto 
provisions of the draft constitution.   
This interpretation makes sense based on the content of the transitional documents, but it 
has difficulty accounting for the activity of the SCC during the transition, which has largely 
based on the supervision of elections, not constitutional review of legislation or executive acts.  
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The ability to decide on the legitimacy of elections, whether through a priori review of electoral 
laws or adjudication of electoral disputes, gave the SCC much more than simply a power to 
check actions by the other branches.  When the transitional institutions went into action, the full 
potential of this power became apparent.   
  
The SCC in the Transition 
 The examination of the transitional documents leaves some unresolved questions.  Why 
did both the SCAF and the Ben Achour Commission create electoral rules that are at odds with 
their supposed countermajoritarian or majoritarian interests?  The countermajoritarian 
explanation implies that these institutions would act to counter the largest party.  In Egypt, 
seemingly countermajoritarian institutions such as the bicameral legislature and the separate 
Constitutional Assembly failed to provide any check on the presidency.  The courts at least did 
act against the Muslim Brotherhood, but how they did so is not consistent with the 
countermajoritarian explanation. 
In both cases, the transitional institutions are a mixture of majoritarian and counter-
majoritarian elements.  In Egypt, the elaborate checks and balances provided by the separate 
legislative, constituent and executive branches quickly crumbled.  Partly this is due to the 
majority commanded by the Muslim Brotherhood in every other branch of government.  Over 
the course of 2012, Mursi’s plurality in the first round of the presidential elections turned into a 
near monopoly of state power.  The judicial decisions dissolving the House of Representatives 
and the Constituent Assembly provide further evidence of the weakness of these institutions130.  
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Neither institution was able to defend itself against dissolution.  However, these bodies were not 
the focus of opposition to the judiciary and the military.  Of the elected branches, only the 
presidency commanded any real power or popular support by the end of 2012.  In hindsight, the 
weakness of these institutions is apparent even in the provisions of the SCAF’s decree.  The 
decree did little to address the concentration of power in the executive that had long 
characterized Egyptian politics.  If the SCAF had genuinely intended the parliament and the 
Constituent Assembly to check the presidency, it would have granted them additional powers.  
The operation of Egypt’s transitional institutions from 2011 to 2013 also reveals the 
central role played by the courts.  Partly this is because the FJP’s electoral success allowed 
Islamists to control every branch of government apart from the judiciary.  However, the role 
played by the courts in Egypt is not quite in line with the predictions of the countermajoritarian 
explanation.  According to this explanation, the SCAF empowered the judiciary to deal with 
precisely the situation that Egypt faced after the elections, that is a legislative and executive 
controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood.  Yet the most important actions by the SCC during this 
period were not vetoes of legislation or executive actions.  Instead, decisions by the SCC and the 
administrative courts reorganized the structure of the transitional institutions.  With the 
dissolution of the House of Representatives, the contest between Mursi and the courts took on an 
extra-constitutional character.  At first, the SCC’s powers did not extend to a veto over the 
content of the new constitution, as was the case in the South African transition or in India’s basic 
structure doctrine131.  The SCAF added this power through an additional constitutional decree, 
after it became clear that the Muslim Brotherhood would be able to dominate the constitution 
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drafting process132.  Another area of the SCC’s activity centered around the status of the SCAF 
in Egypt’s constitutional framework133. 
 The SCC was involved in deciding Egypt’s constitution both formally through its power 
of review over the draft constitution and informally through its decisions dissolving state 
institutions or dramatically changing their powers.  This constituent role of the SCC can help 
explain some of the puzzling features of the Egyptian transitional regime.  The SCC’s activity is 
the result of an attempt to find a workable balance between the different state institutions.  The 
goal was not simply to limit the power of the Muslim Brotherhood.  The SCC’s reworking of the 
transitional institutions must play out over several years.  It must test different institutional 
arrangements.  The Tunisian model of a unicameral parliament would probably have restrained 
the Muslim Brotherhood more effectively than Egypt’s complicated electoral rules and 
presidential system.  During the first phase of the transition before the election of Mursi to the 
presidency, it seems that the military tried to use elections to recreate the basic features of the 
pre-2011 system, including a weak parliament, and a strong, pro-military presidency.  Direct rule 
by the SCAF during a quick transition also created problems because popular mobilization was 
likely to continue for sometime after the 2011 revolution.  The SCAF knew that it could not 
conclude the revolution itself by simply drafting a new constitution.  
 
The Transitional Constituent Power and the Political Role of the Judiciary 
The examination of the SCAF’s Decree and the Ben Achour Commission’s March 23 
Decree undermines the argument that the drafting bodies were motivated primarily by 
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majoritarian or counter-majoritarian interests.  The actual operation of the transitional institutions 
from 2011 to 2013 casts further doubt on this argument.  Still, there is clearly a different, even 
opposing, logic behind the transitional institutions of the two countries.  The SCAF designed the 
transitional institutions to allow future interventions by the military and the judiciary.  The Ben 
Achour Commission recognised that it could not intervene in future politics, with or without the 
assistance of the judiciary, and so designed a system that made the Assembly resistant to 
interference by other actors.  Despite the ideological differences between the Commission and 
the Assembly, the members of the Commission saw the Assembly as the only means of 
implementing their vision for the transition. 
The design of the transitional institutions is still the result of the interests of the drafting 
bodies, but their interests cannot be described as simply majoritarian or countermajoritarian.  The 
design of the transitional institutions is better explained by the perceived level of durability of 
the bodies charged with drafting these documents, the Ben Achour Commission in Tunisia and 
the SCAF in Egypt, and by the ability of the judiciary in each country to enforce the transitional 
documents on elected institutions.  A body that is perceived to be durable or institutionalized, 
such as the SCAF, is expected to survive long enough to intervene in future political decisions.    
The SCAF represented the Egyptian military, which had long played a central role in 
Egyptian politics.  The members of the SCAF knew that the military would still be able to 
intervene in the political arena in the future, even if the SCAF or its individual members were 
removed.  The existence of the SCC, its high degree of popular legitimacy, and Egypt’s long 
tradition of an activist judiciary gave the SCAF a means of intervening in politics without 
launching a coup or governing the country directly.   
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The Ben Achour Commission in contrast was a temporary gathering of political and civil 
society figures that drew its legitimacy from Tunisia’s constitutional crisis following the 2011 
revolution.  Although many members of the Commission have continued to influence Tunisian 
politics, the Commission itself could not last beyond the immediate post-revolution period.  In 
theory, the judiciary could provide a means of entrenching the Commission’s decisions even 
after it had disbanded.  However, by rejecting constitutional review, the Commission also 
rejected such a role for the judiciary.  Tunisian judiciary was unsuited to such an active role in 
politics.  As a result, the Commission had no means to entrench its decisions against future 
actions by the Assembly, even if it had wanted to do so.   In order for the 
Commission’s strategy of fortifying the Assembly to be effective, the Commission must assume 
that courts are not an attractive means of entrenching its wishes.  In order for the SCAF’s 
strategy of intervening in the transition to be effective, the SCAF must assume that the courts can 
enforce decisions on other actors without direct intervention by the military.  Why so many 
actors have such different perceptions of the ability of courts in the two countries is not clear.  
Yet this perception is as essential to events as the different interests of the SCAF and the 
Commission.  The actions of the SCAF and the Ben Achour Commission do not make sense 
otherwise.  The SCAF would have had no choice but to rule directly after 2011, and especially 
after the election of Mursi in 2012.  The Ben Achour Commission could have continued to 
influence the transition through the courts, perhaps making the Assembly system unnecessary. 
 
The SCAF and the Political Use of the Judiciary 
 It is clear that the Egyptian military is highly institutionalized, and that the members of 
the SCAF acted primarily as representatives of the military establishment.  It is harder to say 
whether the SCAF designed the transitional institutions to facilitate military intervention in 
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politics, or whether they hoped that the countermajoritarian features of the transitional 
documents would make military intervention unnecessary.   
To answer this question, it is necessary to define the military’s role in Egyptian politics 
more precisely.  There are many kinds of military regimes and many patterns of civil-military 
relations.  I outline three ideal types based on the examples of Chile (1990-present), Turkey 
(1960-2002) and Egypt (1952-2011).  The SCAF could have envisioned a situation like the 
transition engineered by Pinochet, where the military gave up power without any expectation of 
a future coup, but also left a constitutional legacy that maintained the autonomy of the military 
and weakened the left-wing opposition.  In Turkey, the military both rewrote the constitution and 
intervened regularly in later politics.  Yet the military establishment also coexisted with both 
pro-military and anti-military elected governments.  In Egypt before 2011, the president was 
always a former military officer and was never subject to any real electoral challenge.  The 
military was capable of direct intervention in politics, but it never did so between the Free 
Officers’ Coup and 2011 because the government was always pro-military134. 
Each of these types implies a different role for a constitutional court.  In the Chilean 
scenario, the constitutional court becomes a truly independent actor in the democratic system that 
enforces a constitution created by the military.  The military cannot influence the actions of the 
court except through the constitution that it drafted before the transition to democracy.  Rulings 
by the court on matters of interest to the military carry no more weight than rulings on other 
areas, and are not more likely to be obeyed by other actors.  The countermajoritarian explanation 
of the transitional documents implies that the SCAF expected a Chilean-style transition, that is a 
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situation in which the military uses law to influence politics even after its capacity to launch a 
coup has waned.   
In the Turkish scenario, the constitutional court coexists with a politicized military, which 
may institutionalize its role in politics through bodies like the Turkish National Security Council 
or the Egyptian SCAF.  The court may enforce a constitution drafted by the military, but it can 
also cooperate with the military in response to political developments.  The military may issue 
amendments to the constitution or other decrees that give a basis to court decisions.  The court’s 
rulings in areas of interest to the military are more likely to be respected than rulings in other 
areas because the court’s decision represents an implicit threat of military intervention. 
 Instead of believing that it had actually given up power to civilians, the SCAF envisioned 
the Turkish scenario of civilian rule with the possibility of military intervention.  The continuing 
role of the SCAF in the transitional documents and the 2012 Constitution make this clear.  The 
2013 coup shows that military intervention remained a possibility in Egypt.  Such intervention 
was the real veto on the elected government.  At some point, the military decided that 
cohabitation with Mursi was impossible and that only a return to the pre-2011 system of a pro-
military presidency was acceptable.  The SCAF might have been able to tolerate a non-military 
president during ordinary times, but the context of popular revolution and constitutional hiatus 
made such cohabitation difficult.  Over the long term, that is after the adoption of a permanent 
constitution, they may have expected the courts to play a more prominent role as the military 
withdrew from politics.  In this scenario, the constitutional court should aid the military by 
defining the limits of acceptable behavior by the civilian leadership.  It can block legislation that 
the military opposes.  It can legitimate the military’s involvement in politics.   
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The debate over the sequencing of elections is better interpreted in light of the SCAF’s 
continued involvement in politics.  The Muslim Brotherhood favored holding legislative and 
presidential elections before drafting a new constitution, presumably because the newly elected 
executive and legislative branches would be able to influence the constitution drafting process.  
The SCAF conceded this point to the Brotherhood in the 2011 Constitutional Declaration135.  
The staggered elections during the long transition designed by the SCAF did not produce 
noticeable countermajoritarian effects; the FJP won all of the elections held in 2011 and 2012.  
However, by drawing out the transitional process, the SCAF gave itself time to react to 
developments.   
The empowerment of the SCC is a result of the long transition.  The strengthened SCC 
allowed the SCAF to rework the transitional institutions after the promulgation of the original 
transitional Decree in 2011.  The SCAF responded to Mursi’s victory in the presidential election 
by limiting the power of the presidency and increasing the independence of the SCC.  It 
responded to the Muslim Brotherhood’s control of the Constituent Assembly by giving the SCC 
a veto over the draft constitution136.  The SCAF’s first choice was the election of a pro-military 
president.  Once the SCAF knew that this was impossible, it shifted greater power to the SCC.  
Its second choice was the Turkish scenario of a civilian president limited by a constitutional 
court and the implicit threat of military intervention.  Only when this second choice became 
unworkable did the military shift to its third choice, direct military rule.  At each of these 
junctures the SCAF worked with the SCC to change the institutional rules governing the 
transition.  The military seems to have underestimated the popularity of the FJP, and 
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overestimated its ability to constrain Mursi.  Yet it is now obvious the military always retained 
its ultimate power to intervene in politics.  Allowing the transition to proceed was relatively 
costless for the military. 
The military could not have predicted that events would compel it to govern directly, the 
option that it had sought to avoid for decades.  Moreover, a short transition under direct military 
rule would create difficulties for the SCAF.  As in Tunisia, the immediate post-revolutionary 
period mobilized the population, creating opportunities for new actors and dangers for 
established institutions.  The Ben Achour Commission benefited from this mobilization, but it 
threatened established institutions like the SCAF.  The demonstrators could not be easily 
demobilized in 2011.  The military needed the Tamarod movement to get the population on its 
side137.  For these reasons, the SCAF preferred a system that would prolong the transition and 
allow the SCAF to intervene in politics rather than governing directly. 
 
The Ben Achour Commission and the Decision to Delay the Decision 
 
For critics like Habib Koubaa, the Commission and the Assembly represent the same 
group of revolutionary parties.  Contrary to this position, I argue that by creating the Assembly, 
the Commission actually gave up a great deal of power to its ideological adversaries.  The Ben 
Achour Commission was certainly a revolutionary body, but it also contained relatively few 
Islamists138.  Indeed many members of the Commission, including Ben Achour himself, who had 
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resigned from the Constitutional Council in 1992, had held high positions under the Ben Ali 
regime.  Ben Achour himself had a difficult relationship with Ennahda.  Ennahda spokesman 
Ziad al-Doulatli stated that Ben Achour is “known for his Francophone and secular leanings and 
his hostility toward religion”139. 
The Commission worked hand in hand with a provisional government headed by two 
figures from the old regime, Mohamed Ghannouchi and Beji Caid Essebsi.  The provisional 
government faced the Kasbah protesters who occupied the Place du Gouvernement demanding 
the establishment of a National Constituent Assembly and the drafting of a new constitution140.  
The provisional government’s original plan of quickly holding presidential elections under the 
1959 constitution proved untenable in the face of the demonstrations.  The Ben Achour 
Commission was convened to find a way out of this impasse.  It is possible that the adoption of 
the Assembly system was unavoidable given the pressure from the Kasbah demonstrators.  For 
anyone who had suspicions of Ennahda and recognized the impossibility of maintaining the old 
regime, the creation of judicial review would seem to be an obvious strategy. 
In fact, both the nature of the transitional constituent power and the status of the 
country’s courts limited the options open to the Ben Achour Commission.  The Commission was 
appointed by the provisional government, and its decisions could only become effective through 
decrees issued by the government.  It gained its legitimacy by representing a broad spectrum of 
political parties and civil society.  Most importantly it operated in a brief window immediately 
                                                                                                                                                       
Ennahda sympathies, but the heavy representation from civil society and labor would seem to limit the influence of 
Islamists in the Commission.  In any case, the March 23 Decree was approved by a nearly unanimous vote. See 
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after the 2011 revolution and before the entrenchment of a new government.  Some members of 
the secular opposition hoped that the Commission might continue to sit in some capacity even 
after it had promulgated the Decree to provide a check on Ennahda.  In fact, the Commission 
quickly lost relevance after March 2011, and voted to disband itself in May 2011141. 
The Commission could not institutionalize itself and thus could not intervene in 
subsequent politics.  The only way that the Commission could ensure that its wishes were carried 
out was by empowering some other body, most likely a court, to enforce the content of its 
Decree on the Assembly.  That the Commission passed up this opportunity to extend its 
influence is puzzling.  However, several factors made the Tunisian courts unsuitable for such a 
role.  The Constitutional Council lacked popular legitimacy.  It could have acted as a secular 
roadblock against Ennahda’s ambitions.  The Council was at odds with the Commission on other 
issues. 
These factors left the Commission with few options for influencing the transition.  The 
best option was to ensure that the Commission’s creation, the Assembly would be able to 
survive.  The fall of the Assembly would mean the end of the Commission’s project.  Any 
replacement for the Assembly would likely overturn the balance between the political factions 
created by the Commission’s choice of electoral rules.  For these reasons, the Commission 
favored the success of the Assembly over an alternative imposed by other actors.  Statements by 
Ben Achour as well as the operation of the Assembly from 2011 to 2014 support this logic. 
In an interview to La Presse, Ben Achour discussed the possibility of a referendum on the 
draft constitution. 
this idea of using a referendum was discussed. But we immediately discarded it because of this 
danger. I remember saying to my colleagues, “We’ll treat the Constituents like the pope. We’ll 
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lock them up in the Bardo palace until they reach agreement on a draft by a two-thirds majority. 
At that point, they’ll send out white smoke.” They just have to manage to arrive at that two-
thirds consensus. This condition is a guarantee the consensus will be achieved. And we did not 
include resort to a referendum in our provisional draft constitution. Otherwise, we run the risk of 
a total vacuum at the level of State institutions. Neither the National Constituent Assembly, nor 
the government nor the President of the Republic will have legitimacy any longer, this time 
either legal or political. This vacuum can be fatal.  It can lead to the development of anarchy. 
And faced with a vacuum or anarchy, no legal armed force can remain indifferent. I’m saying 
this frankly: not only may it intervene, but in this hypothesis of national disaster, out of duty to 
the entire homeland, it is obliged to intervene in order to put an end to chaos.142  
 
This statement reveals several key aspects of Ben Achour’s thinking about the Assembly.  
He emphasizes the impossibility of any institutional check on the Assembly.  Ben Achour was 
clearly alarmed by the possibility that the Assembly would ignore the two thirds rule and instead 
approve the draft constitution by referendum, but he also recognized that no provision of the 
transitional documents prevented it from doing so. 
This understanding of the dangers facing the Tunisian transition led Ben Achour to favor 
the institutional design that would “treat the Constituents like the pope,” or like cardinals to be 
precise.  The failure of the Assembly or rejection of its constitution would create “a total vacuum 
at the level of State institutions.”  Of course, some state institutions, including the ordinary 
courts, would continue to operate in such a scenario.  Ben Achour does not consider the courts 
capable of filling the vacuum.  The military could fill the vacuum, and Ben Achour seems to 
welcome military intervention in case of the failure of the Assembly, but he also considers such 
intervention to be outside the bounds of any political structure.  A military coup in Tunisia would 
have ended the transition set in motion by the Commission.   
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87 
The debate over the expiration of the Assembly’s one year mandate that played out from 
October 2012 until the resignation of the Troika II government in January 2014 reveals the utility 
of this system.  By 2012, the Assembly had become quite unpopular.  The opposition called for 
the dissolution of the Assembly and the appointment of a committee of experts to draft the 
constitution.  However in the absence of any legal means of dissolving, the opposition could 
reach this goal only by plunging the country into the ‘void’ described by Ben Achour.  Given this 
choice, compromise within the Assembly system proved more attractive to the secular 
opposition. 
 
Conclusion: From Countermajoritarianism to Interventionism 
 
The Tunisian transitional institutions are not fully majoritarian, and the Egyptian 
transitional institutions are not fully countermajoritarian.  The interests of the Ben Achour 
Commission and the SCAF cannot simply be described as majoritarian or countermajoritarian.  
Certainly, the SCAF feared rule by the Muslim Brotherhood, but its overarching goal was to 
protect the core interests of the military.  The Commission also tried to prevent the Islamists 
from gaining a majority in the Assembly.  The Ben Achour Commission needed an 
undissolvable Assembly to complete the tasks - writing a constitution and governing the country 
during the transition, that the Commission itself could not do.  This reinterpretation of the design 
of the transitional institutions and of the interests of the drafting bodies undermines the 
countermajoritarian hypothesis, but it does not answer the original question of why the formal 
powers of the SCC were so much greater than those given to any Tunisian court.  Constitutional 
review by a court would seem to be a good way for the Commission to ensure that its wishes 
were carried out.  The characteristics of the SCAF make it capable of intervening in politics, but 
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it is not clear why a partnership with the SCC was most attractive means for such intervention.  
The formal powers of the Tunisian court are limited even when the Commission, the body 
charged with granting these powers, seems to have an interest in strong constitutional review.  
The formal powers of the Egyptian court are strong even when the SCAF does not seem to need 
the courts. 
In the next section, the positions of political parties and legal professionals reveal a 
surprising consensus in each country about the role of courts.  Majority parties do favor 
somewhat weaker courts, and minority parties do favor somewhat stronger courts, but the range 
of positions is limited by underlying notions about the proper role of courts.    
  
Implication 2: Views of Political Parties on the Role of Courts 
 A second implication of the countermajoritarian explanation is that minority political 
parties will support constitutional review, while majority political parties will oppose it.  I assess 
this implication based on interviews with Tunisian political parties and the actions taken by 
Tunisian and Egyptian political parties on issues related to judicial power during the course of 
the transition.  Interviews with legal professionals help put the positions of the political parties in 
context.  There is important variation in the positions of political parties on this question in both 
countries.  However, interviews, public statements, and provisions of draft constitutions show 
that the positions of political parties are constrained by conceptions of the judicial role.   
 
Tunisia 
 
 In Tunisia, political parties addressed the question of constitutional review several times 
during the transition - during the drafting of the transitional documents in spring 2011, the debate 
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over the role of the Administrative Tribunal in 2012 to 2013, the drafting of the transitional 
provisions of the 2014 constitution, and the design of the new Constitutional Court to be created 
by 2016.  On all of these issues, parties show a greater degree of consensus than the majoritarian 
explanation implies. 
 
Dissolving the Constitutional Council: 2011 
 There is a consensus in favor of abolishing the Constitutional Council among Tunisian 
political parties.  All of the interviewees - Samir Taieb of al-Massar, Mohamed Bennour of 
Ettakatol, Fatma Bouraoui of Nidaa Tounes, and Walid ben Omrane of CPR - agree that the 
Constitutional Council was too close to the old regime and to Ben Ali personally and had to be 
dissolved after the revolution.  Even parties that were opposed to the Troika (Al-Massar and 
Nidaa Tounes) or that included members of the dissolved RCD (Nidaa Tounes) supported the 
dissolution of the Council.   
Only legal professionals who had previously been affiliated with the Council were 
willing to defend it.  Hichem Hammi defended the “excellent jurisprudence” of the Council 
while still recognizing that the Council’s close ties to Ben Ali made its dissolution necessary 
after the revolution.  Zouheir M’dhaffar favored a quick transition under the 1959 Constitution 
that would have allowed the continued operation of the Council.  In the interview, Habib Koubaa 
proposed the review of the Assembly’s legislative and executive functions, but not its constituent 
function143.  A somewhat different consensus exists among legal professionals.  They may not 
condemn the Council, but they also recognize that it is incompatible with the transitional system.  
Constitutional review, whether by the Council, the Tribunal, or any other body, requires a basis 
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in the transitional documents.  All of the legal professionals insisted that courts cannot and 
should not claim more powers for themselves. 
 
Provisional Review: The Tribunal and the Instance Provisoire pour le Contrôle Constitutionnel 
des Projets de Loi (IPCCPL) 
 
 There is also a consensus among political parties in favor of the continued operation of 
the Administrative Tribunal with its Ben Ali-era personnel, but some disagreement about the 
possibility of provisional constitutional review by the Tribunal.  The Tribunal clearly has broad 
political legitimacy that the Council lacked.  As a result, it was a more promising site for 
constitutional review during the transition than the Council.  The party representatives and legal 
professionals agreed that review by the Tribunal would be more of a check on the Assembly than 
review by the IPCCPL.  The IPCCPL consists of three members drawn from the court and legal 
academia and three members appointed by government officials.  Koubaa argues that the 
IPCCPL is designed to not provide a real restraint on the Assembly.  Many of its members are 
political appointees and non-judges, and it lacks the long institutional history of the 
Administrative Tribunal144.  The legal professionals were opposed to the IPCCPL and critical of 
its activity, but they were also suspicious of constitutional review by the Tribunal.  Samir Taieb 
attributed the failure of al-Massar’s plans for constitutional review by the Tribunal to opposition 
by the Troika parties.  However, opposition to this plan was more widespread than Taieb’s 
argument implies.  Fatma Bouraoui of Nidaa Tounes expressed support for the IPCCPL, saying 
that it successfully combined constitutional review with the Assembly system.  The 2014 
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Constitution, including the provisions concerning the IPCCPL, was adopted by a nearly 
unanimous vote in the Assembly145.   
 All five legal professionals expressed skepticism of constitutional review by the Tribunal.  
Habib Koubaa considered provisional review by the Tribunal to be marginally preferable to the 
IPCCPL, but also theoretically problematic because the Tribunal is designed only to review the 
legality of administrative acts, not the constitutionality of laws.  As Koubaa puts it “every level 
of legality should have its own guardian”146.  The Tribunal does not have the technical expertise 
necessary to review the constitutionality of laws.  The concentration of both constitutional 
review and administrative law functions in the Tribunal would pose a problem to the balance of 
powers.  Hichem Hammi, currently a magistrate of the Tribunal, also rejected constitutional 
review by the Tribunal, also citing the hierarchy of legality mentioned by Koubaa.  After the 
adoption of the 2014 constitution, the Tribunal could use the constitution as a source of law in its 
decisions, even though it could not void a statute.  During the constitutional hiatus, the Tribunal 
would have no basis for review of the Assembly.  These concerns override the sympathy that 
legal professionals have for the Tribunal and their partisan affiliation with the secular opposition. 
 
Egypt 
 As in Tunisia, actors addressed the question of constitutional review several times during 
the transition.   First, the SCAF decided to continue constitutional review under its February 
2011 Proclamation.  Political parties did not have a direct role in making this decision, but they 
could still take positions on it.  The 2011-2012 elections brought the FJP to power and pushed 
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non-Islamists into the opposition.  Once it became clear that Mursi would win the presidency, the 
debate over constitutional review became a contest between the Muslim Brotherhood and the 
SCC and SCAF.  Restraints on the positions of both sides fell away over the course of 2012-
2013.  Both sides attempted to change the status of the courts for their own interest.  Mursi’s 
government addressed this issue on two occasions - during the drafting of the 2012 Constitution 
and the crisis surrounding Mursi’s constitutional Decree in November and December 2012147.  
Mursi also removed a number of sitting judges from the ordinary courts, and the opposition often 
accused him of planning a judicial purge.  Mursi’s Constitutional Decree was the only time that 
the principle of constitutional review by the SCC was directly challenged.  At other times, debate 
focused on reform of the appointment and internal procedures of the SCC and the ordinary 
judiciary148.   
 In contrast to Tunisia, constitutional review and the status of the SCC became bitterly 
divisive issues in Egypt.  Yet the conflicts surrounding these issues mask a consensus on the role 
of courts that is quite different from the consensus in Tunisia.  The Mursi government never 
sought to suspend constitutional review for any length of time comparable to Tunisia’s three year 
constitutional hiatus.  Judging from both its actions and its statements, the Muslim Brotherhood 
accepted the principle of constitutional review, even as it sought to make constitutional review 
more amenable to its political goals. 
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Direct Rule by the SCAF: February 2011 - June 2012 
 The provisions of the SCAF’s Constitutional Proclamation are discussed above; here the 
focus is on the opposition parties’ responses to the Proclamation.  The Muslim Brotherhood and 
other opposition groups objected to many aspects of the Proclamation and the SCAF’s rule, but 
they accepted constitutional review by the SCC.  The key issues of this early phase of the 
transition include the drafting a new constitution and amending the 1971 Constitution, the 
sequencing of constitution drafting and elections, and electoral law issues.  The SCAF made 
many concessions to the opposition on these issues.  For example, it agreed to the drafting of a 
new constitution after elections, which was a key demand of the opposition.  It rejected direct 
military rule during the constitution drafting process.  It allowed candidates affiliated with parties 
to stand for the independent seats in the parliament149.  It could be that the SCAF saw 
constitutional review as the one area on which they could not compromise.  In fact, there was 
consensus between the SCAF and the opposition on the role of the SCC.  In this early phase, the 
opposition was more likely to see the SCC as a check on the SCAF than as a barrier to majority 
rule.  Direct rule by the SCAF during a constitutional hiatus, the most pro-military position, 
would be at odds with constitutional review by the SCC.  The inclusion of the SCC in the 
Constitutional Proclamation can be seen as part of an overall compromise by the SCAF that 
allowed an elected government to guide the constitution drafting process150. 
The understanding between the Muslim Brotherhood and the judiciary during the 
Mubarak period and the early months of the revolution seems tenuous and half-hearted in 
hindsight.  It could be that the independence of the judiciary and the principle of constitutional 
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review were red lines that the military would not allow the Mursi government to cross.  The 
Brotherhood may have limited its actions and statements from the 2007 platform until the 
November 2012 Constitutional Decree to respect this red line.  Certainly, these statements by the 
Brotherhood mask a deep suspicion of the sitting judges, all of whom were in some way products 
of the Mubarak regime.  The calls for judicial reform by the FJP-dominated House of 
Representatives and Muslim Brotherhood protests against judicial corruption reflect this 
suspicion.  However, certain aspects of the Muslim Brotherhood program, such as pushing back 
the power of the executive and even the gradual Islamicization of Egyptian law, are not 
necessarily at odds with the judiciary.  Moustafa notes that the opposition, including the Muslim 
Brotherhood, considered the drafting of a new constitution the centerpiece of the revolution and 
favored the involvement of courts in the transition.  Rutherford suggests a genuine adherence of 
the leadership of the Brotherhood to an ideology of Islamic constitutionalism151.  Specifically, 
the Brotherhood was invested in the principle of Article 2 of the 1971 constitution, that shariah is 
a source of legislation, and that compatibility of laws with the shariah can be assessed by a court.  
The 2007 Muslim Brotherhood platform - often considered a hardline document - still calls for 
protecting the jurisdiction of the ‘natural judge’ against the exceptional military and security 
courts152.  The ordinary and administrative judiciary would also support these protections.  The 
platform appeared immediately after the struggle over judicial supervision of elections in 2005, 
when the judges and opposition groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood, were on the same 
side against the Mubarak regime. 
Events culminating in Mursi’s election in June 2012 changed the stakes of constitutional 
review.  First, over the course of 2011-2012, the SCC took actions that convinced the 
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Brotherhood that it was an ally of the SCAF.  The SCC upheld the dissolution of the 
Constitutional Assembly.  SCC judges played a direct role in the drafting of the SCAF’s 
constitutional amendments153.  Second, with the election of a civilian government, the SCC’s 
power of constitutional review could be used against the FJP rather than the SCAF, and the 
judiciary increasingly became a target of protests by the Muslim Brotherhood.    
 
Mursi’s Presidency: June 2012 - June 2013 
The FJP government attempted to weaken the judiciary through several means short of 
abolishing constitutional review, both during the transition and to a lesser extent in the 2012 
Constitution.  Before its dissolution by court order, the FJP-controlled parliament considered 
legislation reforming the appointment of SCC judges154.  In the spring of 2013, the Shura 
Council again considered legislation reforming the judiciary.  These indirect approaches 
arguably posed a greater threat than the temporary suspension of constitutional review because 
they were directed at the institutional autonomy of the judiciary, yet Mursi’s Constitutional 
Decree became the turning point in relations between the Muslim Brotherhood and the judiciary.   
Mursi’s Constitutional Decree explicitly excluded executive actions and the work of the 
Constitutional Assembly from judicial review, yet in many respects the aims of this Decree were 
limited.  The Decree stated that it would apply only until the adoption of a new constitution.  In 
practice, it applied for a very limited time frame of several weeks in November and December 
2012, when Mursi suspended the Decree.  In any case, the new constitution was adopted by the 
end of the year.  Mursi’s Decree was clearly an attempt to reverse the SCAF’s June 18 
amendment to the Constitutional Proclamation, which had given the SCC the power to review 
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the draft constitution.  Such a power had not been included in the original Constitutional 
Proclamation and had no precedents in earlier practices of the SCC.  Despite these limitations, 
the Decree’s suspension of constitutional review proved to be an extremely divisive issue.  The 
Judges’ Club, the main professional organization representing Egypt’s judges, organized protests 
and threatened to withhold judicial supervision of the constitutional referendum155. 
The 2012 Constitution was drafted by the FJP-dominated Constitutional Assembly, but it 
also included concessions to the military.  The president cannot declare war without the 
permission of the military.  Some guarantees of the military’s autonomy were written into the 
Constitution.  It was criticized for being too similar to the 1971 Constitution.  The 2012 
Constitution retained broad powers for the presidency, which would empower Mursi.  The 2012 
Constitution did not make substantial changes to the judiciary or the SCC.  It did call for the 
creation of an Islamic law council practicing a priori review of legislation, which could have 
undermined the SCC’s jurisdiction in this area.  It also left many of the details of the SCC’s 
appointment and operation to subsequent legislation, which the opposition worried would open 
the door to attacks on the court’s independence.  Nevertheless, the SCC accepted it as a valid 
constitution in its decision between December 2012 and June 2013.   
In spring 2013, rumors circulated that the FJP government intended to remove up to 
3,500 sitting judges156.  By this time, the SCC and the judiciary in general had become targets of 
protests by Muslim Brotherhood supporters.  The judiciary and the secular opposition in general 
held up Mursi’s constitutional Decree as evidence of the lawlessness of his government.  Despite 
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the adoption of the 2012 constitution, the rift between the judiciary and the government never 
healed.   
 
The Changing Politics of Constitutional Review 
This narrative leads to several conclusions.  Initially, both sides accepted the legitimacy 
of constitutional review and of judicial supervision of elections.  In the midst of disagreements 
about the timing of elections and the means of drafting a new constitution, there was a consensus 
on the role of courts.  This consensus broke down over the course of 2011 and 2012.  The SCAF 
further increased the formal powers and institutional autonomy in response to the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s electoral successes.  The Mursi government responded with the Constitutional 
Decree that suspended constitutional review temporarily.  
Yet this strategic use of the judiciary had its limits.  In Egypt, constitutional review is not 
a politically neutral instrument that can be used by any party.  During the period of direct rule by 
the SCAF 2011-2012, the FJP concluded that it could not trust the judiciary to safeguard its 
interests.  Barring a dramatic purge of the judiciary, the FJP would have to be in power for many 
years or even decades to sufficiently reshape the composition of the judiciary.  Even drafting a 
new constitution might not be enough if the SCC retained the power to interpret it.  Suspending 
or abolishing constitutional review would seem to be a particularly attractive strategy in such 
circumstances.  Still, the FJP did not attempt to remove constitutional review, or even suspend it 
for an extended period of time.  The Tunisian scenario of an open-ended constitutional hiatus 
without constitutional review was unthinkable in Egypt, even for the party that might benefit 
from such a system.  The FJP’s attempts to change the composition of the judiciary and to 
establish a priori review of legislation based on Islamic law suggest that the party was interested 
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in creating judicial review that would be more favorable, rather than eliminating judicial review 
altogether.   
It could be that the courts represented a redline for the military and that the Mursi 
government backed off from attempts to limit their power out of fear of a military intervention.  
However, the Mursi government did continue attempts to reform the composition of the 
judiciary, which were denounced by the judiciary and the military.  In attempting to use the 
judiciary to their advantage, actors in both Tunisia and Egypt were limited by certain 
characteristics of the judicial system they inherited from the pre-revolutionary regime.  Even if a 
majoritarian party in Egypt had total control over the design of the transitional documents it 
seems unlikely that they would have chosen the Assembly system.  Instead, they most likely 
would have created a form of constitutional review that would have been favorable to their 
interests, just as Sadat created the SCC to further his interests.   
 
Conclusion 
 The evidence undermines the countermajoritarian hypothesis.  At first glance, the 
different interests of political authorities in the two countries offer a compelling explanation.  It 
also changes the picture of the relationship between courts and political authorities, including the 
SCAF, Ben Achour Commission, the Mursi government and the Assembly.  The formal powers 
are not simply delegated by these political authorities to courts. 
 Several questions remain.  It is clear that the SCAF knew that it would continue to be a 
factor in Egyptian politics, while the Ben Achour Commission knew that it gained its authority 
only from the immediate post-revolutionary context.  This difference is more important than the 
supposed majoritarianism of the Commission and countermajoritarianism of the SCAF.  It is not 
clear why these characteristics would lead to a different relationship with the courts.  Why did 
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the Ben Achour Commission not try to use constitutional review to entrench its position against 
the Assembly?  After all, if the Commission knew that it could not institutionalize itself, then 
constitutional review would be its only chance to influence later politics.   It is also clear that a 
range of actors, including both political parties and legal professionals, had little confidence in 
constitutional review of the Tunisian Assembly by any court.  Where does this perception come 
from?  The SCAF could intervene without legal cover, but the SCAF preferred to create several 
transitional institutions and to empower the SCC to supervise them, rather than exercising power 
itself.  
 The views of political parties on the courts present a similar puzzle.  They display a 
remarkable level of consensus about issues that the countermajoritarian hypotheses states should 
be divisive.  In Egypt, this consensus broke down following Mursi’s Constitutional Decree.  This 
most radical phase of Mursi’s presidency still did not come close to replicating the Tunisian 
system.  The gap between the two cases remains, even after examining the full spectrum of 
positions adopted by political parties.  In both cases, parties do not adopt the positions that would 
be most favorable to them.  The question for the next two chapters is how this constraint 
developed.   
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3: CIVIL SOCIETY AND JUDICIAL POWER 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
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 Chapter 2 left unanswered the question of why the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces 
(SCAF) chose the courts as the main countermajoritarian feature of the transitional institutions, 
rather than exercising a veto itself or holding elections after the adoption of a new constitution.  
One answer to this question is that the exercise of a veto by a court is more legitimate than the 
exercise of a veto by the military or an extended period of military rule.  Provided that the courts 
would reliably check an elected government, the SCAF may have preferred the more popular 
approach of interim constitutional review by the SCC.  This answer points to the resources that 
courts might have in society at large, beyond formal state institutions. 
 This answer fits well with the civil society hypothesis, which argues that the Supreme 
Constitutional Court (SCC) enjoyed greater support from civil society than the Tunisian courts 
did, and that this support led the SCAF to grant additional powers to the SCC.  This hypothesis 
builds on work by Epp, Rosberg, Brown, El-Ghobashy, and especially Moustafa.  Moustafa and 
El-Ghobashy focus on the connection between the courts and civil society as an explanation for 
the high level of activity of Egyptian courts.  Brown emphasizes conceptions of liberal legality as 
a factor allowing the expanded role of the SCC.  All of these authors look to civil society to 
explain the expansion of the SCC’s activity into new areas or its willingness to rule against the 
government.  They do not argue that civil society activism explains why Sadat created the SCC 
or gave it its powers.  Moustafa instead explains the creation of the SCC as part of the 
government's plan to attract foreign investment.  Rosberg explicitly rejects the ‘English 
hypothesis’ - that groups outside of the state may be strong enough to compel the state to accept 
courts as mediators - as an explanation for the increased independence that the government 
granted to the administrative courts157.  Still, the 2011 revolution could have given civil society 
an opening to influence the formal powers of courts.  Popular protests proved capable of 
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changing the behavior of regimes, and the process of constitution drafting made a redesign of the 
courts plausible.  In Egypt, conflict between liberal civil society and the newly-elected Islamist 
government created a new alliance among the civil society, the courts and the SCAF. 
 The civil society hypothesis has three steps, each of which has observable implications.  
First, civil society support for the courts must increase before 2011.  Civil society supports the 
SCC because of the history of activist litigation since the establishment of the SCC.  Such a 
history is lacking in Tunisia because the Constitutional Council could not exercise a posteriori 
review.  Second, the alliance between civil society and the courts must continue through the 
transition.  Third, the drafting bodies must act according to this pressure from civil society, either 
because civil society has direct control over the drafting process or because the drafting body 
decides to make a concession to civil society.   
 I address each of the three steps described above in both Tunisia and Egypt.  Before 
2011, Egyptian courts did have stronger connections to civil society than their Tunisian 
counterparts.  This is especially true for the constitutional courts.  After 2011, however, Tunisian 
civil society developed rapidly and launched a wave of rights litigation at the Administrative 
Tribunal.  In contrast, Egyptian civil society faced a more difficult environment after 2011 with 
conflicts between liberals and Islamists and repression by both the Mursi government and the 
military.  The SCAF was closed to influence from civil society.  The SCAF may have considered 
public opinion in designing the transitional institutions, but civil society organizations had few 
ways to influence the SCAF.  The Ben Achour Commission was explicitly composed of 
representatives from civil society organizations.  I conclude that the civil society hypothesis fails 
to explain both the presence of judicial power in Egypt and its absence in Tunisia. 
 
Defining Civil Society 
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In examining this hypothesis, it is important to define civil society and distinguish it from 
other concepts, such as public opinion, social movements or protest movements.  In general civil 
society is defined as organizations independent of the state with non-profit goals.  Diamond 
distinguishes civil society from the ‘political society’ of parties and elections in that its goal is 
not to gain control over the government158.  Civil society is distinguished from social movements 
and protest movements by its level of organization and institutionalization, although civil society 
organizations can also be involved in protests.  As a practical matter, is not always clear whether 
an organization falls into the category of civil society.  Beinin notes that the Polish Solidarity 
movement, an archetypal example from the Eastern European civil society revolutions, quickly 
transformed itself into a political party159.  The labor movement and Islamist organizations fit the 
definition of civil society, but these organizations are often examined separately from the rest of 
civil society.  Moreover, in the context of Tunisia and Egypt, Islamist and labor movements often 
pursue goals that are at odds with liberal civil society160. 
The literature considers the various roles that civil society might play in politics.  At one 
extreme, Gellner argues that the regime type of the modern West is better described as ‘civil 
society’ rather than ‘democracy.’  For Dahl, “the freedom to form and join organizations” is an 
essential component of democracy because it helps individuals form their political preferences, 
which can then be expressed through political parties and elections.  This argument assumes that 
civil society is both genuinely independent of the state and has access to the true opinions of the 
public.  The Eastern European experience led scholars to a renewed interest in civil society and 
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its role in democratization.  Arato describes the 1989 transitions as ‘civil society revolutions.’  
These authors assume that there is a natural connection between civil society and democracy and 
that the political goals of civil society are compatible with liberal democracy.  Against this view, 
Sheri Berman argues that the strong civil society of Weimar Germany paved the way for the rise 
of Nazism.  Literature on the Middle East has also examined how authoritarian regimes can co-
opt civil society.  Bellin argues that the Tunisian labor movement cooperated in the consolidation 
of authoritarianism under Ben Ali.  In the case of Egypt, Beinin is skeptical that civil society, or 
rather civil society apart from the labor movement, could play a major role in the 2011 
revolution.  Beinin argues that the focus on the broad category of civil society in explaining the 
success of the Tunisian transition obscures the central role played by the labor movement161.    
The hypothesis requires that civil society act as a ‘judicial support network,’ a term used 
by Epp and Moustafa162.  A judicial support structure consists of civil society organizations that 
engage in activist litigation to further their ends, and that support the independence of courts.  
This is a much narrower category than civil society in general.  Not all civil society groups are 
capable of legal activism, and not all of the goals pursued by civil society can be reached through 
litigation.  The regime can intervene in civil society directly by banning particular groups or 
regulating their membership and activities.  It can also make the legal system more or less 
hospitable to civil society litigation.  In the context of Egypt and Tunisia, activist litigation is 
often the preserve of a particularly elite variety of civil society.    
The hypothesis conceives of the presence of a judicial support network as a binary.  A 
state that has such a network will also have courts with strong formal powers.  The cases show 
the many forms that civil society and its interaction with the courts can take.  At times, civil 
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society in both countries has interacted with the courts in the way suggested by the hypothesis, 
but I conclude that these interactions cannot explain the formal powers of courts in either case. 
 
Civil Society and the Courts before 2011 
 
Egypt 
 
 From the 1980’s to the 2000’s, a tentative alliance among liberal activists, Islamists and 
the courts developed.  In part, this alliance reflects a shared understanding of the judicial role 
among liberals and Islamists.  Chapter 4 discusses Islamist attitudes toward the SCC and 
constitutional review in greater detail.  It also reflects a shared interest in challenging the 
overwhelming power of the regime, and a shared strategy of litigation.  Liberals and Islamists 
cooperated through the 2011 protests and the early phase of the transition, but came into conflict 
especially after the election of Muhammad Mursi in 2012.   
The hypothesis is plausible in the Egyptian context because of the strong links that 
developed between civil society and the courts during the Mubarak era.  Moustafa suggests that 
the protest movement would build on the links between the judiciary and civil society by putting 
legal and constitutional issues at the center of the revolution163.  The divide between liberal and 
Islamist civil society is not necessarily a problem for the hypothesis.  It is possible that liberal 
civil society would support the courts as a check on the Mursi government because of the 
conflict between liberal and Islamist civil society.  Unlike the SCAF, liberal civil society had no 
other means of restraining the Mursi government other than the courts.   
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Liberal Activism 
 
 The goals of liberal litigation include limiting the power of the regime, creating a space 
for the development of civil society, guaranteeing free electoral competition, as well as securing 
property rights.  Liberal litigation includes both work by NGO’s of a secular democratic 
orientation, as well as economically liberal litigation on issues such as property rights by actors 
with an interest in liberal economic reforms.  Moustafa lists the main civil society groups 
involved in litigation before the SCC in the 2000’s as the Hisham Mubarak Center for Legal Aid, 
the Land Center for Human Rights, the Center for Human Rights Legal Aid, and the Center for 
Women’s Legal Assistance.  Major cases brought by these groups include a challenge to 
repudiation divorce (khul’), a challenge to a law discriminating between men and women in 
adultery cases, numerous challenges to aspects of the emergency laws164. 
 Moustafa also recognizes the limits imposed on these organizations by the regime.  Only 
licensed organizations could participate in litigation.  In the 1990’s and 2000’s, the government 
passed a series of NGO laws to restrict civil society organizations.  When the SCC proved too 
willing to challenge the regime during the 2005 elections, Mubarak asserted his power as 
president to name judges to the court165.   
Liberal civil society also faced a challenge in working with two other components of civil 
society, Islamists and the labor movement, that often had different goals.  Islamist groups are 
absent from Moustafa’s list, although he describes how Islamists used litigation and legal 
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education to reach their goals166.  The Egyptian labor movement was at the margins of the new 
civil society of the Mubarak era, and Moustafa does not mention it as part of the judicial support 
structure.  Egyptian workers lacked a strong independent organization comparable to the Union 
Generale des Travailleurs Tunisiens (UGTT) in Tunisia.  Egyptian labor unions were either co-
opted by the regime or banned before 2011.  From the Nasser period on, the Egyptian regime 
suppressed independent labor unions.  Under Mubarak, workers could join only officially 
recognized unions, and the internal governance of these unions was tightly controlled by the 
Ministry of Labor167.   
The co-opted labor movement did not make extensive use of the courts.  The SCC and 
the administrative courts did issue some rulings favorable to labor organizations based on the 
1971 Constitution’s guarantee of freedom of association.  Labor groups worked with NGO’s 
such as the Hisham Mubarak Center to bring these cases to the courts168.  However these rulings 
did little to protect the labor movement from regime manipulation.  Indeed, the liberal economic 
decisions of the SCC, such as the abolition of rent control, often favored property owners over 
workers and renters169.  Beinin notes that the number of wildcat strikes and worker protests 
increased during the years leading up to 2011, as workers turned to forms of activism outside of 
established organizations.  Furthermore, workers, but not unions, were central to the 2011 
protests in Egypt170.   
 
Islamist Activism 
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 Islamist organizations, including those affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, enjoyed a 
huge membership during the Mubarak era.  In addition to religious and social welfare activities, 
Islamists also engaged in activist litigation, often making use of the shariah provision of the 
Egyptian constitution171. 
 On some issues, the aims of liberal litigation and Islamist litigation overlapped.  Both 
liberals and Islamists sought to limit the power of the regime and to protect their own right to 
organize freely.  Both groups found the courts sympathetic to these goals.  Islamists sought the 
right to organize and to participate in elections.  These issues came to a head during the 2005 
parliamentary elections, in which independent candidates affiliated with the Brotherhood won a 
substantial number of seats for the first time.  The Brotherhood supported the judiciary’s claim of 
a power to certify the results of elections, and independent candidates associated with the 
Brotherhood were among the main beneficiaries of the new electoral rules implemented in the 
2005 legislative elections172.  Limiting police abuses was a major goal of both liberal and 
Islamist civil society.  The years leading up to 2011 saw numerous high profile cases of police 
abuse, such as the death by beating of Khaled Mohamed Saeed in 2010, that united different 
strands of Egyptian civil society173.  Islamists in particular were likely to face imprisonment and 
abuse, and Islamists activists focused on helping detainees174.   
Both liberals and Islamists opposed the socialist state of the Nasser era.  The leadership 
of the Muslim Brotherhood drew from a class of small businessmen that was likely to benefit 
from economic liberalization.  The Brotherhood adopted an interpretation of Islamic law that 
protected private property and business.  The courts proved sympathetic to the economic 
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programs of both liberals and Islamists.  Moustafa cites the SCC’s decisions overturning the 
Nasser-era rent control laws as an example of the SCC’s liberal economic program.  In the 1993 
case dealing with this issue, the SCC cited both the 1971 Constitution’s right to property and the 
shariah’s protection of private property as justification for overturning the law175. 
 
Liberals, Islamists and the Regime] 
 
 Islamists and liberals had some overlapping goals, including limiting the arbitrary power 
of the regime and ensuring their own right to organize, and some overlapping strategies, 
including litigation.  However, the Mubarak’s regime different treatment of the two groups 
prevented them from forming strong organizational ties across the liberal-Islamist divide.  As 
Lust-Okar notes, regimes have many tools to impose structure on the opposition, including civil 
society176.  In general, the Mubarak regime repressed Islamist groups more severely than liberal 
groups.  The regime at times brought the Muslim Brotherhood in as part of the tolerated 
opposition, only to violently suppress it a few years later.  Sadat’s initial opening to the Islamists 
as followed by a crackdown in the late 1970’s177.   
The Muslim Brotherhood occupied a dominant position among Islamist civil society 
groups.  The Muslim Brotherhood maintained a tight, centralized organization, in part because of 
its experience with regime repression.  Although members of the Brotherhood debated what 
stances the organization should take, its centralized structure marginalized dissenters178.  The 
transformation of the Muslim Brotherhood into the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) after 2011 
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further complicated relations between liberal and Islamist civil society.  The election of 
Muhammad Mursi both split liberal and Islamist civil society and made the largest Islamist civil 
society group, the Muslim Brotherhood, into an extension of the new regime.  The basic 
mechanism of the hypothesis - civil society support for the courts as a check on the government - 
could still continue in these circumstances.  The question remains whether civil society could 
influence the SCAF’s redesign of the transitional institutions after the 2012 presidential 
elections. 
   
Tunisia 
 
 With the economic and political liberalization of the 1970’s, Tunisia saw the growth of 
human rights NGO’s comparable to those in Egypt.  Among these was the Ligue Tunisienne des 
Droits de l’Homme (LTDH).  The LTDH was founded in 1977 by dissidents from the ruling neo-
Destour party, including Ahmed Mestiri, Beji Caid Essebsi, Saadedine Zmerli, and Hassib ben 
Ammar.  Relations between the Ligue and the Bourguiba regime remained cordial.  Several 
figures of the Ligue, including Essebsi and Zmerli, served in the government in the 1980’s and 
90’s.  It had bureaus throughout Tunisia and 3,000 members in 1985179.  The LTDH had a strong 
legal orientation.  Many of its founding members were lawyers.  It brought cases to the 
Administrative Tribunal during the Ben Ali era, but the effect of these cases was limited by the 
regime’s refusal to enforce some decisions of the Tribunal - problem noted by the interviewees, 
Mohamed Bennour, Hichem Hammi and Habib Koubaa180.  The Ben Ali era proved difficult for 
the LTDH.  The RCD attempted to infiltrate the LTDH.  The activities of the LTDH were 
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suspended briefly by a judicial decision in 1992.  In 2000, the government banned all activities 
of the LTDH.  This ban was subject to numerous challenges, but the LTDH was never able to 
hold a conference again before the 2011 revolution181.  Islamist organizations were suppressed 
more severely.  The social wing of the Ennhada movement was banned along with the political 
party after 1989.  Private mosques and religious schools were not allowed.  As a result, the sort 
of Islamist legal activism described by Moustafa, El-Ghobashy and Lombardi had no parallel in 
Tunisia182. 
 Perhaps the strongest civil society organization in Tunisia from independence through the 
2011 revolution was the Union Generale des Travailleurs Tunisiens (UGTT).  The UGTT had a 
symbiotic relationship with the ruling party from early years of the independence movement.  It 
formed part of the governing coalition during the first fifteen years of Bourguiba’s presidency.  
Economic liberalization from the 1970’s on brought the UGTT into conflict with the regime.  
The UGTT called for general strikes in 1978 and 1984.  Both were suppressed.  The regime 
interfered in the activities of the UGTT, especially during the Ben Ali era.  The economic 
liberalization of the Ben Ali era further weakened the membership base of the UGTT.  As a 
result, the UGTT became somewhat weaker in the years leading up to the 2011 revolution.  
However, the regime never attempted to ban the UGTT, which still enjoyed a broad membership 
and a high level of popular support on the eve of the 2011 revolution183.    
In general, Tunisia’s civil society was more constrained under Ben Ali than Egypt’s civil 
society was under Mubarak.  However, this difference is only a matter of degree.  Tunisian civil 
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society engaged in only modest legal activism before 2011, in contrast to the growth of the 
judicial support network in Egypt.  In Tunisia, the UGTT was tolerated by the regime, while 
human rights groups like the LTDH were banned.  In Egypt, the labor movement was banned, 
but groups comparable to the LTDH, were tolerated.  This had important implications for the 
strategy of Tunisian civil society.  The centerpiece of Tunisian civil society was the UGTT, and 
its favored methods were strikes or negotiations directly with the government, not litigation184. 
 
Civil Society and the Courts in the Transition, 2011-2014 
 
Egypt 
 
 The 2011 protests were a surprising victory for Egyptian civil society, although NGO’s 
made up only part of the movement.   Liberal NGO’s, the Muslim Brotherhood, Salafists, the 
labor movement, and non-political groups such as soccer clubs all took part in the protests in late 
January and early February 2011.  The success of the protests in forcing Mubarak from office 
reflects their broad base of support and especially an alliance between Islamist and liberal 
activists.  However, the transitional period soon proved dangerous for Egyptian civil society.  
The consensus among liberal and Islamist activists collapsed.  Both the military and the Mursi 
government stepped up repressive measures against civil society.  These factors made civil 
society weaker and less able to to influence the course of the transition, including decisions 
relating to the status of courts.  The transition also damaged the connection between civil society 
and the courts that Moustafa describes as a defining feature of judicial politics in the Mubarak 
era.  Civil society won few victories in court comparable to those before 2011.  The important 
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court decisions of the transition - the decision of the High Administrative Court to dissolve the 
House of Representatives and the Constitutional Assembly - were not the result of civil society 
litigation and often served interests opposed to those of civil society.    
 
Liberal-Islamist Tensions 
 
 Many of the issues that might divide liberals and Islamists - changes to the role of Islam 
in the constitution, whether Egypt would have an Islamist president - were not on the table 
during the Mubarak era.  The transition, the constitution drafting process, and the Mursi 
presidency revealed the differences between liberals and Islamists.  Both liberals and Islamists 
participated in the early protests at Tahrir Square, although they did not necessarily do so in a 
coordinated manner.  The protests on the first days January 2011 were dominated by non-
Islamists.  The Brotherhood ordered its supporters to stay away from the protests until January 
28, 2011, when its supporters filled Tahrir Square after Friday prayers185.  The participation of 
the Brotherhood supporters and other Islamists was essential in the success of the protest 
movement, but liberals feared that they would lose control of the movement to the larger and 
more organized Brotherhood. 
 The election of the House of Representatives in 2011 paved the way for the appointment 
of the Constitutional Assembly and the constitution drafting process.  This phase of the transition 
revealed further conflicts between liberals and Islamists.  The victory of the FJP and the strong 
showing of the Salafist Nour Party in the parliamentary elections allowed Islamists to dominate 
the constitution drafting process.  Liberals feared that the Islamists would use the new 
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constitution to expand the role of shariah in the constitution.  Coptic Christians feared that the 
new constitution would exclude them from many aspects of Egyptian citizenship, such as the 
right to serve in the military or to stand for the presidency186.  In this context, liberal and Islamist 
civil society groups began pursuing contradictory goals.  Women’s rights remained an area of 
disagreement.  For example, Article 36 of the 2012 draft constitution produced by the 
Brotherhood supporters in the Constitutional Assembly guarantees equality between men and 
women, except when it is contradicted by the shariah.  Salafists rejected a prohibition on the 
trafficking of women and children because they believed that it would be used to ban early 
marriages187. 
 The presidential elections of 2012 and Mursi’s presidency from 2012 to July 2013 
brought the conflict between liberals and Islamists to a head.  With an Islamist occupying the 
highest office of the state, liberal civil society began working to protect itself from a new regime 
that many feared would be more oppressive than that of Mubarak.  This stance pushed liberal 
civil society into an alliance with the military.  It also changed the nature of the connection 
between civil society and the courts.  Before 2011, civil society had used the courts to achieve 
particular policy changes in areas such as property rights, freedom of speech, and freedom of 
association.  Civil society founded these cases on the fundamental rights included in the 
Egyptian constitution and international treaties.  During the Mursi era, liberal civil society hoped 
that a decision of the courts, especially the SCC, could completely overturn the new regime, or at 
least shift the balance of power away from the presidency.  This more ambitious goal did not 
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require the same sort of organizing as the numerous small cases brought by civil society before 
2011. 
 The politics of the transition split civil society into liberal and Islamist factions.  It also 
shifted the focus of civil society from rights litigation toward structural constitutional questions 
that civil society could do little to decide. 
 
State Repression 
 
 Even as the Egyptian regime became more democratic following the 2011 revolution and 
the 2012 elections, the level of repression increased.  This was true even in the most hopeful 
phase of the transition immediately after the departure of Mubarak.  Courts in particular were a 
means of repression.  Ahmed Eid, an Egyptian lawyer and activist, stated that the administrative 
courts have been “turned against the opposition” since the 2011 revolution.  The military courts 
tried more civilians in the months after 2011 than they had in the previous decades188.  
Demonstrators were more willing to challenge the regime during this period, but they often met 
with a level of violence that would have been unusual in the Mubarak era.   
 The election of Mursi to the presidency in 2012 did not end this trend.  Indeed, the new 
Islamist government began its own programs of repression in parallel to actions by the military, 
police and emergency courts.  In 2013, the Shura Council considered a new NGO law that would 
require organizations to seek government approval for any project receiving foreign funding189. 
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 The 2013 coup brought an unprecedented level of repression.  The massacre of Muslim 
Brotherhood supporters at Raba’ah al-Adawiyah square is the most dramatic example.  Courts 
played a central role in the Sisi regime’s crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood.  Mursi himself 
was put on trial and found guilty of espionage and inciting deadly violence.  Judges issued mass 
death sentences to Muslim Brotherhood supporters, although few of these sentences were ever 
carried out190. 
The violence of the coup was followed by a series of legal restrictions on civil society.  
The 2014 NGO law required all civil society groups to register with the government.  The anti-
protest law was used not only to prevent nearly all public demonstrations after the coup, but also 
to prosecute leaders of Egyptian civil society, including the leaders of the April 6 movement191. 
 
Court Activity, 2011-2013 
 
 Given the problems outlined above, it is not surprising that civil society failed to win 
major victories in the courts during the transition.  The SCC and its judges were involved in the 
transition from the beginning.  The SCAF worked with experts from the SCC to draft the 
Constitutional Decrees.  The SCAF issued a decree law in June 2011 allowing the SCC to select 
its own president, perhaps in anticipation of a greater role for the SCC.  However, the SCC did 
not issue a major decision until June 14, 2012.  Despite the persistence of oppressive laws from 
the Mubarak period, the first year after the revolution did not see a wave of litigation at the SCC 
to overturn these laws.   
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The major decisions that the SCC issued from June 2012 to June 2013 did not result from 
civil society litigation and often favored interests opposed to civil society.  Some of these 
decisions made use of the procedure of a priori review that had been granted to the SCC by the 
Constitutional Decree of 2011192.  According to this provision, the SCC was required to review 
all electoral legislation within fifteen days before it was adopted.  There was no procedure 
through which civil society could not bring these cases to the SCC.  The 2012 Constitution also 
included this power and extended it to laws governing legislative elections.193 
The High Administrative Court suspended the Constitutional Assembly on April 10, 
2012.  The case was filed by.  The court argued that the House of Representatives violated the 
Constitutional Decree by appointing some of its own members to the Constitutional Assembly 
and that the membership of the Assembly was unrepresentative of Egyptian society.  A 
compromise between Islamists and the secular opposition resulted in a new Constituent 
Assembly that included more members of the opposition.  The second Assembly also faced legal 
challenges, although it continued to meet and ultimately drafted the constitution that was adopted 
by referendum in December 2012.  
The SCC issued a decision dissolving the House of Representatives on June 14, 2012194.  
The decision did use the language of fundamental rights.  The court argued that the electoral law 
was invalid because the party list system discriminated against candidates who did not have a 
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party affiliation.  However, the implications of the case were clearly more important for the 
balance of powers among state institutions than for the rights of individuals.  Civil society of the 
kind described as the judicial support structure by Moustafa was not involved in bringing this 
case to the SCC.   
  
Tunisia 
 
Civil Society 
 
 Civil society developed rapidly after the 2011 revolution.  A huge number of new 
organizations were founded immediately after the fall of Ben Ali, including groups, such as the 
Syndicat des Magistrats Tunisiens (SMT), Union des Magistrats Administratifs (UMA), with a 
specific focus on law and courts195.  In some cases, it is more correct to say that existing 
organizations broke free from the restrictions imposed by the Ben Ali regime.  The LTDH is a 
major example.  The Administrative Tribunal lifted the ban on the LTDH’s activities that had 
been imposed by Ben Ali.  The UGTT also emerged from the restrictions of the Ben Ali era and 
became more active than it had been in decades.  Strikes organized by the UGTT became a 
common feature of the transition.  Many of these strikes, such as the general strike following the 
assassination of Mohamed Brahmi on July 25, 2013, were intended to pressure the Troika 
government196. 
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 Islamist organizations developed rapidly too.  Groups like Ansar al-Shariah pressured the 
Assembly for the inclusion of shariah law in the new constitution.  The courts, including the 
Administrative Tribunal, usually proved hostile to the aims of Islamist litigants.  Many Islamist 
groups, including Hizb al-Tahrir and Ansar al-Shariah, sought to legalize their organizations in 
the years after 2011.  The court refused to legalize Hizb al-Tahrir and declared Ansar al-Shariah 
to be a terrorist organization.  Islamist groups did try to use the courts to enforce their view of 
acceptable speech using laws prohibiting libel of religion197.   
 Some challenges remained for civil society during the transition.  Restrictive laws 
governing political parties, non-governmental organizations and the press remained in effect 
even after the fall of Ben Ali198.  Civil society feared that the Troika would use its control of the 
Assembly to pass repressive legislation and write a constitution with weak rights protections.  
The UGTT was threatened by violence from Islamists militias such as the LPR199.  Nevertheless, 
the years after 2011 mark a dramatic turnaround for Tunisian civil society.    
 
The Administrative Tribunal 
 
 The legalization of the LTDH by the Tribunal points to the close connection that would 
develop between civil society and the courts immediately after the 2011 revolution.  The most 
important decisions of the Tribunal during the transition were the result of cases brought by civil 
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society200.  These include the the 2013 decisions concerning the appointment of members of the 
IVD and ISIE. 
 The strong connection between the Tribunal and civil society did not result in a power of 
interim constitutional review for the Tribunal.  Civil society did support the Tribunal on other 
issues.  Civil society groups, including Human Rights Watch, the Association des Magistrats 
Tunisiens (AMT), the LTDH, and others pressured the government to enforce the Tribunal’s 
decision reinstating the judges removed by the Troika’s justice minister Noureddine Bhiri.  Civil 
society agreed with the Tribunal’s stance on the design of the Conseil Superieur de la 
Magistrature, which was intended to guarantee to judicial independence201.  More generally, civil 
society recognized that a strong judiciary was necessary to preserve the autonomy of civil 
society.  This support for a strong judiciary did not lead to support for transitional constitutional 
review.   
 
Civil Society and the Drafting Bodies, 2011-2014 
 
 If the hypothesis can explain the formal powers of courts, then civil society must be able 
to influence the design of the transitional institutions, which was first decided by the drafting 
bodies: the SCAF in Egypt and the Ben Achour Commission in Tunisia.  The SCAF was less 
open than the Ben Achour Commission to influence from civil society.  Moreover, transitional 
politics eroded civil society organizations in Egypt and strengthened them in Tunisia.  Both 
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countries saw the rise of new protest movements in 2013 - the Arrahil movement in Tunisia and 
the Tamarod movement in Egypt - that threatened established civil society organizations.  In 
Egypt, the Tamarod movement supplanted older civil society organizations, while in Tunisia, the 
Arrahil movement strengthened them through the formation of the National Dialogue. 
 
Egypt 
 
 The military showed itself to be very conscious of public opinion and of the need for 
public support.  However, it also undermined the organizations that could turn the public into 
civil society and broke the connections between civil society and the courts.   
 
The SCAF 
 
 The period of interim government SCAF was a concession by the military in response to 
the protests of January and February 2011.  The military originally wanted Omar Suleiman, a 
former army general and high-ranking intelligence official, to replace Mubarak.  Suleiman was 
appointed vice president on January 29, 2011, in the midst of the protests.  Mubarak’s 
resignation would pave the way for Suleiman to assume the presidency until new elections could 
be held.  This plan to have a Mubarak appointee step into the presidency was unpopular with all 
parts of the protest movement.  In the end, Suleiman resigned with Mubarak on February 11, 
2011.  The SCAF responded by issuing the Constitutional Decree of February 13, 2011, 
declaring itself the provisional government of the country202. 
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 These events show the power that the protest movement could have, even over the 
military.  However, this does not mean that civil society was able to influence specific decisions 
by the SCAF.  As the transition continued, the protest movement became less effective in 
pressuring the military.  Furthermore, the protest movement is not equivalent to the civil society 
organizations described by Moustafa.  The military exploited the difference between civil society 
and the protest movement to create a variety of popular politics - the Tamarod movement - that 
was more suited to its own interests. 
 
The Military’s Policy towards Civil Society 
 
The hypothesis assumes that civil society will be able to influence power-holders, such as 
the Egyptian military.  In fact, the military was more able to manipulate civil society than civil 
society was able to manipulate the military.  The military, as well as other actors such as the 
Mursi government, the courts and the Ministry of the Interior, attempted to shape Egyptian civil 
society.  The military’s policy towards civil society resulted in the Tamarod movement.  The 
extent to which the Tamarod movement was a genuine grassroots uprising as opposed to a plan 
hatched by the military and the Ministry of the Interior is one of the basic disagreements between 
supporters and opponents of the Sisi regime.  The movement grew out of dissatisfaction with the 
Mursi presidency in spring 2013.  It did build on existing civil society organizations and political 
parties.  On the other hand, critics of the Sisi regime argue that the military or the Ministry of the 
Interior played a major role in organizing the original leadership of the Tamarod movement203.  
In any case, the movement had little importance until the military called on Egyptians to 
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‘descend’ on the streets on June 30.  The prospect of support from the military was the only 
factor that made the movement’s goal, removal of Mursi from the presidency, plausible.   
From the perspective of the military, the Tamarod movement had several advantages over 
other forms of civil society.  Tamarod lacked a permanent organization and leadership.  It 
developed quickly in the spring of 2013 and declined after the June 30, 2013 coup.  It was 
oriented towards only one goal: the removal of Mursi from the presidency.  These factors made 
the movement less likely to interact with the courts than the older civil society organizations.  
The Tamarod movement could help the military bring out large numbers of protestors, but it 
would not organize activist litigation.  After Mursi was removed, Tamarod would not shift to 
other goals that might challenge the military. 
The Tamarod movement not only helped bring about the 2013, it also changed Egyptian 
civil society even before the coup.  Many previously independent organizations attached 
themselves to the overarching goal of removing Mursi.  Some leaders of the Tamarod movement 
had previously been involved in the Kefaya movement against Mubarak during the 2000’s.  
Other organizations such as the April 6 Youth movement and the Popular Current cooperated in 
gathering signatures for Tamarod’s petition204.  The participation of other civil society 
organizations in the Tamarod movement compromised their independence from the emerging 
military regime.  It also shifted their activity away from litigating rights issues towards protests.  
Groups that refused to support the Tamarod movement were marked for repression by the new 
military regime205.   
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The Tamarod movement has not had a major impact on Egyptian politics after the 2013 
coup.  Partly this is due to the movement’s lack of organization.  It is also due to the nature of the 
goals pursued by the movement.  After Mursi was removed from power, the movement struggled 
to find a new cause.  In any case, the Tamarod movement failed to build connections with the 
judiciary.  Tellingly, the causes that it took up after the coup - the reversal of Egypt’s peace 
treaty with Israel and opposition to international military intervention in Syria - did not touch on 
domestic Egyptian politics and could not be achieved through litigation.  The movement 
considered establishing a political party, but its application to do so was rejected by the Supreme 
Electoral Commission in 2014206. 
 
Tunisia 
 
 The Tunisian system not only responded to the demands of protesters, but also gave civil 
society organizations a central role in the three main transitional institutions: the Ben Achour 
Commission, the Assembly, and the National Dialogue.  Civil society had ample opportunity to 
grant additional powers to courts, but chose not to do so. 
 
The Ben Achour Commission 
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 The creation of the Ben Achour Commission was clearly the result of street protests.  The 
Kasbah demonstrators camped outside of the headquarters of the transitional government of 
Mohamed Ghannouchi demanding the election of a National Assembly and the drafting of a new 
constitution.  In response, the government formed the Commission to guide the first step of the 
transition.  As in Egypt, the government initially favored a quick transition to a new presidency, 
but popular protests made this plan untenable.  In its origins the Commission resembles the 
SCAF’s assumption of power in the midst of the protests.  However, the design of the 
Commission made it much more open to influence by civil society organizations.  Many of the 
members of the Commission were chosen specifically as representatives of different civil society 
organizations, including the UGTT, the LTDH, the ONAT and fifteen other organizations207.  
The Commission was independent of the Ghannouchi government in a way that the SCAF could 
never be independent of the military.   
The Commission had a great deal of leeway in designing the transitional institutions.  The 
government was checked by popular opinion.  The Kasbah protest movement insisted on the 
creation of the National Assembly, but this choice did not preclude some form of interim judicial 
review208.  If civil society wanted to empower the courts by giving them a power of 
constitutional review, it had an opportunity to do so through the Ben Achour Commission. 
 
The Assembly 
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 Of the three transitional institutions, the Assembly was perhaps the most resistant to civil 
society influence.  Although there is a lot of overlap between political parties and civil society 
organizations in Tunisia, the governing parties had no need to consult such organizations after 
being elected.  Some leading figures of the Troika, most notably President Moncef Marzouki, 
had risen to prominence through civil society and human rights activism rather than party 
politics.  However, Marzouki became closely associated with his own party, the Congres pour la 
Republique (CPR), and the Troika generally.  Observers describe civil society as a check on the 
Assembly rather than a participant in it209.  Nevertheless, civil society groups were able to 
influence the activity of the Assembly with help from the Administrative Tribunal.  The Tribunal 
blocked the appointment of members of several organs created by the Assembly, including the 
Instance Verite et Dignite (IVD, the body charged with transitional justice) and the Instance 
Superieure Independante pour les Elections (ISIE).  In an interview, Hichem Hammi, a judge of 
the Administrative Tribunal emphasized the role of civil society in bringing such cases to the 
Tribunal, stating that “the development of civil society [since 2011] led to the higher number of 
cases as more independent organisations appeal their disputes with the state to the TA 
[Administrative Tribunal]”210. 
 Popular protest provided another means for civil society to pressure the Assembly.  Bardo 
Square directly outside the Assembly building was regularly filled with protests of either liberal 
or Islamist organizations from the election of the Assembly through the end of the transition.  
Civil society challenged the Assembly most dramatically through the Arrahil movement, which 
occupied the square in front of the Assembly starting in July of 2013.  The Arrahil movement has 
                                               
209 Interview with Habib Koubaa 
210 These cases are discussed in Chapter 4 of the dissertation. 
 Benjamin Roger. “En Tunisie, des citoyens veulent envoyer l’Assemblee constituante au Tribunal.”Jeune Afrique. 
31 August 2012. 31/08/2012. http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAWEB20120831122039/ 
126 
some things in common with the Tamarod movement in Egypt.  It called for the removal of a 
democratically elected Islamist government and the drafting of a new constitution by experts.  It 
was organized around this goal in 2013 and did not have a long institutional history.  It enjoyed 
the support of many older civil society organizations, but was distinct from them.  In both cases, 
the old civil society was more likely than the Arrahil and Tamarod movements to see courts as 
allies and to favor additional powers for them.  However, the Arrahil movement did not make 
constitutional review part of its demands.  Indeed, the idea of a constitution written by experts 
might empower legal experts, but it also made provisional constitutional review implausible.  
Also, a committee of experts would not be subject to review by the Administrative Tribunal the 
way that the Assembly was.   
Of course, the results of the 2013 protests were very different in the two countries.  In 
Tunisia, the old civil society represented by the National Dialogue was able to lead the Arrahil 
movement.  In Egypt, the Tamarod movement led to military intervention and erosion of older 
civil society organizations.  By forcing the the Troika to make concessions on the composition of 
the interim government and the new constitution, the National Dialogue was able to achieve the 
goal of the Arrahil movement without abolishing the Assembly.  However, the National 
Dialogue that resulted from the Arrahil protests also did not expand the power of courts. 
 
The National Dialogue 
 
 The National Dialogue first met in October 2013 after months of protests against the 
Assembly and the Troika government, with the aim of negotiating an end to the crisis between 
the government and the opposition.  The formation of the National Dialogue provided another 
opportunity for civil society to redesign the transitional institutions.  The National Dialogue 
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Quartet formed to mediate between the Troika government and the opposition. The National 
Dialogue consisted of four civil society organizations: the UGTT, the Ordre Nationale des 
Avocats Tunisiens (ONAT), the Tunisian Union of Industry, Trade and Handicrafts (UTICA, the 
national business association) and the LTDH.  Observers consider the National Dialogue to be 
representative of civil society generally, which was a major source of its legitimacy and 
effectiveness in checking the Assembly.  For example, in reference to the 2013 crisis, Habib 
Koubaa argued that “if it were not for the pressure from civil society, the Assembly would have 
stayed in power for five years.”211  As a result, it was a means for civil society to intervene 
directly in transitional politics. 
 The National Dialogue forced a series of compromises on the Troika.  The National 
Dialogue negotiated the resignation of the Troika government and its replacement by an interim 
technocratic government, as well as substantial changes to the draft constitution that was finally 
adopted in January 2014.  It did not force the Troika to accept judicial review of the Assembly 
before the adoption of a new constitution, although proposals for review by the Tribunal 
circulated throughout the transition212.  It also left the government free to design a weak, non-
judicial form of constitutional review - the Instance Provisoire pour le Controle Constitutionnel 
des Projets de Loi (IPCCPL) - after the adoption of the 2014 constitution.  In short, civil society 
had the opportunity to strengthen the courts through the National Dialogue, but chose not to do 
so.  Indeed, the prominence of civil society in mediating political disputes could prevent courts 
from playing this role.  The National Dialogue itself acted as a sort of constitutional court 
reviewing the actions of the Assembly and interpreting the unwritten norms governing the 
transition.  The National Dialogue’s resolution of the crisis may have prevented an intervention 
                                               
211 Interview with Habib Koubaa 
212 These proposals are discussed in chapter of the dissertation. 
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by the Administrative Tribunal, which would have propelled courts to the center of transitional 
politics213. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Like the countermajoritarian hypothesis, the civil society hypothesis focuses on the 
interests of a particular actor in transitional politics.  The failure of these hypotheses points to the 
need to consider how actors conceive of their own interests.  The next section looks at how the 
practices of the legal system created different conceptions of the judicial role in Egypt and 
Tunisia, drawing examples from the Tunisian Administrative Tribunal, the incorporation of 
shariah in Tunisia and Egypt, and the SCC’s relations with the ordinary judiciary in Egypt. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION TO SECTION II: THE JUDICIAL ROLE 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction: Ideas and Interests 
 
 The first two hypotheses - the countermajoritarian hypothesis and the civil society 
hypothesis - are based on the interests of political actors.  The failure of these hypotheses 
suggests a turn to explanations based on ideas held by these actors.  A purely ideational 
                                               
213 “Le Dialogue national ne me represente pas, seule la constitution me protege,” Webdo, 3 December 2014. 
http://www.webdo.tn/2014/12/03/tunisie-le-dialogue-national-ne-me-represente-pas-seule-la-constitution-me-
protege/ 
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explanation would have difficulty accounting for the different outcomes in Egypt and Tunisia 
because their overall legal cultures are similar, as described in chapter 1.  Moreover, any 
difference between these legal cultures might be the result of the political factors addressed by 
the first two hypotheses - the interests of the drafting bodies or the interests of civil society - or 
by other political factors.  Such explanations would be difficult to test because it is impossible to 
observe whether the drafting bodies were motivated by a particular set of ideas. 
 The judicial role hypothesis combines elements of ideational and political explanations.  
It argues that the formal powers of the courts after 2011 are the result of normative ideas about 
the judicial role, but these ideas in turn are the result of judicial practices in the decades before 
2011.  It posits a three step process from judicial practices before 2011 to ideas about the judicial 
role to formal powers after 2011.  A purely ideational argument would look at judicial ideology 
or popular opinion about the judicial role, but not judicial practices.   
 This hypothesis could be falsified by the total absence of one of the steps, or by a clear 
contradiction between ideas about the judicial role and the formal powers granted to courts.  The 
absence of such evidence does not exclude other explanations.  Each of the links in this three 
step process produces observable implications.  The impact of judicial practice on ideas up until 
2011.  The impact of these ideas on the transitional documents, and on the activity of courts after 
2011.   
The first section of this introduction outlines the judicial role hypothesis and its 
mechanism connecting judicial activity to ideas about the judicial role to the formal powers of 
courts after 2011.  The second section lists the observable implications of the hypothesis in the 
areas of history, judicial activity, and statements from the interviews and writings by judges and 
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political parties.  The conclusion outlines how the following chapters will examine the 
hypothesis. 
 
The Judicial Role Hypothesis 
 
The Judicial Role and Formal Powers of Courts 
 
 The judicial role hypothesis draws on two bodies of literature.  The first literature deals 
with formalist and sociological approaches to law.  Formalism can be both a normative stance 
and a theory of how courts do in fact operate214.  The descriptive definition of formalism states 
that courts base their activity on the direct application of formal rules contained in laws and 
constitutions.  The countermajoritarian and civil society hypotheses adopts this view by 
assuming that courts will behave according to their formal powers.  The drafting bodies could 
assign any level of power to the courts to suit their political aims.  If the courts used limited 
powers to defend civil society, they would also use expanded powers in the same way.  The 
judicial role hypothesis argues that the drafting bodies must take into consideration non-formal 
factors, such as the courts’ interpretation of the judicial role. 
 The second literature addresses the logic of action behind judicial activity.  March and 
Olsen describe the logic of appropriateness as “action as driven by rules of appropriate or 
exemplary behavior, organized into institutions. Rules are followed because they are seen as 
natural, rightful, expected, and legitimate” and the logic of consequentiality based on the self 
                                               
214 Schauer (1988), Weber (1978) argues that modern law tends toward formalism or rationalization.  Kennedy 
describes formalism as an “epithet” for modern legal scholars.  On the other hand, social scientists often use 
formalist indicators, such as the formal powers of courts in the constitution, as independent or dependent variables.  
Ginsburg (2003) 
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interest of the actor215.  The first two hypotheses assume a logic of consequentiality for the 
drafting bodies, the courts, and other actors such as civil society and political parties.   
The judicial role hypothesis does not reject the logic of consequences, but does show how 
the logic of appropriateness can shape the design of the transitional institutions.  The judicial role 
hypothesis assumes that courts act according to a logic of appropriateness, rather than a logic of 
consequentiality.  For courts, the bounds of what is appropriate and what is feasible are closely 
related.  Unlike armies, political parties or trade unions, courts have few means of applying 
pressure216.  Moreover, judges are professionals who gain their status from holding an office.  
Their self interest is closely aligned with the standing of the judiciary as a whole.  As a result, 
judges believe that acting according to the judicial role is also in their own self interest.  The 
drafting bodies may act according to a logic of appropriateness or a logic of consequentiality that 
takes into account the limits that the judicial role imposes on the judiciary’s activity. 
 
Components of the Judicial Role 
 
Shapiro describes a general “judicial paradigm” of triadic dispute resolution217.  In this 
paradigm, a dispute between two parties is mediated by a judge.  The court does not make policy 
or decide any issue beyond the case that is put in front of it.  Shapiro describes the judicial 
                                               
215 March and Olsen (2009) 
216 Judges can persuade other actors to apply such pressure.  Egypt saw numerous popular protests in support of the 
judiciary both before and after 2011 for example.  Judges can also go on strike.  In Egypt, a strike was a serious 
threat because the absence of judicial supervision would make the election results invalid.  Still, this depends on a 
belief that judicial supervision is essential for legitimate elections.  A judicial strike could make it difficult to 
maintain social order and resolve disputes.  However, the effects of a judicial strike are not as immediate as those of 
many other kinds of workers, such as transport workers, garbage collectors or police.  In Tunisia, the UGTT’s 
general strike proved more effective than any of the judicial strikes organized by the judicial syndicates, the SMT 
and AMT.  In Egypt, the disappearance of the police during the Mursi presidency made daily more difficult and 
dangerous in a way that a judicial strike never could.  Political authorities often resist implementing judicial 
decisions even in established democracies.  This problem was especially acute in both Tunisia and Egypt both 
before and after 2011. 
217 Shapiro (1981) 
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paradigm as an ideal type from which actual courts may diverge substantially.  For this project, 
variations in these ideas between the two countries are of central importance, but Shapiro’s 
judicial paradigm provides a landmark for these variations. 
 Alec Stone Sweet categorizes different high courts based on how closely they correspond 
to Shapiro’s “judicial paradigm” of dispute resolution as opposed to policy-making roles.  His 
“Continuum for Comparing Types of Courts against the ‘Judicial Paradigm’” is partly 
reproduced below218.   
Table 3: Varieties of the Judicial Role 
Most Judicial     Least Judicial 
Ordinary 
Courts 
Courts of 
Cassation 
High 
Administrative 
Courts 
Concrete Const. 
Review 
Abstract Const. 
Review 
Dispute 
Resolution 
Appeals Public Law 
Appeals 
Const. Cases Review of Draft 
Legislation 
 
 
Ideas about the judicial role can be described as a statement about which of these roles are 
appropriate for courts.  In the French system, the judicial role is defined narrowly.  Ordinary 
judicial courts are separated from overly political activities by by two barriers: the split 
jurisdiction of the administrative courts and the separation between the Constitutional Council 
and the judiciary.  The core of any concept of the judicial role is a definition of judicial activity 
as either technical (judicial dispute mediation) or political (policy-making), or an idea of the 
limits of proper judicial activity (which of the activities listed in the chart are suitable for the 
judiciary).  The judicial role is connected to ideas about the sources of judicial independence, the 
                                               
218 Sweet (1992) pg. 248.  I have added a description of the activity by each court in the last row.  Activities of the 
ordinary judiciary are in bold and underlined.  Activities of the administrative judiciary are underlined.  Activities of 
non-judicial institutions are plain. 
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role of other state institutions, the sources of law, and the nature of the constitution.  To illustrate 
how these connections might play out, I sketch two ideal types of the judicial role based on non-
political and political activity. 
 If the judicial role emphasizes the non-involvement of courts in political decisions, the 
legislative and executive must have a broader scope of activity.  The judiciary must derive its 
independence from its internal organization, not from an ability to block actions by the political 
branches.  Respecting the broad scope of legislative action implies a positivist, literal 
interpretation of statutes, and the exclusion of non-legislative sources of law.  Deference to the 
legislative power implies deference to the constituent power. 
 If the judicial role emphasizes the power of courts to balance the other branches, then the 
powers of the other branches are necessarily constrained.  If the judiciary is able to block actions 
by the other branches, then this power could be a guarantee of judicial independence.  If the 
judiciary is able to overturn actions by the other branches, it must be able to call on some higher 
source of law, such as a constitution, fundamental rights, or natural law.  At least it must have 
broad powers to interpret legislation.  If the judiciary uses fundamental rights or natural law, or if 
it conceives of the constitution as an embodiment of these higher sources of law, then judicial 
review should continue even in the absence of a formal constitution. 
 
The Mechanism: From Judicial Role to Formal Powers in Tunisia and Egypt 
 
 The judicial role and its implications may be contested by different actors, even within 
the judiciary itself.  Indeed, this contestation is essential to the mechanism of the hypothesis.  
The hypothesis posits a pathway from judicial activity before 2011 to ideas about judicial role to 
formal powers after 2011.  The first step is the production of ideas about the judicial role through 
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the activity of courts.  Decisions of constitutional courts, including the SCC and the Tunisian 
Constitutional Council, enjoy a wide readership among legal professionals in their respective 
countries.  Constitutional courts can act as conduits for the importation of legal ideas from other 
countries.  The activity of the constitutional court may carve out a new role for the judiciary.  For 
example, by consistently ruling against political authorities the constitutional court may claim a 
more political role. 
 The second step is the influence of these ideas on the design of the transitional 
institutions in 2011.  The drafting bodies may have been motivated by a normative commitment 
to the judicial role that was prominent in their countries.  Many members of the Ben Achour 
Commission were lawyers, and the SCAF worked closely with judges from the SCC.  The 
decisions of the drafting bodies could reflect a belief about what activities the judiciary was 
capable of.  The SCC may have been an attractive countermajoritarian mechanism for the SCAF 
because of its past jurisprudence during the Mubarak era.  The reluctance of the Tunisian judges 
to engage in political activity could make constitutional review implausible to the Ben Achour 
Commission as a means of restraining the Assembly.  Some group outside of the drafting bodies, 
such as political parties, civil society or the judges themselves may have been committed to a 
particular version of the judicial role and pressured the drafting bodies to incorporate their views 
into the transitional documents.  In any of these three scenarios, ideas are crucial for connecting 
the activity of courts before 2011 to the formal powers given to the courts after 2011. 
 
Implications  
 
Interviews and Writings by Judges 
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 Judges, lawyers and political party representatives should share some common normative 
views about the judicial role.  The civil society and countermajoritarian hypotheses imply 
disagreements among these actors about the powers that should be assigned to courts and the 
appropriateness of judicial activity.  The judicial role hypothesis implies that there should be a 
broad consensus among these different actors in each country, but a difference between the two 
countries. 
 In Tunisia, judges should support an apolitical role for the judiciary, as well as the 
implications of this role for the sources of law and the nature of the constitution outlined above.  
Judges should accept the Assembly system, even if they are opposed to the Troika government. 
 In Egypt, judges should support an activist role for the judiciary, as well as the 
implications of this role for the sources of law and the nature of the constitution outlined above.  
Judges should support interim constitutional review, but the more important implication is that 
Islamists should also support interim constitutional review because this implication is at odds 
with the other two hypotheses. 
 
Judicial Activity, 2011-2014 
 
 Judicial activity during the transition should be motivated by the same ideas that existed 
before the transition.  The conception of the judicial role includes limits on judicial activity 
toward the other branches.  Court decisions after 2011 should not transgress these boundaries 
either, even if the changing political circumstances of the transition might make such actions 
attractive to courts.  Cases in which the judicial role and the political pressure on the court dictate 
opposite actions are a particularly important test of the hypothesis.  The two other hypotheses 
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provide predictions for judicial activity, which can be compared with the predictions of the 
judicial role hypothesis. 
 In Tunisia, courts should limit their activity even within the bounds imposed by the 
absence of constitutional review.  They should not seek to claim additional formal powers, 
because the formal powers included in the transitional documents already reflect the judicial role. 
 In Egypt, courts should be willing to confront political authorities, but only on issues 
where courts had established a record of activism before 2011. 
 
History  
 
Each of the steps from judicial activity to ideas to formal powers should be present in 
each of the cases.  Sources for the first step include judicial decisions and judicial politics in the 
era before 2011.  The text of court decisions may include descriptions of the judicial role.  
Particular decisions may establish a precedent for judicial activity in a new area.  Sources for the 
second step include the content of the transitional documents and statements by judges and 
political party figures.   
Putting these events in chronological order can also distinguish between different 
hypotheses.  To distinguish role explanations from purely normative or political explanations, it 
is necessary to look at how the role was constructed historically.  It could be that judicial activity 
and the judicial role advocated by judges is simply a response to changing political 
circumstances.  
 
Conclusion: Plan of the Section 
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The following chapters use several strategies to test this hypothesis.  To show the 
plausibility of this hypothesis, the chapters trace the three step process in each of the cases.  They 
also highlight examples where the predictions of the first two hypotheses would be flatly 
contradicted by the judicial role hypothesis.  These include the refusal of the Tunisian 
Administrative Tribunal to claim additional powers and the support of the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood for constitutional review. 
This section includes four chapters.  Chapter 4 looks at the activity of the Tunisian 
Administrative Tribunal.  The Administrative Tribunal declined to claim additional formal 
powers during the transition, despite support from civil society and the opposition parties.  
Chapter 5 looks at the incorporation of shariah into the legal systems of Tunisia and Egypt.  The 
Muslim Brotherhood supported interim constitutional review even though it would act as a 
countermajoritarian mechanism.  Chapter 6 looks at relations between the Supreme 
Constitutional Court of Egypt and the ordinary judiciary.  Each of these chapters provides 
examples of the three step mechanism suggested by the judicial role hypothesis.  Chapter 7 looks 
at the range of options for the transitional institutions and how the judicial role hypothesis can 
explain the choices of the drafting bodies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4: THE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL AND THE JUDICIAL ROLE 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
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 The chapter outlines the activity of the Tunisian Administrative Tribunal from 2011 to 
2014.  This outline provides a test of the countermajoritarian and civil society hypotheses, both 
of which imply that the Tribunal should rule assertively against the Assembly and the Troika 
government.  The Tribunal did rule against the Assembly on a number of issues, but it also 
passed up two opportunities to check the Assembly.  First, it declined to issue a decision on the 
validity of the Assembly’s mandate.  Second, it declined to use the 1959 Constitution as a source 
of law, which would have allowed the Tribunal to overturn legislation passed by the Assembly.  
In general, the Tribunal expanded its activity during the transition but declined to claim 
additional formal powers against the Assembly.  This anomaly can be explained by the judges’ 
conception of their role.  The second section outlines the judicial role through a history of 
relations between the Tribunal and political authorities both before and after 2011 and through 
interviews with legal professionals.  The third section shows how these conceptions limited the 
activity of the Tribunal on the issues of the Assembly’s mandate and 1959 Constitution.   
Chapter 2 concluded with the question of why the Ben Achour Commission did not 
attempt to use judicial review to entrench its program against the Assembly.  In the absence of a 
constitutional court, the Administrative Tribunal was the most plausible option for provisional 
constitutional review, so understanding the Tribunal is an important step to answering the 
question of why the Tunisian transitional regime rejected constitutional review.  The Ben Achour 
Commission’s Decree was not the only opportunity to grant additional formal powers to the 
Tribunal.  The Troika and the opposition renegotiated many aspects of transitional institutions in 
late 2013.  The Tribunal acted as an ally of the secular opposition against the Troika, but when 
the opposition forced the Troika government to make a series of compromises in late 2013, it did 
not include greater powers for the Tribunal in these demands.  By January 2014, the opposition 
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was able to engineer the resignation of the Troika and its replacement with a technocratic 
government, so it seems plausible that the Troika could have accepted judicial review if the 
opposition had demanded it.      
Even in the absence of an expansion of the Tribunal’s formal powers by the Assembly or 
another political authority, it could have claimed additional powers through its activity.  Many 
courts claimed powers that were not formally enumerated in any constitution.  The US Supreme 
Court’s claim of a power of constitutional review in Marbury v. Madison is an example.  In any 
case, the high court must interpret its formal powers through activity.  The Tribunal had two 
major opportunities to claim a power of constitutional review during the transition: the dispute 
over the expiration of the Assembly’s mandate in 2012 and the November 7, 2013 case 
concerning the appointment of members of the transitional justice body, in which the president 
of the Tribunal suggested that the 1959 Constitution might still be valid219.  The Tribunal 
declined to rule on the Assembly’s mandate and quickly retreated from the claim that the 1959 
Constitution was still valid.  Even given favorable circumstances in 2012 and 2013, the Tribunal 
did not expand its formal powers, or even promote an expansive interpretation of its powers, and 
it was not granted any additional formal powers by the political authorities. 
 
I. The Countermajoritarian Hypothesis and the Civil Society Hypothesis as Explanations 
for the Behavior of the Tribunal 
 
                                               
219 On the issue of the Assembly’s mandate, https://islamuswest.org/resources_Islam_and_the_West/Yadh-Ben-
Achour-interview.pdf,  
“Nous risquons une dictature pire que celle de Ben Ali.” 31 August 2012. http://lapresse.tn/20012015/54651/nous-
risquons-une-dictature-pire-que-celle-de-ben-ali.htm 
On the November 7, 2013 case: Amine Mahfoudh, “Le Tribunal Adminstratif: Juge Constitutionnel” La Presse. 
http://www.lapresse.tn/20012015/75116/le-tribunal-administratif-juge-constitutionnel.html  
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The Countermajoritarian Hypothesis  
 
The countermajoritarian hypothesis implies that the activity of courts will serve the 
interests of the actors that empowered them, and that courts will be willing and able to rule 
against governments.  The hypothesis assumes that courts can play a countermajoritarian role 
because of certain aspects of their institutional design: their appointments are insulated from 
political authority, the internal structure of the court cannot be easily changed by the 
government, and they are empowered to review the acts of the legislative and executive. 
A countermajoritarian role is particularly plausible for the Tunisian Administrative 
Tribunal because of its political environment.  The Tribunal did not gain additional formal 
powers after 2011, but the fluid political situation of the transition gave it many opportunities to 
act assertively.  Moreover, there is evidence that the opposition intended to use the Tribunal as a 
countermajoritarian mechanism against the Troika government.  By the summer of 2011, the 
provisional government headed by Beji Caid Essebsi had ceded control of constitutional 
questions to the Ben Achour Commission, which in turn called for the election of an Assembly 
to draft the new constitution.  The provisional government lacked the legitimacy and the legal 
authority to alter formal powers of the Tribunal or to issue a document that could form the basis 
for constitutional review.  It did still have broad authority to appoint judges.  As one of the last 
acts of its tenure, the provisional government appointed a new president of the Administrative 
Tribunal, Raoudha Mechichi.  Mechichi was known as a staunch secularist.  Although she had 
worked in the Tribunal since 1984, she was still considered to be close to the Essebsi 
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government220.  Through this choice, the provisional government intended the Tribunal to act as 
a check on the Assembly and the future Ennahda-led government221.   
 The Tribunal was suitable for such a countermajoritarian role because of its institutional 
history and the assumed political views of its judges.  According to the organic law governing 
the Tribunal, the head of government (the President of the Republic before 2011 or the Prime 
Minister after 2011) had the power to appoint the president of the Tribunal222.  In theory, the 
Troika government could have removed Mechichi and appointed a pro-government president.  
Certainly, such a move would have been condemned by the secular opposition.  It would likely 
be ineffective as well because most of the lower ranking judges were also opposed to the Troika 
government.  Like most judges in Tunisia, the judges of the Tribunal are assumed to support 
secular parties and to oppose Ennahda.  Their ties to the Ben Ali regime, their social and 
economic status, and their professional background all suggest a secular political stance.  An 
Islamist government would have to remove a large number of sitting judges and replace them 
with partisan appointees to change the basic political composition of the Tribunal. 
 
The Civil Society Hypothesis 
 
 The civil society hypothesis argues that the greater activity of the Tribunal - especially in 
fundamental rights and other areas litigated by civil society - should lead to greater formal 
powers for the Tribunal, either because the drafting bodies give the Tribunal greater formal 
powers as a concession to civil society or because the Tribunal claims these powers for itself.  
                                               
220 “Raoudha Mechichi,” Leaders, 26 September 2011. http://www.leaders.com.tn/article/6429-raoudha-mechichi 
221 “Justice: Nomination de premier president du Tribunal Administratif,” La Presse, 7 September 2011. 
http://www.lapresse.tn/07092011/36336/justice-nomination-de-premier-president-au-tribunal-administratif.html 
222 Law 72-40, June 1, 1972, http://www.legislation-securite.tn/fr/node/28167 
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Civil society is a broad category, but most of the Tribunal’s civil society allies were on the 
secular side of the political spectrum.  Many of the civil society groups that formed part of the 
Tribunal’s support network were also part of the Arrahil movement that called for the dissolution 
of the Assembly and the resignation of the Troika government223.  As a result, both the civil 
society hypothesis and the countermajoritarian hypothesis predict that the Tribunal should act 
against the Assembly. 
The Tribunal did not claim additional powers and none of the transitional authorities 
granted it additional powers, but both of these outcomes were plausible.  At the time of the 
revolution, the Tribunal already enjoyed the support of a broad range of political parties and civil 
society groups.  As outlined in Chapter 3, the Administrative Tribunal developed an extensive 
judicial support network immediately after 2011. The activity of the Tribunal as measured by the 
total number of cases has increased dramatically since 2011.  Hichem Hammi confirms that this 
increase is the result greater activity of civil society in bringing cases to the Tribunal224.  This 
increasing influence could have given the Tribunal greater leverage in the redesign of the 
transitional institutions that occurred during the 2013 crisis and in the 2014 constitution 
Civil society litigation suggested an alternative means for the Tribunal to overturn 
legislation by the Assembly by using the fundamental rights enumerated in international treaties.  
This approach could have allowed the Tribunal to side-step highly controversial issues like the 
Assembly’s mandate and the validity of the 1959 Constitution while still claiming a power to 
review the Assembly’s legislation.  Fundamental rights, whether drawn from constitutions, 
                                               
223 Anouar Boukhars et al. “The Egypt Effect: Sharpened Tensions, Reshuffled Alliances,” Carnegie Endowment, 
13 February 2014. http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/02/13/egypt-effect-sharpened-tensions-reshuffled-
alliances/h5ps#sthash.e7dBL1LZ.dpuf 
224 “Tribunal Administratif: Le nombre des affaires a evolue a 2694 contre 1965 en 2010” 
http://www.tunisienumerique.com/tribunal-administratif-le-nombre-des-affaires-a-presque-double-en-2011/57505 
Interviews with Hichem Hammi, Mohamed Bennour, Samir Taieb, Fatma Bouraoui and Walid ben Omrane. 
http://www.lapresse.tn/18042015/80788/des-decisions-inconstitutionnelles.html for further information about the 
number of cases decided by the Tribunal. 
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international treaties or other sources, usually have a prominent role in civil society litigation and 
‘rights revolutions.’225  In Tunisia from 2011 to 2014, human rights were at the center of 
revolutionary discourse.  A claim by the Tribunal to act as a guardian of human rights could be 
particularly potent in this environment.  Furthermore, Tunisia was party to several international 
treaties containing rights provisions, such as the UN Convention on Human Rights.  The 
Tribunal’s doctrine considers treaties to be superior to legislation, so if there is a conflict 
between a law and the treaty, the Tribunal would refuse to apply the law226.  
 
The Tribunal and the Assembly, 2011-2014 
 
This section surveys interaction between the Tribunal and the Assembly from 2011 to 
2014 focusing on four key incidents: the design of the transitional institutions in the months after 
the January 2011 revolution, the debate over the Assembly’s mandate from October 2012 to the 
summer of 2013, the Tribunal’s November 2013 decisions dealing with the 1959 constitution, 
and the adoption of the final constitution in January 2014.  Each of these periods poses problems 
for the the countermajoritarian and civil society hypotheses.  The Tribunal expanded its activity 
rapidly in 2011 but it was not granted additional powers.  The Assembly’s mandate and the 
November 2013 decisions were opportunities to for the Tribunal to claim additional powers and 
to check the Assembly, but the Tribunal did not take advantage of the these opportunities.  In late 
2013, the opposition forced the Troika to resign and to make major concessions on the content of 
the new constitution, but at the same time, the opposition also limited the Tribunal’s power by 
                                               
225 Epp (1998), Lasser (2009) 
226 Interview with Hammi.  The 2014 Constitution makes the superiority of treaties to legislation explicit.  
“Constitution of Tunisia, 2014,” Constitute Project. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Tunisia_2014.pdf 
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creating the Instance Provisoire pour le Controle Constitutionnel des Projets de Loi (IPCCPL) 
and removing Raoudha Mechichi from the presidency of the Tribunal. 
 
The Ben Achour Commission and the Decree - January 2011 - October 2012 
 
 The March 23 Decree left the Tribunal as the sole representative of legal continuity with 
the pre-2011 regime.  The first year after the fall of Ben Ali saw a flood of rights litigation at the 
Tribunal.  The Tribunal quickly became involved in deciding procedural issues arising from the 
new National Assembly. 
In the months after the 2011 revolution, the Tribunal issued decisions overturning 
repressive regulations left over from the Ben Ali regime.  Immediately after the revolution in 
2011, the Tribunal overturned the ban on Council for Human Rights, which had been dissolved 
by the Ben Ali regime.  It dissolved the Conseil Superieur des Magistrats, which was a relic of 
the Ben Ali regime227.  The Tribunal also decided disputes relating to the elections for the 
Assembly in October 2011.    
These decisions increased the prominence of the Tribunal and paved the way for actions 
against the Assembly and the Troika government.  The Tribunal ruled in favor of civil society on 
cases dealing with the internal procedures of the Assembly, the operation of the ISIE, and the 
Instance Verite et Dignite.  A group of civil society organizations, including Bawsala, demanded 
that the Assembly reveal information about the internal activities of the Tribunal, such as the 
                                               
227 Lilia Weslaty. Nawaat, 9 October 2012. “Selon le Tribunal Administratif le Conseil Superieur des Magistrats est 
illegal.” http://nawaat.org/portail/2012/10/09/tunisie-selon-le-tribunal-administratif-le-conseil-superieur-des-
magistrats-est-illegal/ 
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attendance of particular delegates at meetings.  The Tribunal forced the Assembly to accept 
greater transparency228.   
This activity supports both of the hypotheses.  The Tribunal did act as a counterweight to 
the Assembly several times during the transition.  The Tribunal ruled against the Assembly on 
the internal procedures of the Assembly, the reinstatement of the dismissed judges, the operation 
of the ISIE, the body charged with overseeing elections, and the nomination of members of the 
Instance Verite et Dignite (IVD), the transitional justice body.  All of these decisions resulted 
from cases brought by civil society.  Such a large number of rulings against the government was 
unprecedented in the Tribunal’s history229.  
Although many of the cases brought by civil society deal with human rights directly or 
indirectly, the Tribunal has not used the UN Convention of Human Rights or other international 
human rights treaties in its decisions.  Instead, it used arguments founded on the statutes 
themselves and avoided overturning any legislation as incompatible with international treaties230.   
 
The Assembly’s Mandate - October 2012 - August 2013 
 
The debate about the Assembly’s mandate grew out of the ambiguities of the transitional 
documents that created the Assembly.  The Ben Achour Commission’s interim decree of March 
23, 2011 called for the creation of a National Assembly with full legislative and constituent 
                                               
228 Benjamin Roger. “En Tunisie, des citoyens veulent envoyer l’Assemblee constituante au Tribunal.”Jeune 
Afrique. 31 August 2012. 31/08/2012. http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAWEB20120831122039/ 
229 “Tribunal Administratif: Le nombre des affaires a evolue a 2694 contre 1965 en 2010” 
http://www.tunisienumerique.com/tribunal-administratif-le-nombre-des-affaires-a-presque-double-en-2011/57505 
http://www.lapresse.tn/18042015/80788/des-decisions-inconstitutionnelles.html for further information about the 
number of cases decided by the Tribunal. 
Interview with Hammi.   
230 Mahfoudh notes that other Tunisian courts have accepted the principle of the superiority of treaties over 
legislation.  Amine Mahfoudh, “Le Tribunal Adminstratif: Juge Constitutionnel” La Presse, 19 November 2013. 
http://www.lapresse.tn/20012015/75116/le-tribunal-administratif-juge-constitutionnel.html  
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powers.  However, the decree contained few rules for the operation of the Assembly or any clear 
description of its powers.  In any case, the decree also included a clause voiding application of 
the decree after the election of the Assembly231.  In May 2011, the major political parties 
formally agreed to limit the mandate of the Assembly to one year after its election on October 
23, 2011.  Even earlier, there had been a consensus that the Assembly should draft a new 
constitution and call new elections as quickly as possible, probably within a year or less232.  The 
secular parties argued that the Assembly must not ‘turn itself into a parliament,’ that is try to 
govern the country for the long term or implement major legislation233.   
By the summer of 2012, it was clear that the Assembly would not finish drafting the 
constitution within one year.  The expiration of the one year mandate, and its indefinite renewal 
by the Assembly itself, created a crisis of legitimacy for the Assembly.  The Assembly’s 
legitimacy crisis coincided with growing discontent against to the Troika government.  The 
assassinations of Chokri Belaid and Mohamed Brahmi led to widespread protests.  In the 
Assembly, parliamentarians began abandoning Ennahda’s coalition partners, Ettakatol and CPR.  
Starting in July 2013 after the assassination of Brahmi, opposition protesters occupied the square 
outside the National Assembly building demanding the resignation of the Troika and the 
dissolution of the Assembly234.   
The question of whether the expiration of the mandate made the Assembly was illegal 
remained open.  For both political and legal reasons, many opposition figures tried to shift the 
discussion of the Assembly’s mandate from politics to law.  A decision from the Tribunal on this 
                                               
231 The Assembly replaced the decree with an organic law on December 17, 2011, which reproduced most of the 
features of the decree.   
232 Stepan (2012) 
233 Khemais Frini. “Vers la dictature de l’Assemblee” La Presse, 5 August 2013.  
http://lapresse.tn/10122014/70903/vers-la-dictature-dassemblee.html.   
234 “Le sit-in Arrahil se poursuivra jusqu’au depart du gouvernement” La Presse, 23 August 2013. 
http://lapresse.tn/13012015/71498/le-sit-in-arrahil-se-poursuivra-jusquau-depart-du-gouvernement.html 
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issue could force the dissolution of the Assembly and provide a legal basis for the accession of a 
new transitional government.  Opposition figures, including Beji Caid Essebsi, leader of the 
emerging secular party Nidaa Tounes, argued that the Tribunal became illegal on October 23, 
2012.  Opposition legal scholars provided the groundwork for this argument235. 
Both the political sympathies of most of the Tribunal judges and the political atmosphere 
during the summer of 2013 favored the dissolution of the Assembly.  Despite numerous threats 
to bring a case to the Tribunal, the opposition never did so.  Still, the Tribunal could have found 
a way to rule on this question in the context of another case.  Any action taken by the Assembly 
could be deemed illegal if the Assembly itself were illegal.  The absence of a decision by the 
Tribunal on this issue is not easily explained.   
 
The 1959 Constitution: September 2013 - December 2013 
 
 The National Dialogue agreed that the Assembly system should remain in place.  
Negotiations about the final constitution and the caretaker government began in earnest. 
On November 7, 2013, the Tribunal issued a major decision overturning the appointment 
of members of the Instance Verite et Dignite.  This decision had the potential to derail the 
government’s plans for transitional justice, which is an issue that pits figures of the old regime 
against the new democratic government.  It also followed several decisions blocking the 
appointment of members of the Instance Superieure Independante pour les Elections (ISIE), 
which caused further friction between the Assembly and the Tribunal.  A statement issued by the 
Judicial Council of the Tribunal alongside this decision also asserted the Tribunal’s power to 
                                               
235 Jean-Christophe Ploquin. “En Tunisie, un veteran de l’independance face aux islamistes” La Croix, 11 
November 2013. http://paris-international.blogs.la-croix.com/en-tunisie-un-veteran-de-lindependance-face-aux-
islamistes/2013/11/11/ 
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review legislation based on conformity to the 1959 constitution236.  The statement asserted that in 
the absence of a constitutional court the Tribunal must decide whether legislation is in conflict 
with the constitution.  This claim was controversial because the Tribunal had never before 
exercised a power of constitutional review of legislation and because the 1959 constitution had 
been suspended immediately after the 2011 revolution237.    
Political parties and civil society were divided by the issue of transitional justice covered 
by the decision as well as validity of of the Tribunal’s statement claiming a power of 
constitutional review.  Supporters of the secular opposition welcomed the Tribunal’s decision on 
transitional justice.  The secular opposition was suspicious of the Instance Verite et Dignite as a 
possible means of prosecuting opponents of the Troika who had ties to the Ben Ali regime.  Civil 
society groups that advocated for transitional justice opposed the decision.  Islamists and 
supporters of the Ennahda government saw the decision and the statement as an attack on the 
transition as a whole238.  Some opposition figures welcomed the statement and argued in favor of 
provisional review by the Tribunal.   
The Tribunal’s decision did force the government to reform the procedures for selecting 
members of the Instance, even though the Tribunal backed down on the questions of the validity 
of the 1959 Constitution and of the Tribunal’s power to review legislation.  Ultimately, the 
Tribunal did not exercise the powers outlined in the statement.  It never declared a piece of 
legislation to be unconstitutional, and it did not refer to the 1959 Constitution in its later 
                                               
236 Arret 7 Novembre 2013, 134866 – 134855 – 134854  
For an overview of disputes surrounding the ISIE, see Rafaa ben Achour, “Les enjeux du proces electoral” 
colloquium organized 3 December 2013 in Tunis. http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_38488-1522-1-
30.pdf?140804145710 
237 ‘Amr al-Safrawi, “Ra’i qanuni: Ra’is al-Mahkamah al-Idariyah yuzakki kharaq al-dustur wa yujayiz tujawuz al-
sultah wa yaqbur manzumat al-’adalah al-intiqaliyah.”(Judicial Opinion: The President of the Administrative 
Tribunal  stokes the fire burning the constitution, allows the excess of power, and buries the system of transitional 
justice), Assabah http://www.assabah.com.tn/ 
238 ‘Amr al-Safrawi, “Ra’i qanuni: Ra’is al-Mahkamah al-Idariyah yuzakki kharaq al-dustur wa yujayiz tujawuz al-
sultah wa yaqbur manzumat al-’adalah al-intiqaliyah.”  
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decisions.  This outcome may represent a decision by the Tribunal to backtrack or it may be the 
result of changing political circumstances that made the Tribunal’s countermajoritarian role less 
appealing to the secular parties.  As secularists gained control of the government, first in the 
Jomaa caretaker government, and then more decisively after the 2014 elections, the potential for 
confrontation between the Tribunal and government decreased.  The Tribunal had only a short 
window to apply this doctrine because the new Constitution would be adopted in January 2014, 
three months after the Tribunal raised the possibility of citing the 1959 Constitution.  The 2014 
constitution also created a specialized body for provisional constitutional review, the IPCCPL, 
rather than giving this power to the Tribunal.  Nidaa Tounes, the main secularist party, supported 
this provision as much as the Troika parties239. 
 
The 2014 Constitution and the Resignation of the Troika - January 2014 - March 2014 
 
 Negotiations between the Troika and the opposition starting from the summer of 2013 
resulted in a comprehensive plan.  First, the Troika government would resign to be replaced a 
technocratic caretaker government headed by Mehdi Jomaa.  Second, a permanent constitution 
would be adopted in January 2014.  The transitional provisions of the 2014 constitution seem 
designed to limit the power of the Tribunal.  The 2014 constitution created the IPCCPL as an 
alternative to provisional constitutional review by the Tribunal.  Supporters of the Tribunal 
opposed the creation of the IPCCPL for this reason.  The Jomaa government also removed 
Mechichi as president of the Tribunal, replacing her with Mohamed Faouzi Ben Hamed.  In 
short, the opposition forced the Troika to resign and imposed major concessions with regard to 
the constitution, but it also agreed to limitations on the Tribunal. 
                                               
239 Interviews with Fatma Bouraoui (Nidaa Tounes), Walid ben Omrane (CPR)  and Mohamed Bennour (Ettakatol) 
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The Tribunal’s activity from 2011 to 2014 reveals a mixture of assertiveness and 
deference to political authorities that cannot be explained by either of the alternative hypotheses.  
Under the leadership of president Mechichi, the Tribunal acted as a counterweight to the 
Assembly.  With the support of civil society, the Tribunal ruled against the Assembly.  These 
conditions presented the Tribunal with an opportunity to claim additional powers, but it did not 
do so.     
 
II. The Judicial Role 
 
The Judicial Role Hypothesis  
 
 As described in the Introduction to Section II, the judicial role hypothesis states that 
beliefs about the judicial role will affect formal powers of courts.  The drafting bodies may 
believe that certain roles are appropriate or inappropriate for courts, or they may believe that 
courts will behave in a certain way and design the transitional institutions accordingly.  The 
judicial role consists of both normative and practical elements.  It includes a concept of law and a 
theory of the sources of judicial independence. 
The judicial role develops historically.  First, judges adopt a set of practices and beliefs 
that allow them to secure their interests in the old regime.  Second, these ideas persist during the 
transition and continue to guide judicial behavior in a highly uncertain environment.  Finally, 
these ideas shape the formal powers that courts demand and the formal powers that political 
authorities are willing to grant them.  A different collection of political forces or a different 
arrangement of the transitional institutions would not have made the Tribunal any less reluctant 
to perform these roles. 
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This hypothesis can explain the behavior of the Tribunal, including its combination of 
deference on some issues with assertiveness on others.  It argues that the Tribunal’s deference to 
the Assembly is the result of a choice by the Tribunal to remove itself from politics.  Such a 
choice could result from a principled objection to court interference in politics or a fear of the 
consequences of political activity for the court.  These two reasons could be intertwined.  Like 
many courts, the Tribunal bases its legitimacy on a claim of apolitical expertise.  Aspects of 
Tunisian legal culture, the Tribunal’s internal structure and its relations with political authorities 
before and after 2011 make this claim especially important for the Tribunal.  The Tribunal 
maintained a reputation for independence unequaled by any of the other institutions inherited 
from the Ben Ali regime.  This independence rested on a shared view of the Tribunal’s role as a 
an apolitical expert actor.  The procedures of the Tribunal were designed to protect this role.  The 
judges were promoted according to meritocratic criteria from within the Tribunal.  The Tribunal 
presented an image of consensus; judges do not sign their decisions and public disagreements are 
rare.  Finally, the Ben Ali regime maintained a norm of non-intervention in the internal structure 
of the Tribunal.   
There are two possible objections to this explanation.  First, the ideas espoused by the 
Tribunal could simply be a product of strategic considerations.   Second, the Tribunal might 
show deference to Assembly on some issues of key importance to the Assembly because it is 
afraid of retaliation by the Assembly.  I address the first objection by looking at the history of the 
Tribunal.  A connection between ideas and the practices of the court during the old regime can 
address this objection.  The ideas held by the Tribunal judges are not simply the result of shifting 
interests, but are rather rooted in experiences of the Ben Ali period.  I address the second 
explanation by showing that retaliation against the Tribunal was rare and that the Assembly had 
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few means to retaliate.  The Tribunal is more concerned with divisions among its own judges 
than retaliation from the government.   
It has implications for the activity of courts before and after 2011.  Tunisian courts should 
pass up opportunities to claim additional powers if these powers are at odds with their 
conception of the judicial role.  Such situations are the crucial test of the hypothesis because the 
predictions of the hypothesis diverge from the predictions of the other two hypotheses.  Any time 
that the Tribunal did not rule against the Assembly could be such an opportunity, but this raises 
two objections.  
 In the following section, I outline the views of judges on the judicial role as presented in 
the interviews.  I then address two objections to this explanation.  I then outline how ideas about 
the judicial role explain the Tribunal’s pattern of assertiveness and deference during the debate 
about the Assembly’s mandate from October 2012 to August 2013 and the Tribunal’s November 
7 decision claiming a power of constitutional review. 
 
Applying the Judicial Role Hypothesis to the Tribunal 
 
The Judicial Role and the Tribunal According to Legal Professionals 
 
 The interviews reveal that beliefs of Tunisian legal professionals favor a technocratic 
view of judicial activity and a legal positivist view of the sources of law.  Each of these positions 
is justified not just by legal theory but also by a concern for judicial independence.  The danger 
to judicial independence is politicization of the judges themselves more than cooptation or 
retaliation by political authorities.  The interviewees’ conception of the judicial role consists of 
three principles. 
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First, law is technical or scientific field that is antithetical to politics.  Courts should defer 
to the government on political questions.  The conception of political questions held by Tunisia 
legal professionals is quite broad.  Constitutional review is perceived as a political activity.  As a 
result, legal professionals voiced objections to constitutional review by the Tribunal.  Koubaa 
said that review by the Tribunal would be preferable to review by the IPCCPL because he 
considers the IPCCPL to be too weak to stand up to political authority.  The involvement of the 
Tribunal in constitutional questions would make it a target for interference from the political 
authorities.  
Second, judicial activity requires specialized knowledge and training.  Moreover, 
different legal tasks require different kinds of expertise.  For example, Koubaa and M’dhaffar 
state, the judges of the Tribunal do not have the appropriate training for constitutional review, 
even though both interviewees are sympathetic to the Tribunal.  They consider the process of 
deciding public law issues to be substantially different from constitutional issues.  M’dhaffar 
described the activity of the Constitutional Council as ‘both political and legal,’ and thus 
fundamentally different from the activity of other courts, including the Tribunal.  Not only 
should the Tribunal not meddle in politics, it should also avoid the political questions involved in 
constitutional review. 
Third, courts should base their decisions only on positive law or legislation, rather than 
constitutional norms, natural law or precedents.  They should not claim power that are not clearly 
granted to them by the constitution and organic laws.  For example, Koubaa argued that the 
Tribunal could exercise review based on the 1959 constitution or the March 23 Decree, but 
because such a power was not granted by any valid legal text, it is impossible for the the 
Tribunal to claim such a power.  M’dhaffar rejected any form of a posteriori constitutional 
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review because it could destabilize the legal order in both practical areas, such as social security, 
and highly symbolic areas, such as the personal status code.  The first task of courts is to ensure 
the uniformity and stability of law, not to correct imperfections in the law.   
 The interviewees’ understanding of judicial independence is quite different from how 
judicial independence is understood in the United States, or in Egypt for that matter.  The 
Tunisian conception of judicial independence rests on institutional organization, not on 
constitutional provisions or constitutional review.  In the United States, constitutional review is 
an essential activity of the judiciary.  It is opposed to political activities.  Judicial independence 
is founded in the constitutional separation of powers, which makes the judiciary a branch of 
government equal to the executive and the legislative.  In Egypt too, constitutional review is an 
essential activity of the SCC.  Although lower courts cannot exercise constitutional review, the 
SCC’s power of constitutional review is still important to them because it can be used to 
guarantee judicial independence against government interference.  For this reason, the 
suspension of the constitution would be a greater threat to judicial independence in Egypt than 
Tunisia.  The unusual aspects of the Tunisian conception of judicial independence suggests that 
these ideas about the sources of judicial independence are not simply the result of theory, but 
also of the Tribunal’s experience during the Ben Ali period.   
The legal professionals’ understanding of the judicial role is not simply a normative ideal 
but also a set of causal beliefs about what sorts of activity by the Tribunal will be beneficial or 
harmful to its independence240.  The judges applied these concepts to the cases of the Assembly’s 
mandate and the November 7, 2013 decision.    
 
Relations between the Tribunal and the Ben Ali Regime 
                                               
240 Keohane and Goldstein contrast norms with causal beliefs.  Goldstein and Keohane (1993) 
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 If the judges’ conception of the judicial role can account for the activity of the Tribunal 
after 2011, it should have its roots in the pre-revolutionary period.  Otherwise, this conception 
could simply be a response to the constraints imposed on courts by the Assembly system.  The 
pattern of non-interference in the Tribunal coupled with non-enforcement of some decisions 
dates back to the Ben Ali and Bourguiba regimes.  It is evidenced in the Tribunal’s decisions 
against the Ben Ali regime, the method of appointing members of the Tribunal during the Ben 
Ali regime and the interviewees’ attitude toward the Tribunal.  Moreover, it is implausible that 
the Assembly could impose an ideology of judicial deference on the Tribunal during the 
relatively short transitional period.  
The Tribunal was less active under the Ben Ali regime than it was after 2011.  It decided 
fewer cases per year.  Civil society was less able to bring cases to the Tribunal before 2011.  
Hammi went so far as to say that Tunisia had ‘no real civil society’ before 2011.  It also had little 
political role to play in a regime where power was concentrated in the hands of the president.  
Still this period was of great importance to the activity of the Tribunal after 2011.  As the 
interviews make clear, the Tribunal did sometimes rule against the Ben Ali regime without 
provoking the regime to undermine its independence.  The 2004 decision allowing a teacher to 
wear a hijab and decisions regarding the Tunisian League for Human Rights in the 1990’s are 
among the most well-known241.  The regime did choose not to enforce decisions that it opposed.  
As Mohamed Bennour, spokesman of Ettakatol, put it ‘the problem that the TA faced in the Ben 
Ali period was the non-execution of its judgements by the executive.’   
                                               
241  Comite des droits de l’homme Nations Unies. “La situation des droits de l’homme en Tunisie” March 2008. 
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Mahfoudh cites the Tunisian League for Human Rights decisions as a rare example of the Tribunal’s use of 
international treaties.  Amine Mahfoudh, “Le Tribunal Adminstratif: Juge Constitutionnel” La Presse. 19 November 
2013. http://www.lapresse.tn/20012015/75116/le-tribunal-administratif-juge-constitutionnel.html  
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These informal institutions persisted because Ben Ali allowed them to persist.  The 
Tribunal could easily have ended up like the ‘empty shell institutions’ of the Ben Ali regime, 
such as the Constitutional Council and the parliament242.  The president of the republic had the 
power to appoint a president of the Tribunal243.  However, this power did not translate into direct 
control over the Tribunal or the stacking of the Tribunal with Ben Ali’s associates, as was the 
case with the Constitutional Council.  There was a strong norm that the president should choose 
a president from the Tribunal’s judges and this procedure should not be used to pressure the 
court.  That it did not suggests that the independence of the Tribunal was beneficial to the 
regime.  Over the four decades since its creation in 1972, political authorities had learned how to 
deal with the Tribunal without destroying its independence.  By respecting the independence of 
the Tribunal, the regime maintained a valuable source of unbiased legal expertise.  Like the early 
French Conseil d’Etat, the Tribunal under Ben Ali was a consultative more rather than a judging 
institution.  Like administrative courts in other authoritarian regimes, the Tribunal helped the 
Ben Ali regime monitor the bureaucracy for corruption244.  The regime’s non-enforcement of 
some of the Tribunal’s decisions gave the regime a veto over the Tribunal’s activities without 
fundamentally compromising the institution.  For its part, the Tribunal had developed a set of 
norms for its internal governance that improved on the legal guarantees of its independence.   
The interviewees state that the Tribunal was also remarkably free from interference 
during the Ben Ali period.  Even interviewees, such as Mohamed Bennour of Ettakatol, who 
were bitterly opposed to the Ben Ali regime, agree on this point.  Samir Annabi traces the greater 
independence of the Tribunal to its founding, which grouped together leading jurists, to the 
actions of its first president, Mr. Kanani, who used his political influence to ensure the 
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independence of the Tribunal, and to the practice of appointing judges based on expertise rather 
than political connections245.  By 2011, the Tribunal had already established a reputation for 
independence that was respected by all of the major political parties and by legal professionals.   
The Troika government used much the same approach in dealing with the Tribunal.  
Certainly the impunity of the Troika in choosing which decisions to enforce is not as great as 
during the Ben Ali period.  Some of the most effective decisions of the Tribunal during the 
transition were in the internal procedures of the Assembly and in the implementation of organic 
laws drafted by the Assembly, such as those creating the ISIE and the Instance Verite et Dignite.  
In these cases, the Tribunal’s decisions changed the behavior of the government on important 
issues.  In contrast, the operation of ministries remained an area of relative impunity for the 
government.  The Ministry of Justice refused to reinstate the judges that had been removed for 
corruption, in defiance of a decision by the Tribunal.  As of 2015, these judges have still not 
been reinstated.  This is not surprising because the Troika inherited much of its administrative 
personnel from the Ben Ali period.   
It is implausible that the Assembly system could create a new judicial ideology that could 
replace the Tribunal’s experience during the Ben Ali regime.  As discussed above, the Assembly 
did not retaliate against the Tribunal, it did not attempt to remove judges from the Tribunal, and 
it did not issue new laws reorganizing the judiciary.   
Despite the many changes brought by the revolution, the certain patterns of relations 
between the Tribunal and political authorities remained the same.  These include non-
enforcement rather than interference by political authorities and deference by the Tribunal on 
political questions.  The ideology of the Tribunal is not simply a response to transitional politics.  
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158 
The methods used by the Tribunal to ensure its independence during the Ben Ali regime 
continued to be useful during the transition. 
 
The Assembly’s Limited Means of Retaliation 
 
The activity of the Tribunal combines assertiveness and deference to the Assembly on 
different issues.  An alternative explanation for the Tribunal’s deference on some issues is that it 
faced a threat of retaliation from the Assembly if it issued rulings that threatened the Assembly’s 
core interests.  It could be that the Assembly is more able to retaliate if these core interests are 
threatened.  If this is the case, the inactivity of the Tribunal on the issues of the Assembly’s 
mandate and provisional constitutional review would not be evidence of the ideational 
explanation.  Retaliation might take the form of interference in the internal governance of the 
Tribunal or the removal of judges from the Tribunal.  It is possible that the government could 
communicate its demands to the Tribunal so effectively that the Tribunal would never make the 
mistake of crossing one of the government’s redlines.  In practice, there should be some evidence 
of the Assembly threatening retaliation.  At least there should be clear means through which the 
Assembly could retaliate against the Tribunal, such as interference in the organization of the 
Tribunal, removal of sitting judges or changes to the laws and constitutional provisions 
governing the Tribunal.   
 The Tunisian transitional institutions were designed to concentrate power in the 
Assembly.  This concentration of power could discourage activity by the Tribunal on issues of 
critical importance to the Assembly.  Whatever the balance of power between different parties, a 
majority in the Assembly has nearly unchecked power to pass legislation and draft the 
constitution.  Even if the majority party were voted out after the end of the transition, as 
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happened with Ennahda, it still had major influence over the constitution, and thus the future 
status of the Tribunal.  This argument implies that the Tribunal would rarely challenge the 
interests of the majority in the Assembly.  If the Tribunal did challenge the Assembly, the 
Assembly would respond by altering the statutes that formed the basis of the Tribunal’s decision 
or by interfering in the internal governance of the Tribunal.   
In fact, the Tribunal did not face retaliation for its decisions by any of the transitional 
governments.  In general, governments have several means of retaliating against courts, 
including altering the constitution, legislation governing the courts, or removing sitting judges.  
The Troika had limited control over all of these means of retaliating against the Tribunal. 
The public positions of the political parties on the provisions of the draft constitutions 
undermine the argument that the Assembly’s constituent power gave it a means to retaliate 
against the Tribunal.  No party argued that the Tribunal should be removed from the new 
constitution or that its independence or formal powers should be reduced.  None of the draft 
constitutions, including Ennahda’s controversial draft of June 1, 2013, attempted to restrict the 
formal powers to the Tribunal.   
The draft constitution proved to be one of the issues where the Troika faced the most 
opposition and had to make the most concessions.  The ratification of the new constitution was 
subject to a two-thirds majority requirement.  Like the one year mandate, this requirement could 
not be enforced on the Assembly by any other body, but it would still be costly politically for the 
Troika to ignore this requirement.  In practice, the final draft constitution was approved by over 
ninety percent of the members of the Assembly246.  The first draft constitution produced by the 
Troika government on June 1, 2013 proved highly controversial and contributed to the crisis 
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during the summer of 2013247.  In short, the Assembly’s constituent power was not a more 
effective means to retaliate against the Tribunal or other courts. 
The Troika also found it difficult to pass legislation, despite commanding a majority in 
the Assembly.  The Troika parties may have been committed to the Assembly system, but the 
unity of the Troika government was always in doubt.  Many individual delegates defected from 
Ennahda’s coalition partners in 2012 and 2013.  As a result, the Troika’s majority dwindled from 
138 to 117 out of 217.  As many as sixty opposition delegates suspended their participation in the 
Assembly during the summer of 2013248.  It could be that the Troika parties were only able to 
unite when the Assembly system itself was threatened.  This explanation is plausible because the 
Assembly system was the basis of the Troika parties’ power.  However, the parties often failed to 
agree even on the desirability of maintaining the Assembly system.  Although the Assembly 
ultimately survived, its viability was in doubt for much of the transition.  The opposition openly 
called for the dissolution of the Assembly and the creation of very different transitional 
institutions.  In the summer of 2013, it looked like they might succeed in forcing the dissolution 
of the Assembly.  Ettakatol and CPR may have been too deeply invested in the Assembly system 
to contemplate an alternative.  However, association with the Troika also eroded support for 
these parties.  Ettakatol failed to win a single seat in the 2014 elections.  Many figures from these 
parties have continued to be involved in politics, but in different capacities or with different party 
affiliations249.  By 2013, individual delegates from CPR and Ettakatol may have seen better 
political prospects in opposing the Assembly and trying to secure their own position in a post-
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Assembly system.  The unpopularity of the Assembly gave the Tribunal an opening to challenge 
the basic principle of the supremacy of the Assembly.  
In contrast to the legislative and constituent functions, executive and ministerial actions 
gave more leeway to the Troika.  However, the ability of the government to use its power to 
appoint judges as a means of retaliation against the Tribunal is more limited than it might seem.  
The government always had the power to appoint the president of the Tribunal, but the Troika 
declined to use this power against Mechichi.  Mechichi was removed by the Jomaa government, 
not by the Troika government, which resigned before the removal of Mechichi250.  The 
government did remove a number of ordinary judges in 2012, and failed to reinstate despite a 
ruling from the Tribunal251.  Although the government never reinstated the judges, it did face 
criticism from civil society, the judiciary and the opposition parties on this issues, and its 
removal of the judges did not expand into a broader campaign to reshape the ordinary judiciary.  
In any case, a similar strategy would not work against the Tribunal.  The Tribunal, as an 
administrative rather than a judicial body, is not under the authority of the Ministry of Justice.  
According to the organic law governing the Tribunal, lower ranking judges in the Tribunal are 
appointed by senior judges, not the government.  The government would need to first change the 
organic law governing the Tribunal or use some extraordinary measure, such as transitional 
justice, to remove Tribunal judges on grounds of corruption or other offences.  The Assembly 
also shelved plans to reform the judiciary until after the adoption of a new constitution and the 
election of a permanent legislature252. 
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Retaliation and non-Enforcement 
 
 Many actors, including the opposition parties and the judicial syndicates, the SMT and 
the AMT, accused the Troika government of undermining the independence of the Tribunal and 
retaliating against its decisions.  However, it is difficult to find a clear example of any post-2011 
government retaliating against the Tribunal.  It is possible that relations between the Tribunal 
and the government are still defined by an implicit threat of retaliation.  In fact, non-enforcement 
provided a means for the government to deal with the Tribunal that was more attractive than 
retaliation.   
The removal of Mechichi sparked protests by the AMT, which claimed that the 
government was undermining the independence of the Tribunal.  There are several reasons to be 
skeptical of this claim.   First, the head of government had the legal authority to remove the 
president of the Tribunal.  The law governing the Tribunal had remained the same since the Ben 
Ali period.  Second, the party most opposed to Mechichi, Ennahda, never tried to use this power 
to undermine the Tribunal, even during the confrontation over the Assembly’s mandate.  Third, 
many of the judges of the Tribunal, at least those represented by the UMA, were suspicious of 
Mechichi and her political program.  In this light, the Jomaa government’s decision to remove 
Mechichi was not an attempt to undermine the independence of the Tribunal or punish it for its 
numerous rulings against the government from 2011 to 2014.  Instead, this decision resolved a 
tension between two visions of the Tribunal’s role.  Mechichi, along with secular political parties 
and civil society groups, had sought to make the Tribunal into a counterweight against the 
Assembly.  The other view is presented by the legal professionals that I interviewed - Hammi, 
Annabi and Koubaa.  The Tribunal should confine itself to a relatively narrow technical realm in 
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which it had unquestioned expertise.  It should avoid political conflicts in order to avoid conflicts 
with the government and divisions within the Tribunal.  This role was more in keeping with the 
traditions of the Tribunal and with the legal theory espoused by most Tunisian legal 
professionals.  This second view triumphed because of support from a large number of legal 
professionals, including judges of the Tribunal, and from the Jomaa government.  
The government was able to impose its will on the Tribunal in the area of appointments 
to the ordinary judiciary.  In the interviews, Koubaa and Annabi note that the Troika did refuse 
to enforce some of the Tribunal’s decisions, as during the Ben Ali period.  The most well-known 
example is the case of the judges removed for corruption by the Troika’s minister of justice, 
Noureddine Bhiri in 2012.  The Tribunal ruled that these judges had been removed illegally and 
must be reinstated.  As of 2015, these judges have still not been reinstated despite criticism from 
Tunisian and international NGO’s253.   The Troika government did not have the monopoly on 
power that the Ben Ali regime had, but in this case the Ministry of Justice was still able to 
dominate the ordinary judges in much the way that it had under Ben Ali.   
 In the cases where the Tribunal challenged the Assembly most directly and where the 
Assembly could retaliate through its legislative rather than its constituent power, the government 
responded by non-enforcement of the Tribunal’s decisions, rather than retaliation.  This 
continues a pattern from the old regime.  This pattern has implications for the behavior of 
Tribunal.  The Tribunal does not need to be as careful about overstepping the bounds of what the 
Assembly will allow if the result is only non-enforcement of the decision rather than retaliation 
against the court. 
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The Judicial Role and the Activity of the Tribunal, 2011-2014  
 
The statements of judges show that a certain conception of the judicial role was 
widespread in Tunisia.  The history of the Tribunal under Ben Ali show that these ideas have 
deep roots in the past.  Relations between the Tribunal and the Assembly show that the 
Tribunal’s behavior was not limited by the threat of retaliation.  All of this evidence shows that 
the judicial role hypothesis can be applied to the Tribunal.   
Both the issue of the Assembly’s mandate and the November 7, 2013 case can be 
interpreted as opportunities for the Tribunal to limit the power of the elected government.  
Moreover, they were opportunities for the Tribunal to claim additional formal powers.  However, 
in both of these cases the Tribunal ultimately declined to claim additional powers over the 
Assembly. 
 
The Mandate of the Assembly: Political and Legal Considerations 
 
 The Tribunal’s refusal to issue a decision on the Assembly’s mandate is puzzling from 
the perspective of either the countermajoritarian or civil society hypotheses.  However, 
interviews with legal professionals reveal the importance of ideas about the judicial role, and 
especially about legal methodology and the sources of law, in the Tribunal’s approach to this 
issue.  Legal professionals oppose the Assembly system in practice, but they accept the theory 
underlying it. 
Legal professionals expressed disapproval of the Assembly and its decision to 
unilaterally extend its mandate.  Often their arguments were nearly identical to those used by 
165 
secular opposition politicians, such as Essebsi.  This is not surprising giving the partisan 
affiliation of most judges.  Koubaa and M’dhaffar, two former judges who had since moved to 
private practice were particularly critical of the Assembly.  When I asked why the Assembly 
extended its mandate, Koubaa replied that “they simply wanted power.”  M’dhaffar considered 
the era of the Assembly from 2011 to 2014 to be “a big stupidity” in which “the country lost 
three years.”254   
However, this hostility to the Assembly does not translate into support for action by 
courts against the Assembly system.  Despite their political stance against the Assembly, legal 
professionals reject the argument that the Assembly is illegal because of the expiration of its 
mandate and oppose the involvement of the Tribunal in this issue.  Koubaa places responsibility 
for checking the Assembly on civil society rather than any court.  He argues that “if it were not 
for civil society, the Assembly would have stayed in power for five years.”  Hammi rejected a 
Tribunal decision on the legitimacy of the Assembly because the issue was “completely 
political.”  The one year mandate was simply a political agreement among the parties, not a valid 
legal rule that the Assembly could use in its decisions.  
Such a decision would not be constitutional review because it would not be based on any 
constitutional text.  Instead, it would ask the Tribunal to take on an amorphous role as the 
‘guardian of the transition.’  As Koubaa argued, the March 23 Decree, or the Assembly’s own 
organic law of December 17 could form the basis of judicial review of the Assembly.  Yet these 
documents did not give a power of review to the Tribunal or any other court, and they did not 
include the one year limit. Given the positivist doctrine of the Tribunal, the legal case for 
dissolving the Assembly was weak.   
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 From these interviews, it is clear that legal positivism is the official legal methodology of 
the Tribunal and the Tunisian legal system generally.  It is the only methodology that legal 
professionals endorse in the interviews, regardless of what other considerations these statements 
might mask.  However, it is not clear why the judges are so attached to this methodology.  The 
disputes following the Tribunal’s November 7, 2013 decision reveals some of the political 
considerations that help explain the judges’ commitment to legal positivism. 
    
The Judicial Role and 1959 Constitution: Politics inside the Tribunal 
 
 The decision to block appointments to the IVD was politically sensitive, but not more so 
than the Tribunal’s other decisions.  From a positivist legal perspective, the Tribunal was on 
firmer ground with the November 7, 2013 case than with the issue of the Assembly’s mandate.  
The November 7 decision was the result of a case brought against the Assembly over the 
appointment of members of the Instance Verite et Dignite.  In contrast, the issue of the 
Assembly’s mandate was never addressed in an actual case.  Moreover, the Tribunal could draw 
on several sources of law to justify the decision, including the 1959 Constitution and 
international treaties, whereas a time limit on the Assembly’s mandate is not mentioned in any 
legal text.  However, the Tribunal’s use of the 1959 Constitution entangled it in the question of 
the ultimate authority governing the transitional regime.  This question split legal experts and the 
judges of the Tribunal.  The Tribunal’s refusal to press these claims is the result of politics within 
the Tribunal and of concerns about the Tribunal’s independence. 
Legal experts were uncertain about what power the Tribunal was claiming in the 
statement.  One interpretation of the statement was that the Tribunal was claiming a far-reaching 
power to overturn legislation on the basis of the 1959 constitution.  Amine Mahfoudh claimed 
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that is this act made the Tribunal the “Marshall of Tunisia.”255  Mahfoudh argues that the 1959 
Constitution could still be used as a source of law.  This claim goes a bit farther than the 
constitutional review exercised by the US Supreme Court because the Tribunal seems to claim a 
right to decide what counts as a valid constitution.  At least it is a bold political statement that the 
suspension of the 1959 Constitution after the revolution was illegitimate.  The Tribunal might be 
able to dodge the question of the 1959 Constitution entirely; Mahfoudh also points out that the 
fundamental rights included in the UN Convention of Human Rights could be used to overturn 
statutes because treaties form a higher law than legislation and the Tribunal has always had the 
power to review the application of treaties.   
A second interpretation was that the statement was simply an assertion of the power of 
constitutional review by exception, which the Tribunal had always exercised.  Samir Taieb, 
Secretary General of the Al-Massar party, contended that the Tribunal actually had been 
exercising constitutional review since the dissolution of the Constitutional Council256.  His 
party’s proposal to grant the Tribunal a power provisional constitutional review would simply 
recognize and expand this practice.  Hammi emphasized that the Tribunal always had the power 
apply the constitution to void the application of statutes in particular cases through the procedure 
known as review by exception.  However, such a decision does not overturn the statute in general 
or produce a binding precedent other courts or on later decisions by the Tribunal257.    
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The decision also divided the judges of the Tribunal.  The Union des Magistrats 
Administratifs (UMA), led by Ahmed Soueb, the president of the Tribunal’s Chamber of 
Cassation publicly opposed Mechichi’s position.  Such a public disagreement among judges of 
the Tribunal is extremely rare.  La Presse, Tunisia’s leading francophone newspaper and a 
bastion of secular opinion, characterized Soueb’s campaign against Mechichi as “defamatory”258.   
The interviews shed light on the reasoning that would make the judges of the Tribunal 
oppose the November 7, 2013 statement.  In the interviews, all of the judges and legal 
professionals expressed concerns about the implications of constitutional review by the Tribunal 
for the Tribunal itself and for the broader legal system.  When asked about the issue of 
provisional constitutional review, Koubaa contrasted the strengths of the Tribunal with the 
weaknesses of the IPCCPL.  If the statement were put into practice, the Tribunal would start to 
resemble the IPCCPL in exactly the ways that Koubaa finds most problematic.  The Tribunal 
would publicly endorse one political faction, inviting both control by that faction and retaliation 
by the rival faction.  Of course the actually number of Tribunal judges would not decrease, but as 
judges became public figures, they would be more vulnerable to pressure from political 
authorities.  Mechichi was exactly this sort of public figure judge, and Soueb became one in the 
course of the conflict over the November 7, 2013 statement. 
The November 7, 2013 decision marked the last major act of the Mechichi presidency.  In 
March 2014, the Jomaa government replaced Mechichi with Mohamed Faouzi Ben Hamed, who 
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was known as an insider at the Tribunal259.  In subsequent decisions, the Tribunal has not 
exercised the powers that it claimed in the November 7, 2013 statement.  The “war of clans” 
fought between the UMA and Mechichi was a major concern for the Tribunal260.  It embarrassed 
the Tribunal and threatened the consensus that legitimated its decisions.  It is quite possible that 
opposition from political authorities would have blocked the Tribunal’s claims even without 
opposition from the judges of the UMA.  The parties quickly agreed to create the IPCCPL rather 
than having the Tribunal exercise provisional constitutional review.  Still, it is difficult to 
imagine a situation where the claims could have succeeded because even if the political 
environment favored expanded powers for the Tribunal, the judges themselves would have 
rejected constitutional review.  
 
Conclusion: The Administrative Tribunal and the Ben Achour Commission 
 
This chapter addressed neither the Constitutional Council nor formal powers.  Instead, it 
dealt with the activity of the Tribunal and the informal powers that it might claim for itself rather 
than the formal powers assigned to it in the transitional documents.  Yet, the activity of the 
Tribunal helps explain why the Ben Achour Commission dissolved the Constitutional Council 
rather than granting it greater powers.  The activity of the Tribunal from 2011 to 2014 ultimately 
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confirms the Commission’s skepticism of constitutional review as a means of limiting the 
Assembly.  Even given support from major political parties and civil society, the Tribunal still 
resisted calls to rule on the Assembly’s mandate or to claim a more general power of 
constitutional review.      
In a broader sense, the case of the Tribunal shows how the activity of courts before 2011 
might translate into different formal powers after 2011.  The activity of the Tribunal and other 
courts during the Ben Ali period would shape the Ben Achour Commission’s perception of the 
Tunisian judiciary’s ability to restrain political authorities.  In light of this experience, if the 
Commission had given a power of constitutional review to the Tribunal, it seems likely that the 
judges of the Tribunal would have been wary of the implications of this power for their own 
independence and would have used it only rarely.  As a result, constitutional review by the 
Tribunal could not provide a real check on the Assembly. 
The next section examines a connection between pre-2011 activity and formal powers in 
the very different context of the shariah and personal status law in both Tunisia and Egypt. 
 
  
 
 
CHAPTER 5: INCORPORATION OF THE SHARIAH AND THE JUDICIAL ROLE 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction: Shariah and Judicial Power 
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 After the 2011 revolutions, Tunisia and Egypt created very different transitional 
institutions.  In Egypt, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF)’s Constitutional 
Proclamation created separate legislative, executive, judicial and constitutional drafting 
bodies261.  In Tunisia, the Ben Achour Commission called for the election of a National 
Assembly with legislative, executive and constitution drafting powers262.  These two systems 
gave different powers to courts.  In Egypt, the Supreme Constitutional Court continued to 
exercise constitutional review throughout the transition.  In Tunisia, the Constitutional Council 
was dissolved and no alternative means of constitutional review developed until the adoption of a 
new constitution in January 2014.  Previous chapters of the dissertation examine the 
countermajoritarian hypothesis, which argues that opposition and minority parties support 
constitutional review and governing parties oppose it.   
Anomalies undermine this hypothesis in both of the cases.  In Egypt, many actors, 
including the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists, support constitutional review even 
though it seems to be against their interests as defined by the countermajoritarian hypothesis.  In 
Tunisia, actors that should benefit from constitutional review, including judges and the secular 
opposition parties, still reject it.  The judicial role hypothesis offers an explanation for these 
anomalies.  It argues that judicial activity under the old regime creates a set of idea about the 
judicial role that then influences the formal powers of court after the 2011 revolutions.  Ideas 
about the judicial role can cause actors to adopt positions for or against constitutional review that 
contradict their self interest.  This chapter will investigate the mechanism posited by the judicial 
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role hypothesis - that the practices of the legal system under the old regime create a set of ideas 
that then influence the status of courts during the transition - using the issue of Islamic law as an 
example.   
The attitudes of the Muslim Brotherhood toward constitutional review and the proper role 
of the shariah in Egyptian law are an example of the main mechanism of this hypothesis - how 
the activity of a constitutional court might promote certain ideas.  Rutherford compares three 
varieties of constitutional thought in Egypt: liberal, statist and Islamic263.  In light of a 
comparison with Tunisia, the similarities among these three are more prominent than the 
differences.  All of them accept constitutional review of legislation.  They also share several 
conceptions that make provisional constitutional review more plausible.  The Muslim 
Brotherhood has not indicated that it is opposed to constitutional review in principle.  In fact, 
their commitment to Islamicizing Egyptian law entails some form of constitutional review264.  
The activity of the SCC played a critical role in the development of this consensus.  Before the 
establishment of the SCC, the main features of the consensus had not yet developed, although 
certain elements can be found in the thought of the Muslim Brotherhood, Sanhuri’s Code, and 
Sadat’s efforts at Islamicization.  How the Muslim Brotherhood thinks about implementing 
shariah owes a lot to the practices of the SCC.  Similar examples could be drawn from the 
ordinary judiciary, which originally saw the SCC and a posteriori constitutional review as a 
threat but eventually came to see it as a guarantor of judicial independence265.   
In Tunisia, the shariah was never incorporated into the constitution, and courts never 
played a major role in interpreting the shariah.  The Personal Status Code promulgated by 
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Bourguiba came to symbolize the country’s secular identity, and at the same time cemented a 
legal ideology that gave great weight to positive legislation.  Tunisia’s rejection of the shariah 
also explains some of the skepticism that Tunisian judges show to constitutional review, 
especially a posteriori review.  Even though the shariah is not a source of law in Tunisia, the 
possibility that it might be has provoked a reaction from the country’s leadership.  Soon after 
independence, Bourguiba had a new code of personal status drafted.  This code contained many 
provisions that separated Tunisia from the shariah and from the practices of other Arab countries.  
Polygamy and unilateral divorce by the husband were banned, adoption was allowed, and the 
rules governing inheritance were made more equitable for women.  It also assured that issues of 
personal status, which were the areas most subject to influence from the shariah before 
independence, would be decided by positive legislation.  For this reason, seemingly non-political 
issues surrounding marriage, adoption and inheritance became a central part of Tunisian identity.  
For many secular Tunisians, the personal status code is of greater symbolic importance than the 
1959 constitution, which was subverted by dictatorship anyway.  This veneration of the Code has 
important implications for the powers of courts.  Zouheir M’dhaffar, former Minister of Public 
Property and former Judge of the Constitutional Council, stated that he opposed a posteriori 
constitutional review because a judge might “declare the code of personal status unconstitutional 
because it permits adoption, which is forbidden by the shariah.”266  A stance against 
constitutional review might seem strange for a judge and for a figure of the old regime, but as the 
chapter will make, M’dhaffar is simply taking the veneration of the Personal Status Code to its 
natural conclusion.  Furthermore, M’dhaffar’s argument is an example of the pathway suggested 
by the judicial role hypothesis from the practices of the pre-2011 legal system to ideas about the 
nature of law to a stance on the formal powers of courts after 2011. 
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The first section outlines how the Egyptian and Tunisian legal systems have incorporated 
shariah.  The second section looks at the attitude of Egyptian Islamists, including the Muslim 
Brotherhood, towards law.  The conception of shariah moved from a set of rules and institutions 
outside of the state legal system to a higher law or constitutional norm within the legal system.  
By 2011, Islamists supported some variation of constitutional review as a means of Islamicizing 
Egyptian law.  The third section looks at the role of shariah in debates about the constitution and 
constitutional review in Tunisia after 2011, including the positions of legal professionals and 
Islamist and secular political parties.  From independence onwards, Tunisian secular 
republicanism was closely associated with positive legislation.  Legal positivism also manifested 
itself in suspicion of constitutional review during debates about the new constitution and 
constitutional court, even after a shariah provision in the constitution had been definitively 
rejected. 
 
Overview of Incorporation: The 1971 Constitution and Decisions of the SCC 
 
The 1971 Constitution and Article 2 
 
The SCC and the Islamicization of Egyptian law through constitutional review have their 
roots in Sadat’s presidency and the 1971 Constitution.  However, the SCC emerged as the main 
interpreter of the shariah only after Sadat’s presidency, with its first decision interpreting Article 
2 in 1985. 
Soon after rising to the presidency, Sadat set out to reform three pillars of the Nasser 
regime - revolutionary leftist ideology, the centrally-planned economy, and the single party state 
175 
of the Arab Socialist Union267.  The 1971 Constitution was the centerpiece of these reforms.  The 
Constitution scaled back the revolutionary socialist rhetoric of the Nasser era constitutions.  It 
also guaranteed a right to private property.  The Constitution called for a multi-party system.  It 
called for the creation of the Supreme Constitutional Court.   Most importantly for this chapter, 
the Constitution emphasized Egypt’s Islamic identity and introduced shariah as “a source of 
legislation.”   
From the text of the 1971 Constitution, it is not clear that the SCC has the power to 
overturn legislation that is contrary to the shariah.  Article 2 states “Islam is the religion of the 
State and Arabic its official language.  Shariah is the principle source of legislation.”  Previous 
Egyptian constitutions had mentioned Islam, but not the shariah.  Separately, Chapter 5, 
describes the SCC and its power of constitutional review.  The phrase “the source of legislation” 
seems to imply that the legislature should examine the principles of the shariah in creating 
legislation.  Several other countries - Iran, Afghanistan, Syria, and Pakistan - had incorporated 
the shariah as a source of legislation in their constitutions before 1971268.  By 1971, none of 
these countries had a practice of constitutional review by courts on the basis of these provisions.  
The SCC first claimed this power through a case decided on May 4, 1985.  In this case, the SCC 
specifically considered the argument that Article 2 was not meant to be justiciable.  It rejected 
this argument, but it did decide that Article 2 did not apply retroactively to laws passed before 
1980, when Article 2 was amended to make shariah “the source of legislation,” rather than “a 
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source”269.  It took fourteen years after the adoption of the 1971 constitution for the SCC to 
emerge as an agent of the Islamicization of Egyptian law. 
 
Alternatives to Article 2 
 
 Both of the alternatives to Islamic judicial review - Islamic legislation, and direct 
involvement of the ulema in applying the shariah - remained viable options during the Sadat 
period.  Sadat considered drafting a new code that would be more Islamic than the Sanhuri code.  
To this end, he assembled a group of experts with support from al-Azhar.  By 1980, al-Azhar had 
approved drafts of Islamic civil and criminal codes.  Like many codification efforts, Sadat’s 
Islamic Code floundered as a result of the enormous challenges of drafting an entirely new body 
of legislation and the political controversies created by an attempt at dramatic legal change.  
Islamists, including the Muslim Brotherhood, opposed the codes.  They objected to the claim by 
Sadat and al-Azhar to a monopoly on interpretation of the shariah.  They also objected to the 
liberalization of family law known as Jihan’s law that Sadat passed by decree at around the same 
time.  Secularists rejected the idea of Islamicizing Egyptian law in the first place, leaving Sadat 
with few supporters270.   
The role of al-Azhar in drafting the Islamic codes showed the continuing importance of 
the ulema as a means of Islamicization.  Sadat never proposed the reestablishment of the shariah 
courts or of any other parallel Islamic jurisdiction.  Still, his presidency saw important 
developments in the state religious hierarchy.  In place of the old shariah courts, the Fatwa 
Council of al-Azhar developed to advise Egyptian Muslims on matters related to the shariah.  
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The rise of this institution reflects a desire to Islamicize Egyptian society, although not through 
law.  The Fatwa Councils came to be seen as an alternative or supplement to law and legal 
proceedings, not as a parallel jurisdiction of courts, and they have no means of enforcing their 
decisions.  This development removed another competitor to the courts in defining Islamic 
law271. 
 
Article 2 Doctrine of the SCC 
 
 The SCC decisions have shaped the shariah into a constitutional norm, rather than an all-
encompassing set of legal rules272.  This process justified the SCC’s review and removed the 
intellectual bases of the alternative methods of Islamicization.  The decisions of the SCC also 
balanced the interests of Islamists with those of secularists and the government.  As a result, the 
SCC gained a level of support from both groups.    
The first Article 2 case decided by the SCC involved a challenge by the shaykh of Al-
Azhar against a provision of the Egyptian civil code that required debtors to pay interest on 
overdue loans. The SCC upheld the interest payment law, but it did so on the grounds that it not 
apply Article 2 to any laws that existed before the adoption of the 1980 amendment of Article 2.  
This decision has greatly limited the impact of Article 2, but still gave Islamists a means to 
challenge laws they considered un-Islamic273. 
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The SCC’s use of Article 2 remained limited until 1993, when the court issued a decision 
describing its method of interpreting the shariah.274  According to this decision, the SCC bases its 
Article 2 decisions on the ‘certain rulings of the shariah,’ (al-ahkam al-shar’iyah al-qut’iyah), 
and the ‘aims of the shariah,’ or maqasid.  The certain rulings of the shariah refer to rules clearly 
stated in the Quran or Hadith, such as the rules governing inheritance or the prohibition of 
adoption.  The certain rulings can only have an effect on relatively narrow areas of law.  In the 
system cited by the SCC, the maqasid consists of five general values: religion, life, lineage, 
intellect, and property275.  The SCC’s maqasid jurisprudence contrasts with a view of the shariah 
as a complete body of law and doctrine embodied in historical schools of thought.  Egyptian 
salafists sought to add greater detail to the constitution’s shariah provision, which might force 
the SCC to adopt the latter view.  The draft constitution added Article 219, which stated “The 
principles of Islamic law (sharia) include general evidence, the foundational principles of 
Islamic jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh), the reliable sources from among the Sunni schools of 
thought (madhahib)”276.  Treating the shariah as a set of higher principles rather than a complete 
set of laws makes it easier to combine with constitutional review.  It also limits the scope of 
Islamicization.  According to this interpretation, the SCC need only intervene in rare cases when 
the legislature makes a law that contradicts the shariah.  The SCC do not need to derive a 
complete set of rules from the shariah.  Such a task would be more difficult and more suited to a 
legislature rather than a court. 
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 The SCC’s interpretation of the shariah also minimized the role of religious scholars.  In 
contrast to the language of the 2012 draft constitution, the SCC can choose to ignore the opinions 
of classical jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh) and the schools of law (madhahib).  The SCC also does 
not base its Article 2 decisions on the opinions of contemporary ulema of Al-Azhar.  The SCC 
itself claims to be able to exercise ijtihad, original interpretation of Islamic law277.  The SCC 
application of Article 2 extended beyond personal status cases.  The use of shariah in cases 
outside the area of personal status marks a departure from the practices of the shariah courts of 
the colonial period, when the shariah was treated as a sort of customary law278.  The shariah is a 
principle that can appear in any kind of case, but is only rarely the primary source of law for any 
particular decision.  By erasing the distinction between personal status and other areas of law, the 
SCC removed the basis for a parallel shariah jurisdiction. 
The effect of the SCC’s Article 2 decisions on the content of Egypt’s laws was ultimately 
limited.  Lombardi and Brown argue that the SCC’s interpretation of Article 2 actually restrained 
the Islamicization of Egyptian law and society.  Certainly, Sadat’s original plan to draft a 
completely new Islamic code would have had a much more dramatic impact on Egyptian law.  
However, the SCC also avoided alienating Islamists.  It gave Islamists victories in cases dealing 
with Jihan’s law and the right to wear the veil.  Lombardi argues that the SCC intervened during 
periods of particularly high tension between the regime and Islamists, such as the early 1990’s, 
in order to provide some concessions to Islamists.  Perhaps most importantly, the SCC’s Article 
2 cases showed Islamists that the Islamicization of Egyptian law through constitutional review 
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was possible279.  The next section examines the impact of the SCC on the ideology and political 
activity of Egyptian Islamists.  It outlines how the Muslim Brotherhood accommodated itself to 
the interpretation of the shariah developed by the SCC and how Egyptian Islamists organized to 
use Article 2 litigation to achieve their goals. 
 
Egyptian Islamists’ Attitudes towards Law 
 
The Early Brotherhood, 1928-1970 
 
 Writings by the founder of the Brotherhood, Hassan al-Banna (1928-1949), address the 
question of the shariah and its place in the modern Egyptian legal system during the period 
before Sadat’s reforms and the establishment of the SCC.  The activities of the Brotherhood 
during the constitutional crisis following the fall of the monarchy in 1952 also provide insight 
into their thinking on legal questions280. 
Law and the shariah are central concepts in the thought of the Brotherhood.  Starting with 
the writings of Hassan al-Banna, the Brotherhood often claimed that the Egyptian government 
was illegitimate because it did not apply the shariah.  Moreover, a specific legal theory 
underlines this claim.  The complaint that modern Muslim governments have failed to apply the 
shariah is widespread among many different Islamist currents.  Some of these, such as Salafism 
and Khomeini’s state of the jurist (wilayat al-faqih), reject all forms of positive law.  In contrast, 
Al-Banna rejected the view that positive law or legislation were inherently incompatible with 
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Islam281.  From this early period, the Brotherhood accepted the idea that the shariah was a higher 
law that could be embodied in positive legislation.  However, the question of how to go about 
creating shariah legislation remained. 
The leadership of the Brotherhood advocated at least three approaches to applying the 
shariah: through legislation, special shariah courts, and the inclusion of shariah in the 
constitution.  First, a Brotherhood committee began work to draft an Islamic code that would 
improve on the Sanhuri code.  Second, the Brotherhood opposed the abolition of the parallel 
shariah courts.  Judges with special training in shariah law ran these courts.  As such they 
represent an example of enforcing the shariah through the ulema or other experts in the 
traditional religious sciences.  The Egyptian monarchy replaced these courts with a single 
jurisdiction of courts enforcing the Sanhuri code. 
Third, the Brotherhood favored a constitution that would enshrine the principles of the 
shariah as a law higher than ordinary legislation.  This third option contains the foundation for 
the SCC’s shariah constitutional review.  The Brotherhood described the Quran as a 
‘constitution’ for Muslims.  However, this did not mean that they rejected the idea of a written 
constitution.  The Brotherhood pressed for a the adoption of a new constitution immediately after 
the 1952 Free Officers’ coup.  Hassan al-Banna argued that certain laws should be suppressed 
because they contradicted Islam.  Together, these ideas form the basis for constitutional review 
based on the shariah, although Al-Banna and the other early leaders of the Brotherhood did little 
to develop this idea further282.   
The legal theory of the Brotherhood sets it apart from more radical method of directly 
applying the shariah represented by Saudi Arabia, which rejects the notion of a written 
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constitution, positive legislation, appeal and precedent.   The Brotherhood’s legal theory also 
does not require Islamicization through legislation, as in the Sudan283.  Laws should be 
compatible with the shariah but not necessarily the result of codification of shariah rules. 
Sadat’s reforms represent a concession to Islamists and attempt to ease tensions with the 
Brotherhood.  The incorporation of shariah as a constitutional principle also reflects trends in 
Islamist thought going back to Hassan al-Banna.  However, Sadat did not answer the question of 
how to turn the shariah into legislation.  Of the options outlined above, both the legislative and 
judicial options remained opened.  Sadat also envisioned some role for Islamic scholars and al-
Azhar in the drafting of a future Islamic code, so the conception of the shariah as a jurists’ law 
implemented by the ulema remained alive as well.  Only with the establishment of the SCC in 
1979 and its decision did the courts take the lead in Islamicizing Egyptian law. 
 
Islamist Legal Activism, 1985-2011 
 
 Sadat’s attempt at rapprochement with the Islamists unraveled in the second half of the 
1970’s.  After his assassination, the Mubarak regime began a renewed crackdown of the 
Brotherhood. Surprisingly, Egyptian Islamists found an ally in the SCC and the judiciary during 
this period.  The particular cases are outlined above in section 1.  These cases are important not 
only for their impact on Egyptian law and the doctrine of the SCC, but also for their impact on 
the opinions and organizing strategies of Egyptian Islamists284.   
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The deterioration of relations between the government and the Brotherhood and the 
closure of the electoral arena to any real opposition party left the legal system as the most 
attractive means for Islamists to change state policy.  At the same time, the opening of Egyptian 
law schools to large numbers of students in the 1970’s created a new class of Islamist lawyers.  
Muslim Brotherhood candidates won a majority of seats in the Lawyers’ Syndicate election of 
1992.  The Lawyers’ Syndicate organized shariah training groups throughout Egypt starting in 
the 1980’s285.  This era coincided with the SCC’s ‘golden age’ when it was most willing to rule 
against the regime.  The administrative courts were also gaining greater independence from the 
regime, as described by Rosberg.  Ahmed Eid stated that during this era “the administrative 
courts were known as protectors of human rights.”286  From the 1980’s to the 2000’s, Islamist 
networks grew alongside a more independent and reformist judiciary. 
A huge number of cases claiming violations of Article 2 were filed with the SCC from 
the 1980’s onward.  The SCC chose to hear only a small percentage of these cases.  Some of the 
SCC’s Article 2 decisions are undoubtedly the result of Islamist legal activism.  The first Article 
2 decision by the SCC was the result of a case brought by the leadership of Al-Azhar.  The case 
overturning Jihan’s law.  Moustafa argues that most of these litigants were not Islamist activists 
and that they used Article 2 instrumentally287.  This experience of Islamist legal activism from 
the 1980’s to the 2000’s shaped the attitude of Brotherhood leaders towards law as Egypt 
approached the 2011 revolution.  It propagated ideas about the nature of the shariah and the 
relationship between shariah and the constitution that would be influential in the Brotherhood’s 
political thought.  It demonstrated the practicality of shariah constitutional review as a means of 
legal change.  It made the courts a more sympathetic part of the state apparatus than the police or 
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military in the eyes of Islamists288.  The next section outlines how each of these mechanisms 
made the Brotherhood more willing to accept constitutional review by the SCC during the 2011 
transition. 
 
The Brotherhood Enters Politics, 2007-2012 
 
 Despite the growth of Islamist activism in the legal system, the Brotherhood continued to 
be barred from forming a political party and participating in elections.  During the 2005 
elections, many independent candidates with ties to the Brotherhood were elected to parliament.  
The regime soon took measures to restrain the Muslim Brothers’ involvement in electoral 
politics.  However, this experience led the Brotherhood to circulate a platform for a possible 
future Islamist political party.  Such a political party became a reality after the 2011 revolution, 
with the establishment of the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP).  The Mursi government 
implemented some of the goals set out in the platform, especially in the 2012 constitution. 
The 2007 platform and the 2012 constitution give a clear picture of the Brotherhood’s 
program for applying the shariah.  In contrast to the thought of the early Brotherhood as 
represented by al-Banna.  The 2007 platform and the 2012 constitution implicitly reject 
alternative models for incorporating the shariah, including an Islamic Code and parallel Islamic 
courts.  Such models could be drawn from other countries or from Egypt’s own history.  Saudi 
Arabia’s legal system and the pre-1952 system of shariah courts in Egypt are examples of direct 
application of the shariah by the ulema through Islamic courts.  The Sudan, where President 
Numayri implemented a codification of the shariah covering all areas of law and Sadat’s attempt 
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at drafting an Islamic Code are examples of Islamicization through legislation289.  The Muslim 
Brotherhood could have drawn on any of these models to propose a method of Islamicization 
that would not rely on constitutional review by courts.   
This shift reflects the triumph of the SCC’s model of shariah incorporation.  The 
Brotherhood did attempt to change the institutions that would carry out shariah constitutional 
review.  The 2012 Constitution altered the composition of the SCC by reducing the number of 
judges to ten.  Both the 2007 platform and the 2012 Constitution called for the creation of an 
Islamic law council composed of experts from Al-Azhar to certify that legislation is compatible 
with the shariah.  Such a council would seem to be an example of a priori review.  As discussed 
above, the 2012 Constitution also added greater detail to the shariah provision by stating that 
“usul al-fiqh” would be the basis for review.  The Brotherhood’s ideology reflected the 
experience of thirty years of Islamicization through the SCC.  As a result, the Brotherhood 
remained attached to the principle of constitutional review, even as it came into conflict with the 
judiciary.  This process is an example of the mechanism of the judicial role hypothesis.  
  
Overview of Incorporation: The Tunisian Personal Status Code 
 
Islam in the 1959 Constitution 
 
 The 1959 Constitution establishes Islam as the official religion of Tunisia, but it does not 
mention the shariah or imply that laws are derived from Islam.  The preamble states that it is the 
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“will of this people...to remain faithful to the teachings of Islam.”  Article 1 of the 1959 
Constitution states that “Tunisia is a free, independent and sovereign state.  Its religion is Islam, 
its language is Arabic and its type of government is the Republic.”  The draft constitutions of 
December 2012 and June 2013 as well as the 2014 Constitution repeat these statements 
exactly290. 
The absence of the “source of legislation” provision in the Tunisian constitution is not an 
insurmountable barrier to judicial review of legislation according to the shariah.  The 
establishment of Islam as the official religion could play the same role.  Judges might use 
strategies short of constitutional review to import the shariah into Tunisian law.  They could use 
the teachings of the shariah as a an aid to the interpretation of statutes, on the assumption that the 
legislature could not intend to draft laws contrary to the official religion.  Judges might interpret 
shariah as a widespread customary law that explains the intentions of litigants in legal documents 
such as contracts, wills, or marriage agreements.  Judges might be influenced by shariah without 
actually citing it as a source of law.  In general, the greater leeway is given to judges, the more 
opportunity they have to import the shariah.   
If the goal of the legislator is to prevent the Islamicization of Tunisian law or to enforce a 
particular interpretation of the shariah, it is necessary to put further constraints on judges.  The 
Personal Status Code offers a clear statement of the law in the area that is most susceptible to 
influence from the shariah, personal status and family law. 
 
Promulgation of the Code 
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 The Personal Status Code was drafted in the context of the codification of family law in 
Morocco, Algeria, Egypt and other newly independent countries.  The immediate independence 
period provided an opportunity for extensive legal reform.  Colonial authorities in these countries 
used parallel religious courts to enforce uncodified shariah, especially in personal status cases.  
The post-independence regimes sought to abolish these parallel courts and create a single 
hierarchy of courts.  The codification of personal status law, whether derived from the shariah or 
not, allowed ordinary courts to take over the jurisdiction of the shariah courts.  Tunisia is 
exceptional compared to these other North African countries in the extent to which the 
codification of personal status law was used to implement liberalizing reforms, and the extent to 
which some provisions of the Code broke with the consensus of the classical Islamic schools of 
law (madhahib)291. 
In Tunisia, the codification of personal status law quickly became a personal project of 
Bourguiba.  Bourguiba was involved in drafting the Code in his capacity as leader of the neo-
Destour party, Prime Minister, and President.  The Code was adopted on August 13, 1956, 
several months after independence and about a year before Bourguiba removed the Bey from 
power and established a republic.  The original 1956 Code banned polygamy and created a set of 
rules for intestate succession, civil marriage and the guardianship of children, although not 
adoption.  In 1957 further laws abolished habous or pious endowments and required all 
Tunisians to take a patronymic last name.  As Bourguiba consolidated power, he implemented 
additions to the Code that created more obvious contradictions between the provisions of the 
Code and the shariah.  The 1964 amendment legalized adoption, which Borrmans describes as “a 
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revolution in mentalities and mores.”292  The Quran clearly forbids adoption.  The original code 
made polygamy a crime punishable by a fine, but it did not state that a polygamous marriage was 
invalid.  Two decrees of 20 February 1964 added the rule that any second marriage would be 
null.  A 1968 law equalized the punishments for men and women who commit adultery293. 
   
The Code, Legal Positivism and Islam 
 
 The Code divided Tunisian religious and legal experts.  In 1957, a group of judges from 
the shariah courts issued a fatwa condemning the provisions of the Code outlawing polygamy as 
contrary to Islam294.  Bourguiba and his supporters insisted that the Code was compatible with 
Islam and that it was not an attempt at secularization or westernization.  Moreover, they used 
arguments derived from Islamic jurisprudence to support this claim.  Two of the most prominent 
defenders of the Code were Ahmed Mestiri, Bourguiba’s Minister of Justice from 1956 to 1958, 
and Mohamed Fadhel ben Achour, a scholar of Islamic law and Mufti of the Republic from 1962 
to 1970295.  Mestiri, who studied law in France and had no training in shariah, justified the Code 
in Islamic terms in his 1966 “Letter of an Ambassador”.  Mestiri wrote that the Code avoided 
“the errors of Mustafa Kemal.”  Mestiri argued that in drafting the Code, they turned to the 
consensus (ijma’) of the Muslim community, and followed the practice of the Caliph Umar, who 
suspended rules derived from the Quran in cases of necessity296.   
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Ben Achour presented a fuller justification of the Code and the practice of presidential 
legislation from the perspective of Islamic law.  Notions such as ijtihad and necessity.  Emphasis 
on the conditions of a particular time period and nation.  The selection of the rule from the 
historical schools of law that is most compatible with modern life.  Emphasizing the aims of 
shariah (maqasid) over the content of shariah jurisprudence (fiqh) and the rulings of the schools 
of law (madhahib).  Ben Achour argues that the process of creating the Code through legislation 
is legitimate and compatible with Islam.  Both the form and content of the Code is compatible 
with Islam.297 
The ideological basis used by the defenders of the Code is not secularism or 
westernization. Instead, the ideological basis of the Code is legal positivism, coupled with 
nationalism.  Ahmed Mestiri justified this position in 1966 “Letter of an Ambassador,” by 
arguing that “every Muslim collectivity constitutes a particular case with its own mental and 
sociological structures, and that the legislator is the sole judge of the wisdom of this or that 
reform.”298  Mestiri does not hesitate to describe Tunisia as a “Muslim collectivity,” rather than a 
secular or multi-religious nation.  However, this “Muslim collectivity” is distinct from the global 
Islamic community.  It is the unique features of each nation that require its legislator to create a 
national code of law.  The state should decide legal questions by issuing legislation. 
For critics of the Code, the claim that Bourguiba’s legislation represents ijtihad or reform 
within Islam rings hollow.  Western and Muslim scholars of the shariah often argue that legal 
positivism, and its associated institutions of legislation, codification and judicial hierarchy, is in 
tension with the Islamic legal tradition.  Recent work has questioned this generalization.  There 
are relatively few examples of codification of Islamic law before the modern period or of the 
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veneration of man-made law.  Still, Tunisian legal positivism builds on several aspects of the 
country’s Islamic political heritage.  The Ottoman Empire produced an enormous body of 
positive law that existed alongside uncodified shariah.  The Ottoman Sultans also created a 
partnership with the ulema, consensus, which worked to create an official interpretation of 
Islam299.  The Beys established a shariah court of appeals before the beginning of colonialism, 
which asserted the state’s power to define the correct interpretation of Islamic law300. 
Legal positivism had practical implications for the politics surrounding the Code.  In 
principle, the legislator could roll back the reforms, as Ben Ali considered doing in 1988-89.  
This system created means for opponents to contest the Code, but only through proposing 
reforms to the legislation, not by invoking a higher source of law that could be used to annul the 
legislation.  Judges and courts would have no role in such a process.   
 
Politics of the Personal Status Code, 1959-2011 
 
The debates about the Code described in the previous section reveal the importance of 
legal positivism for defenders of the Code.  The prominence of legal positivism as a justification 
for the Code is matched by the importance of legislation as the means of legal change in Tunisia.  
The Code and subsequent reforms were the result of legislation directed by the president.  As a 
result, Islamist opposition to the Code focused on legislation as the most effective means of 
achieving its goals.   
The text of the Code was largely complete by the late 1960’s.  The only later change to 
the text of the Code occurred in July 1993, when Ben Ali introduced reforms that allowed 
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women to transmit Tunisian nationality to their children301.  However, both Islamists and 
secularists pressed for changes to the Code from the 1960’s through 2011.  Islamists sought to 
roll back the Code, while secularists hoped to extend legislation to equalize the rights of men and 
women in areas such as inheritance, divorce and marriage. Soon after Ben Ali’s rise to power, 
the government considered legislation to abolish adoption, which Islamists considered one of the 
most problematic provisions of the Code302.  Secularists responded with a campaign in favor of 
the Code.  In any case, legal reform depended on the president’s political objectives and his 
relations with Islamists.  Ben Ali originally planned to co-opt the Islamists as a loyal opposition, 
and his proposed reforms to the Code were part of a compromise with Islamists.  After 1989, he 
reinstated restrictions on opposition parties, especially Islamist parties, and cancelled the propsed 
changes to the Code.  Whether Islamist or secular, reform efforts remained focused on the 
legislation, and legislation remained focused on the president. 
Opposition to the Code might make use of the argument that particular provisions of the 
Code were contrary to Islam.  Bourguiba himself accepted the view that the Code should be 
compatible with the shariah.  Bourguiba rejected some reforms as un-Islamic, such as proposals 
to equalize the shares of sons and daughters in cases of intestate succession303.  However, 
Bourguiba, as both president and legislator, did not delegate the power to make such decisions to 
either the ulema or the courts.  Under the Bourguiba and Ben Ali regimes, provisions of the Code 
could be criticized, but these criticisms called for further legislative changes.   
 The Tunisian courts proved to be an inhospitable environment for the sort of Islamist 
legal activism that occurred in Egypt.  In part this is because the Tunisian courts, especially the 
ordinary courts were less willing to side with Islamists against the regime.  The Administrative 
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Tribunal did rule in favor of Islamist interests and against the Ben Ali regime in a 2004 case 
concerning the suspension of a teacher for wearing a hijab304.  The Tribunal ruled that the 
circular 102 (an administrative decree, not a law) published in 1988, a decree that banned the 
wearing of the hijab by public employees, contradicted the freedom of religion provisions of the 
1959 Constitution.  The SCC decided a similar case in which a student wanted to wear a hijab, 
but it did so on the basis of Article 2, not on the basis of the 1971 constitution’s freedom of 
religion provisions.  It also overturned a law in this case, giving Islamist litigants a much greater 
victory than in the Tunisian case305.  The courts could be an ally of Islamists against the Ben Ali 
regime.  However, in the absence of any doctrine requiring that legislation be compatible with 
the shariah, Islamists could not have seen the courts as a means of Islamicizing Tunisian law. 
 
Constitutional Politics and the Shariah in the Tunisian Transition 
 
 The positions of Ennahda, the secular opposition, and judges on constitutional questions 
were influenced by the experience of the Personal Status Code and the relationship between the 
state and the shariah that the Code represented.  Moreover, this influence led to two 
counterintuitive outcomes, both which have implications for the status of courts after 2011.  
First, Ennahda gave up on incorporating shariah into the Tunisian constitution.  In Egypt, the 
SCC depended on at least a measure of support from Islamists.  In Tunisia, Islamists had no 
reason to support constitutional review without a shariah provision.  Second, judges supported 
limitations on judicial review.  This position reflects both an ideological commitment to legal 
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positivism and a political calculation that judicial review could undermine a central policy goal 
of Tunisian secularists: the maintenance of the Personal Status Code.   
 
Ennahda on Law, 1981-2011 
 
 The thought of Ennahda on law and the shariah is similar to that of Egyptian the Muslim 
Brotherhood.  This ideology did not translate into the inclusion of shariah in the post-2011 
Tunisian constitution.  Rather than simply reflecting moderation, these positions reflect the 
influence of Tunisia’s unique method of approaching the shariah.  Given the absence of a 
tradition of shariah review and the judiciary’s hostility to the idea, a shariah provision would not 
be an effective means of Islamicizing Tunisian law.  Ennahda had no reason to support 
constitutional review after 2011, when it was the governing party.    
 Ennahda emerged out of the Islamist Tendency movement during the 1980’s.  Soon 
thereafter, Ben Ali brutally suppressed the party and imprisoned or exiled its leaders.  From the 
1980’s until 1991, when Rached Ghannouchi was appointed president, Ennahda saw numerous 
changes in leadership.  Ennahda lacks the long history, coherent leadership, and clearly 
developed ideology of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, so it is difficult to generalize about the 
party’s positions on law during this period.  Ghannouchi’s numerous writings from the 1990’s 
and 2000’s provide the basis for Ennahda’s views. Ghannouchi spent time in Egypt, Syria, 
Algeria, the Sudan, France and Britain, where he was influenced by Nasserism, Salafism, and the 
Brotherhood at different points in his career.306 
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Ghannouchi’s positions became more moderate during his exile in the West.  According 
to his own statements, Ghannouchi distanced himself from the Muslim Brotherhood and instead 
sought to emulate the Turkish AKP.  Both before and after the 2011 revolution, Rached 
Ghannouchi often stated that Tunisia should remain a ‘civil state’ rather than a religious state307.  
Stepan interprets such statements as evidence of the greater moderation of Ennahda compared to 
the Muslim Brotherhood.  The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood also uses the language of the ‘civil 
state’ as opposed to a fully secular or fully religious state.  Tamimi argues that Ghannouchi’s 
writings during this period are intended to justify a form of Islamic democracy308.  Critics argue 
that Ghannouchi’s thought is in fact a blueprint for undemocratic Islamist rule.  In either case, 
the concept of the shariah developed by Ghannouchi is compatible with shariah constitutional 
review, but not with other means of Islamicization.   
Ghannouchi’s conception of the shariah in his writings from the 1990’s leave open the 
possibility of shariah constitutional review309.  In Les libertés publiques dans l'État islamique, 
Ghannouchi conceives of human government as a ‘viceregency,’ to which God has delegated 
some of his authority through revelation.  Human government cannot exceed the powers granted 
by the Quran and Sunnah.  Shariah is the source of all legislation, at least in the sense that human 
government derives its authority from revelation.  
Ghannouchi rejects the underpinnings of the other methods of Islamicization: direct 
application of the shariah by religious experts or the adoption of a shariah code through 
legislation.  Ghannouchi’s finds that the territorial state is compatible with Islam, rejecting non-
state institutions, such as a transnational Caliphate.310  After 2011, Ghannouchi contrasted 
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Ennahda with other Islamist movements, such as Hizb al Tahrir, that called for the establishment 
of a caliphate311.  Both of these positions would be more extreme than shariah constitutional 
review in the context of Tunisia.  Ghannouchi’s moderation in the 1990’s and 2000’s led him 
away from the other methods of Islamicization, but it did not preclude shariah constitutional 
review. 
Ideological differences between Ennahda and the Muslim Brotherhood cannot account 
for the different outcomes in Tunisia and Egypt.  The early phase of the transition in 2011 gives 
a clear of example of how pressure from other parties forced Ennahda to compromise on the 
shariah.  To distinguish itself from fringe Islamist movements, Ennahda had to give up on 
including shariah in the constitution.  In the absence of such a provision, Ennahda had no reason 
to support continued constitutional review.  Moreover, the legal activism that familiarized 
Egyptian Islamists with shariah constitutional review had no parallel in Tunisia. 
 
Islamist Politics, 2011-2013 
 
 It is debatable whether the Tunisian uprising constitutes a revolution.  However, like the 
great social revolutions in France, Russia or Iran, the Tunisian uprising led to a reassessment of 
the role of religion in politics312.  Every state in the Arab World regulates Islam through 
ministries of religious affairs, official mosques and official religious schools.  Despite its secular 
image, Tunisia under Ben Ali was no exception.  Tunisia had long had one of the most highly 
regulated religious establishments in the Arab World.  The Ben Ali regime allowed no 
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unlicensed mosques to operate.  Under Bourguiba, the state closed the ancient university-mosque 
of Zitouna - the Tunisian equivalent of Al-Azhar - and incorporated its faculty into a department 
of religious studies at the University of Tunis.  Ben Ali reopened Zitouna, but kept it under strict 
state supervision.  Preachers were trained by the Ministry of Religious Affairs and appointed by 
the government.  The Friday sermon was standardized throughout the country.  Other regimes 
have taken similar measures, but there is consensus that the Tunisian state’s control of Islam was 
unusually extensive and effective.  In Egypt for example, unlicensed mosques were common 
under Mubarak, even if they were not officially allowed.  Al-Azhar retained greater autonomy 
than Zitouna313. 
 The post-revolutionary government officially removed some of these restrictions, such as 
the bans on Salafi organizations, or stopped enforcing others, such as the requirement that 
preachers be licensed by the Ministry of Religious Affairs.  As a result, the highly restricted 
religious field was suddenly opened to new organizations and ideologies.  Soon after the 
revolution, several groups organized around the goal of implementing the shariah.  Mokhtar 
Jebali, a Zitouna scholar, organized the Front Tunisien des Associations Islamiques (FTAI), 
which united over a hundred Islamist groups around the goal of including a shariah provision in 
the new constitution.  In the spring of 2012, the FTAI organized demonstrations in front of the 
Assembly to press for this goal.  However, many of the protesters went further, and chanted the 
slogan “the people want a Caliph”314.   
Salafist groups rejected the Tunisian state and participation in politics.  The most 
prominent of these was Ansar al-Shariah, but there were numerous smaller Salafist groups with a 
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range of political and religious positions315.  These groups went beyond calling for the inclusion 
of the shariah in the constitution.  In contrast to Egypt, where the Salafist Nour Party won the 
second largest number of seats in the 2012 elections, Tunisian Salafists did not form a political 
party and did not participate in elections, reflecting their rejection of mainstream politics and the 
Tunisian republic.  They also used terms such as Islamic state, Islamic emirate, or Caliphate.  
Their terminology and symbolism links them to earlier political Salafist movements and to the 
presages the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) that would appear in early 2014316.  In 
addition to the Salafist groups, the immediate post-revolution period saw the rise of the League 
for the Protection of the Revolution (LPR), an Islamist militia, which was more closely aligned 
with Ennahda than the Salafist groups317. 
 All of these groups posed a problem not only for the Tunisian state, but also for Ennahda, 
which sought to represent different strands of Islamism.  Ennahda alternated between trying to 
accommodate Salafist demands and aligning itself with other mainstream parties against the 
fringe represented by groups like Ansar al-Shariah.  Immediately after the 2011 revolution, 
Ennahda favored legalizing previously banned Salafist groups318.  Ennahda’s attitude toward 
these groups quickly soured.  In 2012, Rached Ghannouchi stated that “if Salafism means return 
to the noble values of Islam...yes, I am a Salafist,” while also characterizing the Salafist political 
project as “terrorist.”319  Ultimately, Ennahda found that it could not placate the Salafists.  In 
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Egypt, the Salafist parties formed part of the coalition government from 2012 to 2013.  They 
sought to increase the role of Islam in the Egyptian constitution, but they could still be included 
in the overall project of Islamic constitutionalism directed by the Brotherhood.  Even the Sisi 
regime has been able to coopt the Salafist Nour party.  In Tunisia, no major political party argued 
for shariah constitutional review, leaving Ennahda’s “civil state” and the Salafist caliphate as the 
only options.   
 A series of events in 2012 and 2013 led to a crackdown on the Tunisian Salafist groups, 
bringing this brief period of religious ferment to a close.  In 2012, a group of Salafists protesting 
the film marched from downtown Tunis to the upscale Berges du Lac neighborhood, where they 
tried to storm the US embassy.  The assassinations of Chokri Belaid and Mohamed Brahmi in 
February 2013 and July 2013 respectively were blamed on Salafist extremists.  The beginning of 
a low level insurgency in the Chaambi region in 2013 further raised fears of radical Islamism320.  
All of these events contributed to the Arrahil protest movement against the Troika. 
The government responded with a series of security measures.  The government declared 
Ansar al-Shariah to be a terrorist organization in August 2012.  A court decision dissolved the 
LPR and seized its assets.  The government also reinstated many of the methods used by the Ben 
Ali regime to regulate the religious sphere.  By July 2015, the Minister of religious affairs, 
Othmen Batikh, could state that “more than half of the out of control mosques have been 
closed.”321  The government did not require Friday sermons to be standardized, although this 
measure was considered in 2014.  These efforts had the support of all major political parties, 
including Ennahda.  Indeed, many of these policies were first implemented by the Troika I 
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government, which was heavily dominated by Ennahda, and its conservative minister of religious 
affairs, Noureddine Al-Khademi322.  These measures and a popular backlash against Islamism 
removed groups like the FTAI, the LPR and Ansar al-Shariah from the political scene.  However, 
the Salafist fringe returned as terrorist groups in 2014 and 2015, leading to Tunisia’s current 
security crisis. 
 
The Draft Constitutions 
 
Whether Ennahda would push for the inclusion of shariah in the new constitution was one 
of the most important questions hanging over the early phase of the transition.  The party’s 
platform released before the October 23, 2011 National Assembly elections did not mention the 
shariah, and Ghannouchi stated that the party would not push for the inclusion of shariah in the 
new constitution.  However, the movement’s earlier history and stances as described above were 
compatible with incorporating the shariah into the constitution, and its opponents feared that it 
would do so.  Soon after the October 23, 2011 elections, Ennahda MP’s proposed adding a 
provision describing shariah as “a source among sources of legislation” to the constitution.  The 
CPR and Ettakatol threatened to leave the Troika coalition if this provision were enacted323.  The 
debate over the shariah also revealed a split within Ennahda between an elite of moderate former 
exiles, including Ghannouchi, and a rank of file who had stayed in Tunisia throughout the Ben 
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Ali period324.  Ennahda’ rejection of a shariah provision pushed the issue out of formal politics 
and towards the Islamist fringe represented by the FTAI and the Salafists.  Following 
demonstrations by the FTAI in March 2012, Ennahda reaffirmed that it would not support the 
inclusion of shariah as a source of legislation in the draft constitution325.   
The Troika produced draft constitutions on August 8, 2012, December 2012, April 22, 
2013, and June 1, 2013.  None of these drafts included the shariah as a source of law.  However, 
all of them contained provisions that were objectionable to the secular opposition, including 
provisions that expanded the role of Islam in the Tunisian state.  The secular opposition often 
interpreted constitutional reforms proposed by the Troika, even those that did not mention Islam 
explicitly, as stealth attempts to introduce shariah and undermine the secular state. 
With each revision of the draft constitution, the Troika stepped back from the most 
controversial provisions.  Concerns in the August 8, 2012 draft include provisions annulling 
international treaties that contradict the constitution, complementarity rather than equality of men 
and women, criminalization of “attacks on the sacred,” criminalization of “any normalization 
with Zionism or the Zionist state,” and limiting the presidency to Muslims326.  The Troika 
removed all of these provisions, except the superiority of the constitution to international treaties, 
by the fourth draft published on June 1, 2013327. 
Even after these concessions, the June 1, 2013 constitution still raised fears about the 
Islamicization of the Tunisian state.  Fatma Bouraoui of Nidaa Tounes described these concerns 
as a fear of “erosion of fundamental rights and the rights of women.”  Bouraoui argued that this 
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fear drove the Arrahil movement that pressured the Troika government to step down in late 2013.  
It also spurred the growth of Nidaa Tounes as secular Bourguibist rival to Ennahda.  Human 
Rights Watch found the provisions for equality between men and women to be inadequate.  The 
direct incorporation of international human rights agreements and norms into the constitution 
was a key demand328.   
None of these issues deals with the shariah, but these issues clearly stand in the 
background of fears about the erosion of women’s rights.  The shariah and the experience of 
Bourguiba’s promulgation of the Personal Status Code stand behind these criticisms.  A 
discourse of fundamental rights, constitutional rights and women's’ rights sits side by side with 
the legal positivism of the Personal Status Code.  Fundamental rights are usually understood as 
norms that the constitution must protect against ordinary legislation.  In the Tunisian transition, it 
is also necessary to protect legislation from the constitution. 
 
Judges’ Views of Islam and Constitutional Review in the Tunisian Legal System 
 
The adoption of the Personal Status Code spread a legal positivist ideology among 
Tunisians, just as the SCC spread a view of the shariah as a higher norm among Egyptians.  
Adherence to this ideology leads some Tunisian judges to adopt positions that seem to contradict 
their own professional interests.  The impact of judicial positivism on the activity of the 
Administrative Tribunal is described in chapter 4.  The Personal Status Code also plays a more 
immediate role in the political calculations of Tunisian judges.  Like the secular opposition in 
general, Tunisian judges consider personal status to be of fundamental importance to the 
Tunisian state.  Like the secular opposition, Tunisian judges believe that overturning of the Code 
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and its replacing it with some more shariah-inspired alternative would have implications for 
much more than the topics covered in the Code.  The political imperative to defend the Personal 
Status Code reinforces the legal positivist ideology of Tunisian judges.  As in the case of the 
Administrative Tribunal, judges defined their interests through legal positivist ideology.  Legal 
positivism manifests itself in attitudes towards interbranch relations, the nature of the 
constitution, and the formal powers that should be assigned to courts.   
The January 2014 Constitution marks a further round of concessions by Islamists.  
Indeed, the National Dialogue largely took control of the constitution drafting process away from 
the Troika government.  Still, some judges of a secular or pro-RCD outlook have criticized the 
2014 Constitution as a step back from the gains of the 1959 Constitution.  These criticisms link 
issues including the Personal Status Code, modernization, Islam, and presidential power, which 
are connected only in light of the Personal Status Code and the practice of presidential 
legislation.  Zouheir M’dhaffar considered the rights provisions of the 1959 constitution to be 
superior to the those of the 2014 constitution.  Habib Koubaa objected to the large number of 
constitutional entities in the new constitution, including the ISIE, an anti-corruption agency, and 
IVD, in addition to the usual executive, legislative and judicial branches.  This division of 
powers could weaken the state.  He also objected to the weak executive implied by the semi-
presidential system.  He stated that “the country is in the process of developing and it needs a 
constitution that reflects this reality.”  A strong president would be an agent of modernization. 
Legal professionals’ support for a strong executive is linked to a suspicion of a strong 
judicial branch.  In general, the ideology of legal positivism implies that courts should have 
fewer formal powers and that they should defer to the political branches in their decisions.  
When asked about the possibility of provisional constitutional review by the Administrative 
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Tribunal, M’dhaffar stated that he opposed such review because judges might lack the proper 
understanding of the Tunisian constitution.  He then gave the issue of the Personal Status Code 
as an example.  The interview notes state,   
 
If a public law judge read the new constitution, which declares that Islam is the national religion, 
he would conclude that laws that contradict the shariah are unconstitutional.  Therefore he would 
declare the code of personal status unconstitutional because it permits adoption, which is 
forbidden by the shariah.  However, a constitutional judge who understands the principles and 
history of the Tunisian constitution would know that this literal interpretation was not intended 
by the framers of the constitution329.  
 
Zouheir M’dhaffar worried that the provision declaring Islam the official religion would allow a 
court to overturn Tunisia’s Personal Status Code.  He opposes such an outcome on both political 
and legal grounds.  M’dhaffar’s stance gives the Personal Status Code a semi-constitutional 
status, rooted in “the principles and history of the Tunisian constitution.”  For M’dhaffar, the 
Tunisian constitutions of 1959 and 2014 were superior to legislation in a purely legal sense, but 
both of them lack the sort of prestige that constitutions have in many other countries.  In legal 
positivism, a constitution is simply super legislation passed by a super legislature, not the 
embodiment of universal norms.  Both the Code and the 1959 Constitution were the work of the 
same super legislator - Bourguiba, the 1957-59 National Assembly and founding generation of 
nationalist leaders.  Both are foundational documents of the Tunisian Republic.  The Code could 
not possibly be at odds with the 1959 Constitution. 
Even without a shariah provision, a posteriori constitutional review could still endanger 
the code.   M’dhaffar added that he found the Austrian model to be “problematic” and even 
“dangerous.”  He explains that “a posteriori review requires a political and legal system that is 
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extremely developed, as well as a Court that is truly independent and above politics.”  M’dhaffar 
shifts the focus from the status of the shariah in the constitution to the formal powers of courts 
and the form of constitutional review that they might exercise.  This step is important evidence 
of the link between legal ideas and positions on formal powers of courts after 2011.  
None of the other interviewees echoed M’dhaffar total rejection of a posteriori review.  
M’dhaffar admits that his position is the result of “nostalgia for the old Constitutional 
Council”330.  Other legal professionals supported the creation of a constitutional court exercising 
a posteriori review in the 2014 constitution, even as they objected to proposals for provisional 
constitutional review by the Administrative Tribunal or the IPCCPL.  Elements of the new 
constitutionalism provide an alternative means of securing the goals of secular judges.  The 
inclusion of international treaties as a source of law coequal with the constitution was one of the 
key demands of the secular opposition331.   
Still, judges do take the concerns raised by M’dhaffar seriously, as evidenced by 
proposals to insulate the future constitutional court from shariah review.  Like many other 
constitutional courts, the Tunisian Constitutional Council, the proposed Constitutional Court in 
the 2012 and 2013 draft constitutions, and the IPCCPL did not require all members of the court 
to be professional judges.  Muhammad al-Ju’aidi, a Tunisian judge and frequent commentator on 
legal issues, criticized this provision in the 2013 draft constitution because the appointment of 
non-judges to the constitutional court because it “opens membership to ulema of the shariah.”332  
The 2014 Constitution still allows one third of the members of the new Constitutional Court to 
                                               
330 Interview with Zouheir M’dhaffar 
331 ”Tunisie: La constitution doit marquer le debut d’une nouvelle ere pour les droits humains,” Al-Bawsala, 1 
February 2014. http://www.albawsala.com/pub/52ecff9d12bdaa0a91b722da 
332 Muhammad Al-Afif Al-Ju’aidi. “Ay Mahkamah Dusturiyah fi Tunis? Bab lil-Shari’ah wa Veto lil-’Aqaliyah” 
(Which Constitutional Court in Tunis? A Door to the Shariah and a Veto for the Minority,” Legal Agenda, 18 June 
2013. http://www.legal-agenda.com/article.php?id=427&folder=articles&lang=ar 
205 
be non-legal specialists, but this proportion was reduced as part of the concessions under 
pressure from the secular opposition and the judiciary333. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The issue of the incorporation of Islamic law further undermines the countermajoritarian 
hypothesis.  The Brotherhood supported constitutional review while Tunisian judges opposed it.  
Another version of hypothesis 2 would be that the Islamist parties would oppose constitutional 
review not because they are majoritarian but rather because they are opposed to constitutional 
review in principle.  They may seek to replace it with some more Islamic alternative such as the 
Al-Azhar council described in the 2012 draft constitution, or some more radical reworking of the 
legal system.  A comparison between the two cases shows that there is no one Islamist answer to 
the question of constitutional review.  Instead, the outcome is shaped by each country’s history 
and by the institutions put in place by the authoritarian regime. 
The SCC’s cooptation of Islamic law is not the main source of its legitimacy - it certainly 
did not make Islamists unqualified supporters of the court - but it is an excellent example of how 
the SCC built its legitimacy over the past three decades.  It is also an example of the mechanism 
posited by the judicial role hypothesis: the activity of the SCC before 2011 promoted a set of 
ideas that made the Brotherhood more sympathetic to constitutional review.  In Tunisia, the 
judiciary has been a secular bastion, as in Egypt.  However, secularists are wary of one of the 
theoretical underpinnings of a posteriori review - the notion that statutes can be invalidated by 
their contradiction to a higher law embodied in the constitution - because such review could 
endanger the Personal Status Code and has been a method of Islamicization of law in other 
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countries, including Egypt.  It is another example of the mechanism of the judicial role 
hypothesis: the prominence of positive legislation in the pre-2011 legal system produced a legal 
positivist ideology that made judges suspicious of constitutional review after 2011. 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6: JUDICIAL POLITICS AND THE SUPREME CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF 
EGYPT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 A remarkable feature of the Egyptian transition was the extent to which the judiciary, 
including the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC), the ordinary courts, the administrative courts 
and the Judges Club worked together to achieve common political goals334.  Americans are used 
to thinking of all courts as part of a single judicial power, but in Egypt there are important 
differences among different kinds of courts, inducing their internal organization, their 
relationship with the regime and, most importantly, their political interests.  The SCC in 
particular stands apart from any other court because of its close connection with the presidency, 
which appoints its judges.  Despite these differences, the different parts of the judiciary worked 
together on the cases dissolving the House of Representatives and the Constituent Assembly and 
on the disputes surrounding the 2012 constitutional referendum.  The judicial role hypothesis 
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explains this through a chain of events from judicial activity before 2011 to ideas about the 
judicial role to the formal powers of courts after 2011.  The SCC’s activism before 2011 
cemented a conception of the judicial role that would support an alliance among the different 
parts of the judiciary and a greater involvement of the judiciary in politics after 2011. 
The previous chapter described how the activity of the Supreme Constitutional Court 
(SCC) as an interpreter of the shariah built support for constitutional review among Islamists.  
This chapter looks at how the SCC used constitutional review to build its legitimacy among other 
parts of the judiciary, especially the ordinary judges represented by the Judges’ Club.  As 
described in chapter 1 of the dissertation, Egypt and Tunisia share a set of legal influences from 
European civil law and domestic state building that should favor a non-political, technical view 
of the judicial role.  These views made Egyptian judges suspicious of the SCC during its first two 
decades.  These ideas persisted in Egypt even after the creation of the SCC in 1979, and can still 
be found among Egyptian judges335.  However, the exercise of constitutional review by the SCC 
introduced a new conception of the judicial role - as an active participant in politics - and a new 
strategy for the judiciary to secure its position - balancing against the political branches.  By the 
2000’s, ordinary judges found ideological and practical reasons to support the SCC.  These 
trends coalesced during the disputes surrounding the 2005 elections, when the SCC established 
the principle of judicial supervision of elections and the ordinary judiciary organized to defend 
this principle336. 
The SCC’s activity both before and during the transition reveals three key components of 
its conception of the judicial role.  First, the SCC use of fundamental rights and the shariah as 
constitutional principles in the decades before 2011 made the suspension of constitutional review 
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during the transition illegitimate in the eyes of both liberals and Islamists.  Second, the SCC 
continued to act as a political arbiter through the judiciary’s power to supervise elections.  Third, 
the SCC’s references to Egypt’s constitutional tradition implied a role for the SCC in defining 
the new constitution, even to the extent of claiming a power to review the constitutionality of the 
draft constitution.  The SCC’s activity shows how transitional constitutional review could be 
useful to the political authorities, especially the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), 
which drafted the transitional documents in 2011.   
The first section outlines the mechanism leading from judicial activity to ideas about the 
judicial role in the Egyptian context.  The second section describes the history of the SCC’s 
relations with the ordinary judiciary and how the SCC’s activity promoted new ideas about the 
judicial role.  The third section shows how this history influenced the activity of the SCC after 
2011.  I conclude that the mechanism posited by the hypothesis was at work in this case and that 
changing views of the judicial role set the stage for the SCAF’s inclusion of the SCC in the 
transitional regime. 
 
From Judicial Activity to the Judicial Role 
 
 The mechanism of the hypothesis requires the activity of the constitutional court to 
influence conceptions of the judicial role.  This can be a difficult mechanism to observe.  It is 
difficult to gauge whether particular ideas about the judicial role are widespread.  It is possible 
that changes in ideas about the judicial role are the result of other factors, such as changing 
political pressures.  The case of the Egyptian ordinary judiciary provides a means of addressing 
both of these problems.  Unlike other segments of society, judges produce an elaborate discourse 
about their legal theory.  Moreover, the SCC’s model of the judicial role is in tension with the 
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ordinary judiciary's model of the judicial role and the ordinary judiciary’s conception of its self 
interest.  This case shows how the activity of the SCC promoted a conception of the judicial role 
that had been absent in Egypt and that was at odds with how the ordinary judges defined their 
interests.  
In the United States, scholars often treat the ordinary judges and the constitutional court 
as part of a single judicial power, a stance that reflects the design of the US Supreme Court.  The 
Constitution describes the Supreme Court as part of the “judicial power,” in contrast to non-
judicial European high courts such as the Conseil Constitutionnel and the Conseil d’Etat.  
Because constitutional review is carried out by courts at all levels, not just the Supreme Court, 
there is not a major divide between constitutional review cases and other cases or between the 
activity of the Supreme Court and the lower courts337. 
Conflating the constitutional court with the judiciary in general is misleading in Egypt.  
In general, the SCC follows the Austrian model of constitutional review.  The SCC is separate 
both nominally and practically from the ordinary judiciary.  The 1971 Constitution describes the 
SCC as an “independent judicial body,” but not as part of either the ordinary judiciary or the 
administrative judiciary338.  The SCC was superimposed on much older ordinary and 
administrative judicial hierarchies. 
The creation of the SCC did not automatically result in expanded powers or greater 
independence for the judiciary as a whole.  The design of the SCC presented both dangers and 
opportunities to the ordinary judiciary.  The SCC would be staffed by judges, so it opened the 
door to greater judicial influence.  However it would be formally distinct from the ordinary 
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judiciary and would have its own procedures for appointments.  These procedures gave the 
president direct influence over the SCC, perhaps making the court a tool for controlling the 
judiciary as a whole.  It would exercise a posteriori review, which allow the judiciary to overrule 
any law and would make the lower courts partners in the process of constitutional review.  
However, the SCC could also overrule the lower courts, even the supreme courts, the Court of 
Cassation and the Council of State, which saw themselves as the leaders of the Egyptian 
judiciary.  The inclusion of fundamental rights in the SCC’s power of review gave it additional 
powers, but might also involve the SCC, and the judiciary generally, in controversial political 
questions.   
 Egyptian judges adopted most of these stances toward the SCC at one time or another.  
The SCC’s activity pushed judges to adopt a more favorable view of the SCC.  Support for the 
SCC entailed support for its model of constitutional review.  The SCC can promote ideas both 
through argument and by demonstrating the advantages of these ideas.  The decisions of the SCC 
are long and detailed, resembling the decisions of the US Supreme Court or the German 
Constitutional Court more than the legal syllogism of the French and Tunisian courts339.  As a 
result, they provide ample opportunities to present the courts’ views.  The decisions are widely 
read by ordinary judges because they represent the authoritative interpretation of the constitution 
and laws.  Some judges of the SCC are also prominent academics, and their writings present a 
comprehensive theory of the SCC’s activity and the broader judicial role340.   
The decisions of the SCC have also shown that a court can challenge the actions of the 
Egyptian government.  This phenomenon led to interest in the SCC among Western political 
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scientists.  It also changed how Egyptians, especially Egyptian judges, thought about the possible 
scope of judicial activity and relations between the political branches and the judiciary341. 
For the opposition, the judiciary’s pro-military counter-revolutionary program came as a 
shock because some parts of the judiciary had been centers of reformist activity in the Mubarak 
era.  The SCC enjoyed a ‘golden age’ of activism in the 1990’s.  The administrative courts had 
long been known for their independence from the regime342.   In an interview, Ahmed Eid stated 
that, “For many years the administrative courts were known as protectors of human rights.  They 
would often issue decisions releasing prisoners who were held illegally (even if they police 
might still re-arrest the prisoner after releasing him)....Since the revolution, the administrative 
courts have been turned against the opposition too.”343  The question of how the different parts of 
the judiciary accepted a new conception of the judicial role is closely tied to the question of how 
they abandoned older reformist political stances.   
 
History of Egyptian Judicial Politics 
 
 The Egyptian judiciary was initially hostile to the sort of judicial activity represented by 
the SCC on both ideological and political grounds.  Like its Tunisian counterpart, the Egyptian 
judiciary built its independence on professionalism and an apolitical technical view of judicial 
practice.  As a practical matter, a constitutional court could be a means for the regime to control 
the judiciary.  The SCC used its activity to allay these concerns and to establish itself as a 
guarantor of the independence of the judiciary as a whole.  By the 2000’s, the SCC was able to 
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work with the ordinary judiciary to intervene in the politics surrounding Egypt’s first multi-
candidate presidential elections in 2005. 
 
The Judiciary under Siege, 1952-1970 
 
 Judges and lawyers enjoyed high status under the Egyptian monarchy.  A balance of 
power among the monarchy, the British occupiers and the parliament created a relatively free 
environment for judicial activity.  International trade led to the rise of a class of prosperous 
lawyers344.  French legal positivism was the main influence on the Egyptian judiciary.  The 
independence of the judiciary was founded in meritocratic appointments, educational institutions, 
and an apolitical technical application of the law, not in a power of constitutional review 
exercised by a high court.  However, courts did occasionally use the 1923 Constitution as the 
basis for constitutional review.  Abd al-Razzaq Sanhuri introduced plans for constitutional 
review by the Council of State, suggesting a variety of views about the judicial role during this 
period345.  
The 1952 Free Officers’ coup proved to be a grave threat to both judges and lawyers.  
The revolutionary ideology of the officers threatened all established institutions, including 
courts.  The new regime introduced an ideology of ‘socialist legality’ that was at odds with the 
liberal views of Egypt’s judiciary.  The regime created new institutions, such as the military 
courts and the socialist prosecutor, that competed with the jurisdiction of the ordinary and 
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administrative courts.  Furthermore, the new regime began the nationalization of many areas of 
the Egyptian economy, eroding the economic basis for the prosperity of lawyers346.   
The revolutionary environment following the Free Officers’ coup also cut off the 
constitution as a source of judicial independence.  The constitution was in flux during this 
period.  Egypt adopted a new constitution in 1956 and again in 1964347.  Moreover, the 
constitution drafting process was under the direct control of the Nasser regime.  The 
constitutions contained some provisions that threatened the judiciary.  Both constitutions 
concentrated power in the hands of the president and opened the door to long-term emergency 
rule, which began in 1958.   Neither constitution contained any provision for judicial review.  
The regime suppressed the attempt by the Council of State to claim a power of constitutional 
review, and exiled the Council’s president, Abd al-Razzaq Sanhuri in 1954.  In short, the new 
constitutions were more likely to be a threat to the judiciary than a guarantor of judicial 
independence348.  In this environment, the traditional positivist sources of the judiciary’s 
independence - professionalism and apolitical expertise - became even more important. 
Judges and lawyers strengthened their professional organizations in response to the 
Nasser regime.  The Judges’ Club and the Lawyers’ Syndicate continued to operate throughout 
the Nasser era.  They maintained control over their internal organization and avoided 
incorporation into Nasser’s party, the Arab Socialist Union.  Both organizations became centers 
of opposition to the Nasser regime349. 
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 Judges emphasized the special training and attitudes that they believed were necessary for 
true judicial independence.  The Nasser government lowered standards for admissions to law 
schools as part of its policy of providing universal higher education.  From the 1960’s to the 
1980’s, the number of law students and lawyers increased dramatically, resulting in lower 
prestige for the profession350.  In contrast, judges were able to retain some control over the 
training and recruitment of new judges through institutions such as the High Council of the 
Ordinary Judiciary, which is headed by the president of the Court of Cassation351.  Promotion by 
seniority or by meritocratic criteria remained central features of the judicial hierarchy.  The goal 
of these measures was not only to ensure the quality of members of the judiciary, but also to 
exclude new members who might have a political orientation (either Islamist or pro-regime) that 
was at odds with the judiciary.  To this end, the admissions exam to the judicial academy gave 
extra points to the sons of judges352.  All of these mechanisms insulated the judiciary from 
attempts by the regime to change its composition. 
The authoritarian environment during the Nasser era influenced the judges’ thinking 
about their role.  During this period, judges articulated an interpretation of their role that would 
justify their opposition to the Nasser regime and protect their independence.  Muhammad ‘Asfur 
was an Egyptian judge.  His book Istiqlal al-Sultah al-Qada’iyah (Independence of the Judicial 
Power), which was published in 1969 in the midst of the conflict between Nasser and the judges, 
sets out a vision of the judicial role353.  ‘Asfur’s main contention is that the judiciary is “a power, 
not an office”.  Judges cannot be treated like ordinary state employees.  Much of the work is 
taken up by a comparison between Egypt and the systems of France, Britain, Germany and the 
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United States.  ‘Asfur cites the American example of judicial review approvingly, but he does 
not suggest that such a model is necessary for the Egyptian judiciary.  Even if it might be 
desirable, an independent constitutional court exercising judicial review of government actions 
was implausible in Egypt in 1969, given the absence of a stable constitution and the regime’s 
monopoly on power.  ‘Asfur’s conception of judicial independence depends on the autonomy of 
all judges, not on the status of the highest court.  ‘Asfur’s concrete proposals for the Egyptian 
judiciary focus on guarantees of tenure for sitting judges, exclusion of non-judges from judicial 
activities, and the autonomy of the judiciary from political parties.  These demands counter the 
Nasser regime’s strategies for controlling the judiciary. 
 The conflict between Nasser and the judges peaked in 1969 with the massacre of the 
judiciary, in which Nasser removed a large number of sitting judges and began the incorporation 
of the judiciary into the Arab Socialist Union.  By 1969, Egyptian judges feared that the old 
guarantees of their independence were gone for good, and that there would be nothing to replace 
them.  Ziadeh shares these fears.  Ziadeh argued that judicial independence and the rule of law in 
Egypt were founded on a “body of men,” including both lawyers and judges, that had absorbed 
modern legal education and liberal ideas under the monarchy.  The autonomy of this elite from 
the government was built from the bottom up.  Education, legal culture and a vibrant private 
sector were all necessary for the survival of this elite.  According to this argument, even if the 
Nasser regime had wanted to create independent courts, it could not do so without these 
ingredients354. 
 
Establishment of the SCC, 1970-2000 
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 Soon after assuming power in 1970, Sadat set out to improve relations with the judiciary.   
The new constitution adopted in 1971 included liberal principles, fundamental rights, and 
guarantees of judicial independence.  It also called for the creation of the SCC, although it left 
many of the details of this institution to legislation.  In 1973, he reinstated the judges that had 
been fired during the massacre of the judiciary355.   
Still, judges were suspicious of the president’s plans and did not find his guarantees of 
judicial independence credible.  Said argues that the Judges’ Club had two major demands in 
reforming its status: amendment of the judicial authority law to ensure autonomy of judiciary’s 
budget and appointments, and enforcement of the requirement that judges supervise elections356.  
The judiciary opposed the short-lived Supreme Court, which was created in 1969 and replaced 
by the SCC in 1979.  The greater independence of the SCC went some way toward allaying the 
fears of ordinary judges about constitutional review, but criticism of the SCC continued.  The 
Judges’ Club held a conference on the theme of judicial independence in 1985.  Brown argues 
that this conference revealed the disagreements between the ordinary judiciary and the SCC 
about the definition of judicial independence.  The statement by the Judges’ Club argued that the 
SCC should be abolished.  Some judges argued for constitutional review by the Council of State 
or the Court of Cassation.  The SCC countered these arguments with its own statement 
emphasizing the role of the judiciary in defending the constitution and monitoring the other 
branches of government357. 
 In the 1980’s the SCC began issuing its first major decisions.  This era produced most of 
the SCC’s well-known decisions on Islamic law, property law and NGO law.  The SCC also 
acted to defend the interests of the judiciary.  The SCC issued a decision on the case of the 
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Lawyer’s Syndicate.  judicial independence.  These decisions raised the profile of the SCC and 
increased its popularity among the civil society organizations and lawyers that make up the 
judicial support network.  It also attracted the attention of scholars.  Much of the political science 
literature on Egyptian courts is the product of this golden age358.   
Judges of the SCC participated in the creation of this literature, as both authors and 
informants to academic researchers.  The most prominent of these academic judges are Adel 
Omar Sherif and ‘Awad al-Murr.  Adel Omar Sherif has served on the SCC since 2002.  He 
published a book in Arabic on constitutional review in Egypt in 1988.  He has published several 
articles in English on the SCC, human rights, the Egyptian judiciary and Islamic law.  Sherif 
studied in Britain and has held visiting appointments at law schools in the United States and 
Canada.  Al-Murr was chief justice of the SCC from 1991 to 1998 during its most activist era359.   
Sherif describes the SCC as a protector of judicial independence and a check on the 
power of the government.  In “Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence in Constitutional 
Democracies: The Egyptian and American Experiences,” Sherif emphasizes the role of the 
SCC’s decisions in defining and protecting the independence of Egyptian judges.  He cites two 
decisions by the SCC that deal with judicial independence.  The SCC used a case about 
bankruptcy judges to present a general statement of the requirements for judicial 
independence360.  The prerequisites for judicial independence mentioned in the decision, such as 
security of judicial appointments and self government of judges’ professional organizations, are 
similar to demands made by the Judges’ Club for decades.  What is new is that the SCC has 
asserted itself as the protector of the ordinary judiciary.  In another case, the SCC overturned 
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some mandatory sentences required by legislation, on the grounds that determining sentences is a 
specifically judicial power361.  The separation of powers at the constitutional level protects 
judicial independence at all levels.   
Al-Murr was the chief justice of the SCC during its most active period.  The SCC was 
more willing to rule against the government during this period than it had before.  Al-Murr also 
introduced new sources of law to the SCC, especially international human rights norms362.  The 
view of the SCC’s role that these authors supported emphasized international human rights 
norms as the basis for the SCC’s activity.  Al-Murr defended the new rights jurisprudence of the 
SCC in his academic writings.  In “The Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt and the 
Protection of Human and Political Rights,” “Human Rights in the Constitutional Systems of 
Egypt and other Islamic Countries: International and Comparative Standards,” Al-Murr argued 
that international human rights norms and the shariah provide a complementary set of rights 
protections363.  These two sources of higher law form the basis of the SCC’s activity.  Al-Murr 
also emphasized the SCC’s decisions protecting the right to litigation364.  Here too, the SCC used 
constitutional review to strengthen the independence of the ordinary judiciary. 
Sherif and al-Murr introduced a new set of justifications for the activity of the SCC.  It is 
not clear that their views were representative of the SCC as a whole, let alone the broader 
judiciary.  Sherif and al-Murr are unusual in their liberal views and their close connections to 
Western Anglophone academia.  Some judges of the SCC presented a view of the SCC’s activity 
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that is more statist in Rutherford’s terms365.  Naturally, Sherif and al-Murr also present a positive 
view of the SCC’s activity and its impact on human rights and the independence of the ordinary 
judiciary.   
In fact, ordinary judges also accepted many of the arguments in favor of the SCC 
presented by Sherif and al-Murr.  This era also marks a transition in ordinary judges’ attitudes 
towards the SCC and their conception of the sources of judicial independence.  Muhammad 
Kamil ‘Ubayd published Istiqlal al-Qada’: Dirasah Muqaranah (Independence of the Judiciary: 
A Comparative Study) in 1991.  ‘Ubayd’s work presents a traditional view of judicial 
independence.  Although ‘Ubayd was not a judge, the Judges Club implicitly endorsed his views.  
The book was published by the Judges’ Club press with an introduction by Yahya al-Rifa’i, 
president of the Judges’ Club.   Like ‘Asfur’s Istiqlal al-Sultah al-Qada’iyah, the book again 
compares Egypt with the main legal models: France, Britain, Germany and the United States.  To 
these, he adds Islamic law as an additional model for the Egyptian judiciary.  ‘Ubayd repeats the 
basic demands for judicial independence: control over appointments, freedom from political 
interference, no appointment of non-specialists to judicial positions, and self-government for 
judicial professional organizations.  The SCC and constitutional review remain marginal in 
‘Ubayd’s work.  The ordinary judiciary is embedded in a state structure that includes the 
executive and legislative branches, as well as the administrative judiciary and the SCC.  ‘Ubayd 
does not suggest that the ordinary judiciary’s relationship with the SCC is more important than 
its relations with these other institutions.  The independence of the judiciary is guaranteed by 
procedures of appointment and professional self-governance, not by the SCC or even by the 
constitution.  
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Hisham Muhammad Fawzi’s Raqabat Dusturiyat al-Qawanin: Dirasah Muqaranah bayn 
Amrika wa Misr (Constitutional Review of Laws: A Comparative Study of America and Egypt) 
presents a new view of the SCC and the broader judiciary366.  The book was published by the 
Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, not the Judges’ Club.  Like ‘Asfur and ‘Ubayd, Fawzi 
compares the Egyptian judiciary with international models.  Unlike ‘Asfur, Fawzi argues for the 
importation of the practices of the  US Supreme Court to Egypt.   Constitutional review by the 
SCC should be a protection of fundamental rights, just at like constitutional review by the US 
Supreme Court.  Fawzi lists “attempts to limit the role of the American Supreme Court,” 
including the creation of extraordinary tribunals during the Civil War, refusal of the executive 
and legislative branches to follow the Supreme Court’s rulings, and attempts to increase the 
number of judges367.   
He draws lessons for the SCC from these incidents of American judicial history.  The 
SCC faces similar “limitations,” from extraordinary courts, constitutional interpretation by the 
president, and government interference in its internal organization.  The parliament proposed a 
reform of the law governing the SCC that would replace a posteriori review with a priori review.  
Fawzi argues that the reform of the SCC by legislation, rather than constitutional amendment is 
interference in the independence of the SCC.  A priori review is undesirable because it would 
limit the effect of the SCC’s decision and make the SCC’s review part of a legislative, rather 
than judicial process.  Fawzi’s comparison between the US Supreme Court and the SCC leads to 
a program for reforming the Egyptian judiciary and its role in the broader constitutional system.  
Fawzi proposes that the SCC adopt “the Anglo-Saxon style” of judicial decisions, that is signed 
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opinions by individual judges, including dissents368.  Fawzi argues that this proposal would 
increase the status of the judges as public figures.  The influence of the American model of 
judicial review and global human rights discourse is evident in this work.  However, without the 
SCC these examples would not be plausible in Egypt.  The SCC provided a tool to strengthen the 
judiciary and check the regime.  The model of strong constitutional review exercised by the US 
Supreme Court provided a justification for the SCC’s activity.      
The SCC became a possible guarantor of judicial independence during the 1980’s and 
1990’s, although judges and legal academics debated whether this role was suitable for the SCC.  
Starting in 2000, disputes about the supervision of elections by judges provided an opportunity 
for an alliance between the SCC and the ordinary judiciary. 
  
Elections and the Judicial Revolt, 2000-2011 
 
 In the period between 2000 and 2005, the ordinary judiciary and the SCC became 
involved in electoral politics.  The 1971 Constitution requires the judiciary to supervise 
elections.  Until 2000, this requirement was interpreted narrowly.  A small number of judges 
were assigned to election boards that usually had no direct involvement in supervising voting.  In 
2000, the SCC ruled that the 1956 law on the Exercise of Political Rights was unconstitutional 
because it allowed the heads of the electoral committees to be non-judges369.  The decision called 
for a greatly increased involvement of the judiciary in elections.  
This decision coincided with a brief opening of the electoral field to opposition 
candidates.  The 2000 elections resulted in victories for Mubarak and the ruling party, but also 
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criticism of the electoral rules that produced these lopsided results.  In the 2005 elections, large 
numbers of independent candidates affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood were allowed to run 
for the first time.  A 2005 amendment to the constitution allowed multi-candidate presidential 
elections for the first time.  Previously, the president had been chosen by the parliament and then 
approved by a popular referendum, ensuring that Mubarak was reelected without any real 
opposition370.  Article 76 of the Constitution as amended in 2005 states, 
Candidature applications shall be submitted to an independent committee, named the Presidential 
Elections Committee. The committee shall be composed of the head of the Supreme 
Constitutional Court as a chairman and the head of the Cairo Court of Appeal, the most senior 
deputy of the head of the Supreme Constitutional Court, the most senior deputy of the head of 
the Court of Cassation, the most senior deputy of the State Council and five public figures, 
recognized for impartiality…. 
The committee shall establish main committees to be composed of members of the judiciary to 
supervise the process in accordance with such rules and regulations as may be decided by the 
committee.  
 
The wording of the amended constitution does not fully reflect the enormous efforts of 
the judiciary in supervising the 2005 elections.  The committees described in this provision 
decided to place judges in every polling place in Egypt to ensure that the voting proceded 
without fraud.  The effort involved thousands of judges371.   
The involvement of judges in the electoral process made the judges political arbiters.   If 
the regime interfered in the referendum on the constitutional amendment, the Judges’ Club 
threatened to boycott the presidential elections372.  Without judicial supervision, the elections 
could not be valid, according to the SCC’s interpretation of the 1971 Constitution.  The results of 
the 2005 elections brought the judiciary into conflict with the regime.  The Judges’ Club 
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published a report accusing the government of widespread electoral fraud373.  Judges participated 
in public protests.  Mohamed Sayed Said describes these events as a ‘judges’ revolt’.  The 
regime responded by disciplining judges through the provisions of the 1972 judiciary law.  In 
2006, the police surrounded the Judges’ Club, the Court of Cassation and the Lawyers’ Syndicate 
buildings to forestall possible protests in support of the judges374. 
The SCC had an ambiguous role in this process.  The SCC’s 2000 decision started the 
chain of events.  Its judges were involved in the elections committees.  The events of 2005 
indicate the involvement of the SCC in politics and cooperation between the SCC and the 
ordinary judiciary.  The SCC’s ruling was supported by protests from civil society and a strike 
by ordinary judges.  The SCC certified the results of the 2005 elections, despite the allegations of 
fraud.  Some parts of the opposition saw the SCC’s decision as a betrayal.  Moustafa describes 
the SCC as a rubber stamp for approving election results favorable to the regime.  As Moustafa 
notes, the composition of the SCC had changed substantially between 2000 and 2005, as 
Mubarak had appointed numerous pro-regime judges to curb the activism of the SCC375.  Despite 
these controversies, the opposition and the ordinary judiciary still supported the broader principle 
of judicial supervision of elections. 
 Moustafa describes the years after 2005 as an era of decline for the SCC and the judiciary 
generally.  Samir Annabi, President of the Tunisian anti-Corruption Agency, echoed the view 
that the period after 2005 marked a decline in the independence and professionalism of the 
Egyptian judiciary376.  However, this period did have important implications for ideas about the 
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judicial role and the later activities of the judiciary.  Despite initial resistance by the Mubarak 
regime, the judiciary’s role in observing elections became institutionalized.  The judiciary also 
supervised the 2010 elections.  The SCAF included this power in the Constitutional Decree with 
little controversy.  The decisions of the SCC and the administrative courts dissolving the House 
of Representative and the Constituent Assembly builds on this tradition377.  In these decisions, 
the SCC and the administrative courts used the principle that elections could only be valid if they 
were supervised by the judiciary.  They also relied on the activism of the ordinary judiciary, 
especially the Judges’ Club, to make these rulings effective.  As in 2005, the Judge’ Club 
threatened a boycott of the 2012 constitutional referendum.   
The events of 2005 had a broader impact on conceptions of the judicial role and the 
ordinary judiciary’s attitude toward the SCC.  Younes describes a ‘politicization of the judges’ 
discourse,’ in which judges framed their demand for judicial independence as part of a larger 
struggle against the arbitrary power of the Mubarak regime378.  Whether the judges intended to 
confront the regime or not, the principle of judicial supervision of elections pushed the activity of 
both the SCC and the ordinary judiciary far to the political end of the chart from the Introduction 
to Section II.  The events of 2005 show that the ordinary judges were clearly committed to this 
activity and to the expanded judicial role that it implied.   
During the 2005 elections, the ordinary judges seemed able to influence electoral politics 
for the first time.  To do so, they needed the help of the SCC to protect the constitutional 
principle of judicial supervision of elections, just as the SCC needed the ordinary judges to carry 
out electoral supervision.  At least in the realm of electoral politics, the distinction between the 
purely technical activity of the ordinary judiciary and the more political activity of constitutional 
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review that is central to the French and Austrian models started to break down379.  If the 
Mubarak regime had continued to prevent real electoral competition, these changes might have 
had little impact on broader politics.  However, the 2011 revolution brought electoral politics to 
the fore, and with it the principle of judicial supervision of elections and the political conception 
of the judicial role that it implied.  Ironically, the period of conflict between the judiciary and the 
Mubarak regime paved the way for the SCC’s pro-military decisions during the transition.   
 
Judicial Activity in the Transition 
 
 The SCC exercised three main forms of activity during the transition: supervision of 
elections and electoral law, fundamental rights review, and intervention in the constitution 
drafting process.  Each of these activities builds on precedents from before 2011.  Expansions of 
the SCC’s powers may have been controversial.  Through each of these methods, the SCC 
showed how it could be an effective player in transitional politics, and how it could be useful for 
the SCAF.  Excluding the SCC from the transitional regime would have considerable costs: 
alienating the ordinary judiciary, which would complicate any effort to supervise elections and 
lead to a repeat of the 2005 disputes.  Including it would have considerable benefits: legitimating 
constraints on the political branches (even if the SCAF could exercise such constraints without 
the courts).   
 
Judicial Supervision of Elections 
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 The Constitutional Decree also included the principle that judges must supervise the 
elections.  The language of the Constitutional Decree on electoral supervision is similar to the 
1971 Constitution and would be interpreted the same way by the SCC380.  This choice fits with 
Egypt’s earlier history as described above, but it is very different from the international model 
for supervising elections, which emphasizes foreign observers and the creation of an independent 
elections committee.  The Ben Achour Commission chose this model for Tunisia in 2011381.   
The Constitutional Decree introduced a new power to the SCC: a priori review of 
electoral laws.  Article 28 of the Constitutional Decree describes this power,   
Draft legislation for presidential elections will be shown to the Supreme Constitutional Court 
before being issued to determine the extent of compliance with the constitution. The Supreme 
Constitutional Court will issue its decision on this matter within 15 days of receiving the draft 
legislation. If it decides that the text is unconstitutional, more work must be done before the law 
can be issued. In all cases, the decision of the Court will be obligatory for all authorities of the 
state, and will be published in the official gazette within three days of being released382. 
 
The 2012 Constitution included this provision and extended the SCC’s a priori review to 
legislative elections as well, presumably because the Muslim Brotherhood wanted to ensure that 
the parliament would not be dissolved by the SCC on the grounds that it had been elected 
through an unconstitutional electoral law383.   
 The SCC had never exercised any form of a priori review before 2011.  Indeed, the SCC 
had campaigned against the addition of such review in the past because it would insulate laws 
from later constitutional review384.  A priori review also put the SCC in a closer relationship with 
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political authorities.  It would now review legislation drafted by the parliament, rather than just 
concrete cases appealed to it from the lower courts.  Still, the power of a priori review of 
electoral laws builds on the SCC’s past activity.  The SCC dissolved the parliament as the result 
of flaws in the electoral law during the Mubarak era as well385. 
The most important decisions of the transition were based on the SCC’s review of 
electoral law.  The judiciary’s involvement in the electoral arena extended beyond the SCC’s 
decisions.  The requirement that judges supervise elections connected the decisions of the SCC 
to partisan politics and a protest movement by ordinary judges.   
 
Fundamental Rights and the Nature of the Egyptian Constitution 
 
 The main question facing the drafting bodies was what aspects of the existing 
constitution should be suspended.  If the fundamental rights included in the constitution are 
derived from natural law, they should not be suspended.  If they are also included in international 
treaties and form an important part of the court’s past jurisprudence, suspending them would also 
create some legal difficulties.  The SCC’s past use of fundamental rights made it difficult to 
suspend them as both a legal and political matter. 
The SCAF’s Constitutional Decree included several fundamental rights: Article 4 (right 
to association), Article 6 (right to property), Article (personal freedom, freedom from 
unwarranted searches and detentions), Article 12 (freedom of religion and opinion), Article 16 
(right of assembly), Article 21 (right to natural judge), Article 22 (right to legal defense), Article 
                                               
385 In 1990, the SCC ruled that the 1987 elections were invalid because the electoral law discriminated against 
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23 (rights of detainees)386.  The Ben Achour Commission’s decree did not include a list of rights 
or any reference to fundamental rights.  The rights decisions of the Administrative Tribunal did 
not depend on the provisions of the Ben Achour Commission’s decree or the Assembly’s organic 
law of December 2011387. 
In its decisions from 2011 to 2014, the SCC also considered a broader range of rights 
drawn from sources other than the SCAF’s Constitutional Decree.  Although the 1971 
Constitution was suspended, its rights provisions still informed the decisions of the SCC.  
International treaties provided another source of fundamental rights.  Even from a purely legal 
standpoint, suspending the constitution is not enough to stop the SCC from using the 
fundamental rights as a source of law.  From a political standpoint, numerous actors were 
invested in fundamental rights review by the SCC, including civil society, the ordinary judges, 
and property owners.   
The SCC issued relatively few decisions resulting from civil society litigation during the 
transition.  However, it did use fundamental rights in its decisions, often in unexpected ways.  It 
ruled that diplomats do not have a right to marry foreign nationals.  It ruled overturned some 
aspects of the emergency law on June 2, 2013388.  Still, fundamental rights arguments make their 
way into the SCC’s other decisions.  For example, the SCC argued that the party-list system 
violated the rights of independent candidates.  The SCC’s decisions certainly drew on its own 
precedents.  As long as the SCC continued to operate, fundamental rights would form an 
important part of its activity.  This is not true of all constitutional courts, or even all courts 
showing a high level of independence and activity.  The US Supreme Court rarely used the Bill 
                                               
386 “Constitutional Declaration 2011,” Egypt State Information Service, 30 March 2011. 
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387 These decisions are discussed in chapter 4 of the dissertation. 
388 Brown (2013), The rights decisions of the SCC during the transition are discussed in chapter 3 of the 
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of Rights in its decisions before Reconstruction.  Following Kelsen’s model, the interwar 
German and Austrian courts did not have jurisdiction over rights cases389.   
In the decades before 2011, the SCC often built its decisions on fundamental rights and 
the shariah.  By presenting itself as a defender of these principles, the SCC was able to build its 
legitimacy.  Such principles can be conceived as super constitutional.  This model influence the 
formal powers of the SCC at two critical points during the transition: in the SCAF’s decision to 
give the SCC a power of transitional constitutional review in the February 2011 Constitutional 
Decree, and in the SCAF’s June 18, 2012 amendment to the Decree, which granted the SCC a 
power to review the draft constitution for conformity to the “any principle agreed upon in all of 
Egypt’s previous constitutions.”390 
 
The SCC’s Constituent Power 
 
 During the transition, the SCC presented itself not just as a defender of fundamental 
rights, but also as a defender of a particular tradition of Egyptian law.  This tradition was 
embodied in Egypt’s past constitutions and its political and legal institutions.  This tradition 
could not be broken by any political authority.  This view of the Egyptian constitution implied 
that the SCC itself should have a role in deciding the content of Egypt’s post-2011 constitution, 
or at least a veto over the constituent power exercised by the elected Constituent Assembly.  This 
view of the SCC’s role manifested itself three times during the transition: the SCC’s review of 
the draft constitution, the SCC decisions during the transition, which drew on varied sources of 
                                               
389 Kelsen (1942), Sweet (1992), Lasser (2009), Whittington (2007) 
390 Brown (2013),  
“English Text of SCAF Amended Constitutional Declaration,” Al-Ahram, 18 June 2012. 
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/45350/Egypt/Politics-/URGENT-English-text-of-SCAF-amended-
Constitutional.aspx 
230 
law, and the SCC’s involvement in drafting the 2014 constitution.  In each of these areas, the 
SCC built on its activity before 2011 to issue decisions on the most contentious issues of the 
transition. 
 The SCAF amended the Constitutional Declaration in June 2012, soon after Mursi won 
the presidential elections.  The Muslim Brotherhood’s victory in the legislative elections also 
allowed it to elect a Constituent Assembly dominated by Islamists.  As a result, the SCAF feared 
that the Constituent Assembly would produce a draft constitution that would be threatening to 
non-Islamists.  Article 60 B1 of the Amended Constitutional Declaration reads, 
 
If the president, the head of SCAF, the prime minister, the Supreme Council of the Judiciary or a 
fifth of the constituent assembly find that the new constitution contains an article or more which 
conflict with the revolution's goals and its main principles or which conflict with any principle 
agreed upon in all of Egypt's former constitutions, any of the aforementioned bodies may 
demand that the constituent assembly revises this specific article within 15 days. Should the 
constituent assembly object to revising the contentious article, the article will be referred to the 
High Constitutional Court (HCC) which will then be obliged to give its verdict within seven 
days. The HCC's decision is final and will be published in the official gazette within three days 
from the date of issuance391. 
 
 The language of this amendment granted a lot of leeway to the SCC.  The principles of 
Egypt’s past constitutions included extensive lists of fundamental rights, statements of Egypt’s 
national identity, and definitions of the state’s relationship to Islam.  The SCC could use any of 
these principles to rewrite the draft constitution.  On the other hand, the amendment did not 
prevent Islamist government from adopting a constitution very similar to the 1971 Constitution, 
which would concentrate power in Mursi’s hands the way that the old constitution had 
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concentrated power in the hands of Mubarak and Sadat.  As a result, the amendment is not a 
foolproof protection against the sort of Islamist takeover feared by the Brotherhood’s opponents.   
Like the requirement that judges supervise the constitutional referendum, the possibility 
that the SCC might overturn the draft constitution gave the judiciary an additional veto over the 
Constituent Assembly, although the SCC accepted the 2012 draft constitution without any 
changes.  The amendment is certainly part of the SCAF’s strategy of constraining the Mursi 
government.  However, the amendment was also a delegation of power by the SCAF to the SCC.  
With this amendment, the SCAF also risked an unfavorable ruling by the SCC.  Despite the 
involvement of the SCAF and other state institutions in forwarding the draft constitution, the 
SCC was the final decider.  The SCAF could have created a set of principles to guide the SCC’s 
review of the draft constitution.  Instead it preferred a reference to Egypt’s past constitutions, 
which gave the SCC the final say in deciding whether the draft constitution was acceptable or 
not.  This choice reflects the legitimacy of Egypt’s past constitutions, even those like the 1956 
and 1964 constitutions that were clearly the product of authoritarian regimes.  It also shows the 
SCAF’s eagerness to portray any veto of the draft constitution as a judicial decision by the SCC 
rather than a political decision by the SCAF itself. 
The power of a constitutional court to review a constitution may seem paradoxical.  It 
certainly poses problems for the hierarchy of norms theory that undergirds the Egyptian and 
Tunisian ordinary and administrative judiciaries.  In an interview, Habib Koubaa objected to 
even the very limited role of the Tunisian Constitutional Court in reviewing constitutional 
amendments to ensure that they have been adopted according to the procedures outlined in the 
2014 Constitution.  This review does not touch on the content of the amendments in anyway, but 
Koubaa still opposed it because it means that the court “can judge the source of its own 
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authority, the constitution”392.  Egyptian legal scholars have expressed a similar skepticism of the 
SCC’s review of the draft constitution393. 
The activity of the SCC before 2011 shows how this power of constitutional review of 
the constitution can be justified.  As a practical matter, the SCC had been involved in previous 
periods of constitutional change, such as the adoption of the 2005 constitutional amendment 
allowing multi-candidate presidential elections.  Moreover, the doctrine of the SCC is compatible 
with review of the constitution.  As Abdelal notes, the SCC’s power to review the 
constitutionality of constitutional acts depends on something approximating a basic structure 
doctrine, which states that a court can overturn amendments to the constitution that violate the 
basic structure of the constitution.  The basic structure may be fundamental rights, the 
democratic nature of the state or a super-constitutional norm, such as human dignity.  The 
Supreme Court of India used the basic structure doctrine to overturn amendments to the 
constitution in the Minerva Mills case.  The basic structure doctrine is common in former British 
colonies394.  Although, the SCC had never asserted such a doctrine, its basic ingredients are 
present in the SCC’s decisions and its conception of the Egyptian constitution: the SCC had 
hinted at extra-constitutional and super-constitutional sources of law in its previous decisions.  
These include human rights norms, the shariah, and national security.  Of course, the SCC could 
not use any of these principles to remove provisions from the constitution.  It did act on the 
assumption that the constitution, human rights and the shariah do not contradict each other.  As a 
result, the SCC is compelled to interpret the constitution in such a way that it is compatible with 
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human rights and the shariah.  These views are evident in the writings of al-Murr.  The decisions 
of the SCC on the right to private property show a similar logic.  The shariah provides a basis for 
interpreting the constitutional right to property in a particular way395.   
 After the 2013 coup, the Sisi regime began a new constitution drafting process.  In 
August 2013, the government appointed a group of ten legal experts, including judges and law 
professors, to draft a new constitution.  A larger ‘Group of Fifty,’ made up of political, religious 
and legal figures then approved the draft.  The post-coup Group of Fifty charged with drafting 
the new constitution included a handful of judges and lawyers, none of which were from the 
SCC396.  However, these numbers underestimate the influence of the SCC over the drafting 
process.  Adly Mansour, formerly chief justice of the SCC, served as interim president of Egypt 
from July 2013 until July 2014.  The SCC retained the power to review the draft constitution.  
The text of the constitution reveals the influence of the SCC on the process.  The provisions of 
the 2014 Constitution favored the judiciary, especially the SCC.  The SCC’s right to select its 
own president was included in the new constitution, as was a provision preventing the removal of 
sitting SCC judges.  The ordinary judiciary also won the power to veto legislation affecting its 
own organization397.   
The Sisi government intended to draft an expert constitution as opposed to the political 
constitution drafted by the Mursi government in 2012398.  Such a project would naturally require 
legal expertise from judges and lawyers.  However, it does not necessarily imply a major role for 
the SCC or any existing legal institution.  Yet the SCC not only played an important role in the 
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drafting process, its jurisprudence is an important part of the constitutional text.  The preamble to 
the 2014 includes a reference to the SCC: “We are drafting a Constitution that affirms that the 
principles of Islamic Sharia are the principal source of legislation, and that the reference for the 
interpretation of such principles lies in the body of the relevant Supreme Constitutional Court 
Rulings.”  Like the SCC’s review of the draft constitution, this provision poses a problem for the 
hierarchy of norms.  This provision also blocks influence from other, more radical interpretations 
of the shariah.  It preempts any role for al-Azhar in interpreting the shariah provision of the 
constitution.  The provision is also a good example of how the SCC’s role in the constitution-
drafting process can be justified.  If the shariah is a super-constitutional norm, then the SCC’s 
interpretation of the shariah is too.  As a practical matter, the SCC predates the 2014 
Constitution.   
  
Conclusion: From Activity to Formal Powers 
 
The chapter outlines the path from judicial activity to ideas about the judicial role to the 
formal status of the court after 2011.  The example of the ordinary judiciary is particularly 
instructive because lower court judges are threatened by the wrong kind of constitutional court 
just as it is protected by the right kind.  The introduction of constitutional review into the 
Egyptian legal system forced judges to consider the sources of their independence.  At the 
broadest level, the SCC’s constitutional review introduced a new conception of the Egyptian 
constitution.  By putting fundamental rights and shariah at the center of the constitution, the SCC 
promoted an interpretation of the constitution as a reflection of a higher law.  Naturally, such 
higher law could not be repealed or suspended, even if the 1971 Constitution was.  The SCC also 
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introduced a new conception of the judicial role, relations between the SCC and the ordinary 
judiciary and between the judiciary and the political branches.   
 The SCC’s activity during the transition shows the ongoing importance of these ideas.  It 
also hints at how the SCAF viewed the judiciary and its purpose in the transitional regime, and 
why the SCAF the SCC expanded formal powers. It is possible that the SCAF was influenced 
directly by normative ideas about the judicial role.  Even if it was not, these ideas still define the 
limits of the SCC’s possible activity and thus the uses that it could have for the SCAF.  The 
judicial role advocated by the SCC allowed the SCC and other courts to act as 
countermajoritarian institutions.  This activity was only possible because of the SCC’s 
development of this role.  Even seemingly radical court decisions, such as those dissolving the 
House of Representatives and the Constituent Assembly, actually had roots in the pre-
revolutionary period.  The next chapter looks at how the Ben Achour Commission and the SCAF 
designed the transitional institutions in light of ideas about the judicial role. 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 7: INSTITUTIONAL CHOICES, 2011-2014 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Introduction 
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The drafting bodies - the Ben Achour Commission in Tunisia and the Supreme Council 
of the Armed Forces (SCAF) in Egypt - faced many pressures while designing the transitional 
institutions, from the protest movement, civil society and the military for example.  However, 
ideas about the judicial role proved to be a surprisingly strong constraint on the drafting bodies’ 
decision making for two reasons.  First, conceptions of the judicial role remained stable from the 
old regime through the transition.  The judicial role includes a basic conceptual framework - 
legal positivism in Tunisia and new constitutionalism in Egypt - and a set of practices - 
administrative review by the Tunisian Administrative Tribunal and constitutional review by the 
Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court.  Both the conceptual framework and the practices were 
difficult to change.  Second, ideas about the judicial role could influence the formal powers of 
courts through several mechanisms.  In both cases, the judicial role contains a set of normative 
prescriptions about what powers courts should have and about how the broader legal system 
should be structured.  These normative ideas could influence the drafting bodies directly or 
through pressure from civil society or the protest movement.  Ideas about the judicial role also 
guide actors’ understanding of how courts are likely to act in particular circumstances.  The 
drafting bodies had to take the likely behavior of courts into consideration when designing the 
transitional institutions; formal powers can only act as a countermajoritarian mechanism if courts 
choose to exercise them.   
The formal powers of courts were determined in two turning points: the drafting of the 
transitional documents in 2011, and during political contests in 2012 and 2013.  Ideas about the 
judicial role affected the outcome at each of these turning points.  The first issue facing the 
drafting bodies after the revolutions was whether to suspend the existing constitution and how to 
draft a new constitution.  In Egypt, the SCAF opted for separate legislative, executive, 
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constituent and judicial branches while in Tunisia the Ben Achour Commission opted for a single 
Constituent National Assembly.  This first choice was not determined by the judicial role, but the 
drafting bodies still designed systems that were compatible the dominant conceptions of the 
judicial role in each country.  The transition itself offered another opportunity for both 
governments and courts to redefine the status of the judiciary.  Different actors, including the 
transitional governments and the courts, had the opportunity to redesign the formal powers of 
courts after the adoption of the original transitional documents in 2011.  In Tunisia, the National 
Dialogue renegotiated the transitional institutions in 2013, and the Administrative Tribunal 
emerged as an important political actor399.  In Egypt, both the SCAF and President Mursi issued 
constitutional decrees in 2012, and the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) issued decisions that 
re-interpreted the transitional documents400.  The courts themselves had the opportunity to 
redefine their powers through activity.  Despite changing political circumstances, underlying 
features of the judicial system remained the same. 
 I outline each of these two turning points, first in early 2011 during the drafting of the 
transitional documents and then later during the transitional period.  In each of these turning 
points, there were several proposals for the design of the formal powers of courts that were 
seriously considered but ultimately rejected by both political actors and the courts.  These 
alternative proposals were compatible with the countermajoritarian hypothesis, yet the drafting 
bodies did not select them.  I conclude that ideas about the judicial role influenced both political 
actors and courts to reject these alternatives. 
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The Assembly System and the Courts in Tunisia, 2011  
 
 Although the Ben Achour Commission was responsible for drafting Tunisia’s transitional 
document, other actors, including the transitional government and protests movements, also 
shaped the decision to adopt the Assembly system.  The transitional government and supporters 
of the old regime favored legal continuity through amendment of the 1959 constitution.  This 
plan was rejected by the Kasbah protest movement, which forced the government to convene the 
Ben Achour Commission401.  The Kasbah protesters demanded the election of a National 
Assembly followed by the drafting of a new constitution.  However, these demands did not 
completely tie the hands of the Commission.  The Commission could limit the Assembly system 
through a more comprehensive Transitional Decree, which would be enforced by the 
Administrative Tribunal or other courts.  The second alternative would be in the interest of the 
Commission, but it is at odds with the judicial role and so would likely not be enforced by the 
Tribunal.  The rejection of this alternative reveals the influence of the judicial role on the 
deliberations of the Commission. 
 
Alternative 1. Rapid presidential elections, preservation of existing institutions, and amendment 
of the constitution through existing procedures.   
 
Supporters of the old regime favored a short transition that would amend but not replace 
the 1959 Constitution.  By holding quick elections, Mohamed Ghannouchi, who was Prime 
Minister before the revolution, could be eased into the presidency.  Many judges are also 
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supporters of the old regime402.  For example, Zouheir M’dhaffar, former President of the 
Constitutional Council and former Minister of Property, supported this approach.  He stated that 
“the problem with the old regime was in its practices not in its constitution.  The procedure of 
amendment would take '15 days.'”403  In contrast he argued that “the country lost three years” 
because of the Assembly system.  This approach had obvious political advantages to supporters 
of the old regime, including judges.  Moreover, this approach seems like it should appeal 
especially to judges because it maintains legal continuity.  Courts would be more empowered by 
this option than the Assembly system.  The Constitutional Council could continue exercising 
constitutional review, and the maintenance of the 1959 Constitution would prevent any radical 
reforms that might undermine the judiciary.   Despite these considerations, the judiciary still 
accepted the Assembly system once it had been adopted.  Even M’dhaffar did not believe that 
the Assembly was illegal, only that it was politically unwise given Tunisia’s circumstances.  
Judges who remained in official positions, such as Hichem Hammi and Leila Chikhaoui, openly 
accepted the Assembly system and the decision to suspend the 1959 Constitution404.   
Judges’ acceptance of the suspension of the 1959 Constitution can be explained by the 
normative aspects of the judicial role.  Leila Chikhaoui stated as a matter of fact that “there was a 
juridic void after the repeal of the 1959 Constitution in January 2011.  Thus there was no legal 
basis for constitutional review.”  The suspension of the constitution and constitutional review 
does not mean the suspension of the rule of law.  As Mahfoudh argues, the courts must operate 
differently in the absence of a constitution, but there is nothing illegitimate about such a 
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situation405.  Tunisian judges consider the choice between the Assembly system and legal 
continuity under the 1959 Constitution to be a political question.  The hierarchy of norms places 
this decision beyond the competency of the judiciary406.   As a practical matter, the importance of 
administrative review rather than constitutional review in Tunisia made the decision to suspend 
the 1959 Constitution less threatening to the judiciary.  Constitutional hiatus would mean the 
dissolution or suspension of the Constitutional Council, but it would not affect the activity of the 
Administrative Tribunal.  The interests of the leading court in Tunisia were not at stake in the 
decision to suspend the 1959 Constitution.    
The transitional government's decision to suspend the 1959 Constitution and create the 
Assembly system was the result of pressure from the protest movement.  The judiciary was not a 
major player in this stage of the transition.  However, the influence of conceptions of the judicial 
role can still be found in this example.  The partisan affiliation and professional self-interest of 
most judges would lead them to support legal continuity and reject the Assembly system.  That 
the judges did not reject the Assembly system is an indication of the importance of their 
conception of the judicial role407.  In contrast, Egyptian judges saw legal continuity and the 
avoidance of any constitutional hiatus as essential to the judiciary as a matter of both law and 
politics408.   
The protest movement was able to ensure the creation of the Assembly system because 
the different strands of the movement agreed on the principle of the Assembly system.  However, 
there were other decisions about the transitional institutions, such as the status courts and the 
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content of the transitional decree, that the protest movement did not agree on and did not make a 
central part of their program.  As a result, the alternative discussed below - review of the 
Assembly based on an expanded transitional decree - remained a viable option even given the 
influence of the protest movement over the drafting the transitional documents. 
  
Alternative 2. Review of the Assembly based on an expanded transitional decree.   
 
The Ben Achour Commission’s Decree of March 23, 2011 made only minimal 
arrangements for the transitional institutions, the Assembly and an independent elections 
committee, the ISIE409.  The Commission could have made the Decree more detailed, perhaps by 
including a strict time limit on the Assembly, a description of the Assembly’s legislative powers, 
or a list of fundamental rights.  It could also formally empower a court to enforce these 
provisions.  Such review could be by the Constitutional Council, the Administrative Tribunal, or 
a provisional instance created for this purpose.  This approach approximates the Egyptian model 
of a detailed interim constitutional document enforced by judicial review.    
This approach was more plausible than the first approach of legal continuity and rapid 
presidential elections given the context of popular mobilization in 2011.  The Ben Achour 
Commission had broad support and no formal limits on what it could include in the transitional 
decree.  The protest movement did not emphasize the suspension of constitutional review as 
much as the creation of the Assembly system.  The factions involved in the Ben Achour 
Commission may have had difficulty agreeing on some points, but a broad statement of 
fundamental rights might have been acceptable to all sides.  As described in chapter 2, the Ben 
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Achour Commission’s interests did not overlap completely with those of the protest movement 
or the revolutionary parties.  The Commission included few Islamists, and some members of the 
Commission, including Yadh ben Achour himself, were known to be suspicious of Ennahda.  In 
this light, the Commission had an interest in restraining a future Islamist government410.  If 
formal powers of courts are a countermajoritarian instrument, the Commission should have 
empowered the Tribunal or the Constitutional Council through an expanded transitional decree. 
An expanded decree could greatly empower the Administrative Tribunal and other courts.  
Fundamental rights provisions could form the basis for the review of many different kinds of 
legislation.  Structural provisions, such as a time limit on the Assembly’s mandate or limiting the 
Assembly’s role to drafting a new constitution, could make the Tribunal an arbiter of transitional 
politics similar to the SCC in Egypt.  However, the Tribunal would be unlikely to exercise these 
formal powers because doing so would cross the line between law and politics as defined by the 
judges of the Tribunal. 
The actual case of the debate surrounding the Assembly’s mandate, which is described in 
chapter 4 of the dissertation, provides insight into the likely responses of judges to the 
hypothetical situation of an expanded Decree.  The Commission did not include a one year time 
limit on the Assembly’s mandate in the Decree, but the parties agreed upon this limit informally.  
Opposition political figures argued that this informal agreement could be enforced by the 
                                               
410 The Commission consisted of 155 members.  Thirty-six of these were drawn from political parties, 33 from civil 
society, 12 from the provinces, and 74 from other categories.  Ennahda had only three representatives in the 
Commission, the same number as the other twelve parties.  Many of the representatives may have harbored pro-
Ennahda sympathies, but the heavy representation from civil society and labor would seem to limit the influence of 
Islamists in the Commission.  In any case, the March 23 Decree was approved by a nearly unanimous vote. See 
“Liste des membres du Conseil de la Haute instance pour la réalisation des objectifs de la révolution.”  
http://www.tunisie.gov.tn/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1488&Itemid=518&lang=french 
See Chapter 2 of the dissertation. 
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Tribunal, much like a hypothetical expanded decree411.  However, legal professionals, such as 
Hichem Hammi, a current magistrate of the Tribunal, reject this argument.  Hammi instead 
argues that “the Assembly is a sovereign constituent institution that can renew its own mandate,” 
and the question of a limit on the Assembly’s mandate is “completely political”412.  To be 
legitimate in the eyes of Tunisian judges, review of the Assembly based on an expanded 
transitional decree would require a clear provision empowering the Tribunal or another court.  
The Tribunal did not reject any use of the Decree as a source of law.  The Tribunal did use the 
provisions of the Decree describing the Instance Superieure Independante pour les Elections 
(ISIE) to issue decisions blocking appointments to the ISIE by the Assembly.  Such activity is 
based on a clear legal mandate and does not require the Assembly to decide political questions.  
In contrast, the sort of legal interpretation that would be required to find a limitation on the 
Assembly’s legislative and executive powers is at odds with the positivist ideology of Tunisian 
judges.   
Judges pointed to the absence of such a provision as a reason not to rule on the 
Assembly’s mandate, but this is only the first reason413.  Even if such a provision had been 
included in the transitional decree, review of the Assembly by the Tribunal would violate the 
hierarchy of norms.  As Habib Koubaa, former Secretary of the Constitutional Council, stated, 
“Every level of legality should have its own guardian.  The [Administrative Tribunal] is the 
guardian of statutes, not of constitutionality.  Granting it a power of constitutional review would 
                                               
411 Khemais Frini. “Vers la dictature de l'Assemblée” La Presse, 5 August 2013.  
http://lapresse.tn/10122014/70903/vers-la-dictature-dassemblee.html   
On the issue of the Assembly’s mandate, https://islamuswest.org/resources_Islam_and_the_West/Yadh-Ben-
Achour-interview.pdf,  
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412 Interview with Hichem Hammi 
413 See chapter 4 of the dissertation 
244 
destroy the distinction between statute and constitution.”414  The Tribunal would be required to 
interpret what is essentially a constitution and enforce its provisions on the legislative and 
executive powers of the Assembly.  Even if the review were described as administrative review 
based on an organic law (the transitional decree) rather than constitutional review, it would still 
require a form of judicial activity unprecedented in the Tribunal’s history.  The interviewees 
were skeptical that the Tribunal would have the technical expertise for such activity, even if there 
were a clear mandate in the transitional Decree.  Zouheir M’dhaffar insist on a sharp distinction 
between the practices of constitutional and administrative review and the sort of expertise needed 
to exercise them.  In response to a question about the feasibility of constitutional review by the 
Tribunal, M’dhaffar stated, “The [Administrative Tribunal] is composed of public law judges 
with very specialized training.  They are excellent public law judges, but they lack an 
understanding of politics and the fundamental principles of the constitution.”415  As a practical 
matter, enforcing the expanded decree in a way that would actually limit the Assembly’s 
authority would involve the courts in politics.  Given the judges’ conception of the origins of 
judicial independence, involvement in politics would pose a danger to the Tribunal as an 
institution416.  The Commission would know that the Tribunal would likely not make extensive 
use of an expanded decree.  Political party representatives also expressed skepticism about the 
potential for judicial activism by either the Council or the Tribunal, often in the same terms used 
by legal professionals.  For Nidaa Tounes representative Fatma Bouraoui, the Constitutional 
Council “was a consultative institution.  The Constitutional Council was not capable of 
exercising a power of constitutional review during the transition.”  Bouraoui’s position is an 
                                               
414 Interview with Habib Koubaa 
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416 See chapter 4 of the dissertation 
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example of the second mechanism: ideas about the judicial role inform political authorities’ 
expectations about the future behavior of courts. 
 
  
Strategies to Maintain Constitutional Review within the Tunisian Assembly System, 2012-
2014 
 
 Even after the election of the National Assembly on October 23, 2011, several options 
remained open for courts to claim additional powers.  First, the Administrative Tribunal could 
use international human rights treaties to review legislation passed by the Assembly.  Second, the 
Administrative Tribunal could argue that the 1959 Constitution remained a valid source of law 
even after its suspension by the Ben Achour Commission.  In fact, the courts did not claim 
additional powers after the establishment of the Assembly.  From a political standpoint, such an 
outcome is unexpected because the balance of power among the different political factions 
changed drastically from 2011 to 2013, giving the courts an opportunity to claim additional 
powers.  Ideas about the judicial role, particularly fears about the politicization of the judiciary, 
prevented such an expansion of judicial power during the transition.  The behavior of the 
judiciary during this period is an example of how ideas about the judicial role can shape the 
actions of judges directly, which in turn shapes the formal powers exercised by courts. 
 
Alternative 1. Review of legislation on the basis of fundamental rights found in international 
treaties.   
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 Review based on international treaties seems to be compatible with the judicial role and 
seems to set the stage for a major expansion of judicial powers.  In the absence of a constitution, 
as in the period from 2011 to 2014, the Administrative Tribunal is empowered to review the 
hierarchy of norms up to the treaty level.  As a purely legal matter, the use of international 
treaties as a source of law superior to legislation is not controversial among Tunisian judges.  In 
the hierarchy of norms, treaties are above legislation417.  Tunisia is party to a number of 
international human rights treaties, including the United Nations Charter of Human Rights and 
the Convention of the International Labour Organization.  As a result, even without being 
granted additional powers, the Tribunal could decide to make greater use of international treaties 
to block the application of laws passed by the Assembly418.   
The Tribunal would exercise this power through review by exception.  Through review 
by exception, the Tribunal can block the application of laws in particular cases if the laws are 
found to be contrary to the constitution or international treaties.  Hammi describes this process in 
a situation where a constitution is in force: “The [Administrative Tribunal] bases its decisions on 
the hierarchy of laws, with the constitution at the top.  If a law contradicts the constitution, the 
Tribunal will make its decision based on the constitution and ignore the law.  It cannot overturn 
the law.”419 Review based on international treaties would also occur through the mechanism of 
                                               
417 Hammi and Koubaa cite the hierarchy of norms as an important principle of the Tribunal’s activities.  Interviews 
with Hammi and Koubaa.  The relationship between international treaties and the constitution in the hierarchy of 
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question by giving international treaties an “infra-constitutional status.”  Treaties are considered a source of law on 
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transitional decrees.  “Constitution of Tunisia, 1959,” 
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review by exception.  Through this procedure, the Tribunal could claim a power of review based 
on international treaties without simultaneously claiming a power to rewrite the transitional 
documents or a broader power of constitutional review.  As a result, review based on treaties 
would be less threatening to the Assembly than other methods of review by the Tribunal.   
Courts did make limited use of international treaties during the transition420.  However, 
the Tribunal never used an international treaty to block the application of a statute, and this 
power remained of little political importance.  Two factors limit the potential for an expansion of 
judicial power on the basis of international treaties.  First, these treaties would be of limited use 
to courts in deciding the major political issues of the transition without an expansive 
interpretation by courts.  The international treaties that Tunisia had signed dealt with human 
rights.  As a result, they were less useful in deciding issues of structural constitutional law.  The 
most important questions of the transition - the mandate of the Assembly, elections, and the 
reform of state institutions - were structural issues, not fundamental rights issues.  It would 
require creative reasoning by a court to apply international human rights norms to such cases.  
The interpretation necessary to apply treaties to cases that are not strictly about human rights 
would is at odds with the legal positivist methodology of legal interpretation.  The Tribunal 
could have blocked legislation on the basis of international treaties, but such a scenario never 
arose.  The provisions of these treaties on the rights of women is particularly important because 
it could be used to block changes to the Personal Status Code421.   
Second, the desire to avoid political entanglements would prevent the Tribunal from 
using this power422.  Although Tunisian courts accept that treaties are a source of law superior to 
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http://www.lapresse.tn/20012015/75116/le-tribunal-administratif-juge-constitutionnel.html  
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statutes, extensive use of international treaty runs into a different objection from the judicial role.  
The judicial role states that the courts should not exercise legislative or constituent powers or any 
powers not delegated to them by the constituent power, and that the courts should not involve 
themselves in political disputes that might undermine their independence.  The key criterion is 
whether such a decision would divide the judges of the Tribunal. 
Third, the Tribunal’s established practice of administrative review resolved many of the 
rights issues addressed by international rights treaties.  As discussed in chapter 4 of the 
dissertation, the years following the revolution saw a surge of legal activism focused on the 
Tribunal.  The decisions of the Tribunal were based on statutes, not on international treaties.  
Tunisia’s existing laws were adequate for these cases.  As Mohamed Bennour put it, “the 
problem that the [Tribunal] faced in the Ben Ali period was the non-execution of its judgments 
by the executive.”423  Tunisian law guaranteed fundamental rights even in the Bena Ali period, 
even if the government did not always respect these laws.  Through administrative review, the 
Tribunal could achieve its goals without a confrontation with the Assembly or the introduction of 
a new source of law.   
On the question of constitutional review, the power of courts was limited by what formal 
powers the Commission chose to give to courts.  However, on the question of review by 
international treaties, the Tribunal had broad scope to determine its own powers.  That it did not 
claim such powers undermines the assumption of the countermajoritarian hypothesis that courts 
will check political authorities if they are granted the formal powers necessary to do so.   
 
Alternative 2. Revival of the 1959 constitution as a source of law for judicial decisions.   
 
                                               
423 Interview with Mohamed Bennour 
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The Ben Achour Commission’s March 23, 2011 Decree suspended the 1959 Constitution 
and dissolved most of the institutions described in the 1959 Constitution, including the 
parliament, the presidency and the Constitutional Council.  The Assembly had the power to issue 
organic laws describing the transitional institutions, such as the December 16, 2011 organic 
law424.  These organic laws supplanted the 1959 Constitution as the law governing state 
institutions.    
The Tribunal or another court could have used the 1959 constitution as a source of law 
despite the suspension of the Constitution by the Ben Achour Commission425.  President 
Mechichi of the Administrative Tribunal claimed this power in the Tribunal’s November 7, 2013 
statement426.  The 1959 Constitution could provide the basis for courts to rule against the 
government on a range of issues.  The claim by the Administrative Tribunal to act as the final 
interpreter of the constitution would also mark an expansion of judicial powers, but the extent of 
these powers depends on the approach that the Tribunal takes to the 1959 Constitution427.   
 From one perspective, the legal effect of the 1959 Constitution would be limited.  The 
structural provisions of the 1959 Constitution had been suspended through the dissolution of the 
presidency, the parliament and the Constitutional Council in 2011.  If read simply as a source of 
fundamental rights, the text of the 1959 Constitution would have little to add to the Tribunal’s 
decisions.  The rights guarantees of the 1959 Constitution would add little to the protections 
already available to the Tribunal through international treaties.  Even this limited approach to the 
1959 Constitution has the same problems as review of the Assembly based on international 
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treaties.  Such review would involve the Tribunal or other courts in politics.  It would go beyond 
the technical competence of the judges.  As Leila Chikhaoui put it “before the adoption of the 
new constitution [in January 2014], the ‘review’ of the Assembly was a political question, not a 
legal question.  Civil society exercised such ‘review’ through organizations such as Bawsala, 
which examined and publicized the activities of the Assembly.”428  Such activity is more suited 
to civil society than to the courts. 
Review based on the 1959 Constitution raises further problems.  Positivist doctrine limits 
the Tribunal’s sources of law to the constitutional text and positive legislation.   Just as 
legislation is produced by the legislative power, the constitution is produced by the constituent 
power.  Courts should have no role in either process.  As described above, the use of the 1959 
Constitution as a source of law would entail the exercise of a constituent power by the Tribunal 
because the Tribunal would itself define what counts as the interim constitution.  The courts 
would have to decide between two legal and political models - the Assembly system or some 
form of legal continuity based on the 1959 Constitution.  Furthermore, the establishment of the 
Assembly system contradicts the procedures of the 1959 Constitution, which contains no 
provision for the establishment of a National Constituent Assembly or the drafting of a new 
constitution429.  There is no way to compromise between legal continuity and the Assembly 
system.  This is a decision that could not possibly be based on any form of positive law.  
 The Tribunal’s behavior during the summer 2013 crisis, when the Arrahil movement tried 
to dissolve the Assembly, shows why the Tribunal was suspicious of any use of the 1959 
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Constitution during the transition430.  During the summer of 2013, the Arrahil protests movement 
demanded the dissolution of the Assembly.  One way to achieve this goal was to have the 
Tribunal to either dissolve the Assembly or at least issue a decision that would force the 
Assembly and the Troika government to make concessions431.  The political environment 
favored dissolving the Assembly.  Dissolving the Assembly was politically risky, but it was 
supported by much of the opposition, including the Nidaa Tounes party, which would win the 
2014 elections.  It was legal considerations that prevented the Tribunal from doing so.  The 
Tribunal could have used the 1959 Constitution to overturn the transitional Decree.  On the other 
hand, dissolving the Assembly would require the problematic legal reasoning described above.  
If the Tribunal claimed that the 1959 Constitution remained in effect, it would implicitly 
overturn the actions of the Ben Achour Commission that had suspended the Constitution.  Such a 
claim would make the Tribunal the real source of the transitional constitution.  The example of 
the 2013 crisis shows how far the Tribunal would have to push its jurisprudence to justify 
dissolving the Assembly432.   
  
 
The Convention System and Interim Constitutional Review in Egypt, 2011 
 
 The SCAF took sole responsibility for drafting the 2011 Constitutional Declaration.  
However, the military’s original decision to convene the SCAF and suspend the 1971 
Constitution was the result of pressure from the protestors.  The provisions of the Declaration 
                                               
430 See chapter 4 of the dissertation. 
431 “Le sit-in Arrahil se poursuivra jusqu’au départ du gouvernement” La Presse, 23 August 2013. 
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were also shaped by the political pressures of the revolutionary environment.  As a result, the 
SCAF’s Declaration did not maximize the powers of the military, although it did not handover 
power completely to the elected government either.  Two alternatives existed which would have 
expanded the powers of the military in the transition while marginalizing the courts.  First, the 
SCAF could rule directly during the transitional period.  Second, the SCAF could have reduced 
the formal powers of courts by limiting the SCC’s mandate to structural constitutional issues, by 
not granting the SCC a power of a priori review of electoral laws, or by creating a non-judicial 
elections agency.  The SCAF did not choose these alternatives because doing so would provoke 
opposition from the protest movement.  The SCAF chose to give powers to the courts that the 
opposition would consider acceptable.  The boundaries of acceptable powers for the courts is 
evidence of the influence of ideas about the judicial role on the thinking of the SCAF and the 
protest movement. 
 
Alternative 1. Direct rule by the military   
 
The first question of the transition was how and when to draft a new constitution and hold 
elections.  The Muslim Brotherhood and the protest movement favored early legislative and 
presidential elections followed by the drafting of a new constitution433.  Supporters of the 
military suggested that the military should govern the country during the transition and appoint a 
committee of experts to draft a constitution before the elections434.  The SCAF’s Constitutional 
Declaration is a plan for the first option of early elections followed by constitution drafting.  If 
the military had instead chosen the second option, the transition would have unfolded very 
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differently from the beginning, and courts would have very different powers.  In the absence of a 
constitution, the SCAF would effectively replace the SCC as the arbiter of constitutional 
questions.  There would be no structural constitutional cases or election cases to decide because 
state institutions would be suspended.    
 Judges were divided on the question of direct rule by the SCAF.  SCC justice Tahany 
Gebali supported a constitution drafting process controlled directly by the military435.  This 
stance assumes that the military would allow the SCC to maintain its status under a new 
constitution.  Gebali’s position draws on the judiciary’s longstanding respect for acts of 
sovereignty, or more broadly what Rutherford would label the statist tradition in Egyptian law436.  
However, Gebali later repudiated this position, which is evidence of how unpopular it was.  The 
SCC had spent much of its history establishing itself as the guardian of fundamental rights.  The 
suspension of constitutional review, even for a short period would undermine the claim that the 
SCC was the guardian of universal rights.  The suspension of the constitution would assert a 
positivist view of law that the SCC had worked against for decades. 
The protest movement was opposed to this option for political reasons, but the SCAF’s 
choice to concede this point depends on the judicial role.  The prevalence of ideas about the 
judicial role gave the military another option.  The military might have overruled the protest 
movement, or acquiesced fully to its demands, but interim constitutional review by the SCC gave 
it another option: a relatively long transitional period under judicial supervision.  This option 
allowed the SCAF to placate the protest movement’s demands while also keeping the judiciary 
as a check on any elected government.  The SCAF was aware that the role played by the SCC 
under Mubarak was compatible with interim constitutional review.  The SCAF could be 
                                               
435 David D. Kirkpatrick. “Judge Helped Egypt’s Military to Cement Power,” New York Times, 3 July 2013. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/04/world/middleeast/judge-helped-egypts-military-to-cement-power.html?_r=0 
436 Rutherford (2008) 
254 
confident that the SCC would use the powers given to it by the Decree.  If Egypt had an 
apolitical judiciary and a narrow conception of the judicial role, the protest movement would not 
consider the maintenance of judicial review a concession, and the SCAF could not count on the 
courts to use the powers granted by the Decree.  
 
Alternative 2. Limitation of the SCC's powers: Elections   
 
 The SCC and the broader Egyptian judiciary have an unusual set of formal powers 
compared to courts in other countries.  The SCC has the power to review draft electoral laws.  
Constitutional courts exercising a posteriori review like the SCC usually do not have an 
additional power of a priori review437.  The ordinary judiciary must supervise elections and 
certify their results.  Most countries have an independent non-judicial electoral commission to 
supervise elections.  The SCAF’s Constitutional Proclamation confirmed this set of powers.  
This decision is surprising because the military might oppose the courts’ influence over the 
electoral process, which had created problems for the Mubarak regime in 2005.  Elections and 
electoral laws were likely to be over even greater importance as Egypt embarked on a democratic 
transition.  In practice, many of the most important decisions of the transition were based on this 
power, including the decisions dissolving the House of Representatives and the Constituent 
Assembly. 
 The SCAF could have removed the courts’ power over elections.  It could have removed 
the SCC’s power of a priori review of electoral laws from the Constitutional Proclamation.  It 
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could also have removed the provision requiring the ordinary judiciary to supervise elections, 
and created an independent non-judicial elections agency instead.  These moves would have 
brought Egypt in line with international models.  Tunisia adopted this approach by creating the 
ISIE, and it is much more common internationally than Egypt’s model of direct judicial 
supervision of elections and electoral laws438.  In addition to conforming to the international 
model, these moves would also have insulted the judiciary from contentious political issues 
surrounding elections.  The requirement that judges supervise elections made possible the 
confrontation between Mursi and the judiciary over the supervision of the 2012 constitutional 
referendum.  The main advantage of a priori review of electoral laws was to protect the 
parliament and the Constituent Assembly from dissolution by court order, as happened during 
the Mubarak era.  However, this power actually caused the courts to dissolve both the House of 
Representatives and the Constituent Assembly439.  Given these problems, it is surprising that the 
SCAF did not remove the judiciary’s special powers to regulate elections. 
This outcome is a result of the judiciary’s history of regulating elections in Egypt.  A 
priori review of electoral laws is separate from the issue of transforming all of the SCC’s activity 
to a priori review.  A priori review of electoral laws had been included in the 1971 Constitution 
as well440.  The SCC’s power of a priori review of electoral laws is part of the judiciary’s role in 
supervising elections.  The SCC’s decisions dissolving the parliament during the Mubarak era 
indicate a longer history of the judiciary’s power to rule on the legitimacy of elected institutions.  
The judiciary claimed the power to supervise elections as the result of disputes over the 2000 and 
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2005 elections.  The 2005 elections were the most competitive elections since the Free Officers’ 
coup in 1952.  The involvement of the judiciary was essential to the relative success of the 
opposition in these elections.  Because of this history, a broad range of actors, including civil 
society, the Muslim Brotherhood, the judiciary and the SCAF, agreed on the principle of judicial 
supervision of elections441.   
 
Possible Limitations on Constitutional Review in Egypt, 2012-2013 
 
The SCAF made several decisions in the Constitutional Declaration: separate branches, 
early elections followed by the drafting of a new constitution, electoral supervision by the 
judiciary, and interim constitutional review by the SCC.  However, these provisions could still be 
altered.  The SCAF retained the right to issue amendments to the Constitutional Decree.  It did 
issues such an amendment in June 2012, following the election of Mursi to the presidency.  
Mursi claimed a similar power with his Constitutional Decrees of August and November 2012.  
The SCC could reinterpret the Constitutional Decree through its decisions.  These reforms were 
steps toward two alternative models for the transitional institutions: constitutional hiatus with full 
legislative and constituent powers exercised by the president, and frequent intervention in 
transitional politics through constitutional decrees issued by the SCAF.  Through its own power 
to issue constitutional decrees, the SCAF could also have limited the scope of the SCC’s power 
of constitutional review, even in the context legal continuity and the Convention system.  Even 
in Egypt, courts need not be the final interpreters of the constitution.  These events show that a 
constitutional hiatus could exist in the Egyptian system as well.  However, considerations of the 
judicial role prevented both of these models from taking hold.  The judges resisted Mursi’s 
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decrees, and the SCAF was careful not to push its decree powers beyond what the judiciary 
would accept. 
 
Alternative 1. Constitutional hiatus and Mursi's Constitutional Decrees.   
 
 President Mursi’s Constitutional Decrees revived the possibility of a constitutional hiatus, 
which the SCAF had rejected in 2011.  Mursi issued two Constitutional Decrees, first in August 
2012 and again on November 22, 2012442.  The August Decree gave Mursi the power to appoint 
a new Constituent Assembly if the current Assembly was unable to complete the draft 
constitution.  The November Decree insulated the Constituent Assembly and the president’s own 
decrees and actions from judicial review.  Mursi’s Decrees are an example of executive 
intervention in the process of constitution drafting and in the design of the transitional 
institutions.  From August 2012 to December 2012, Mursi tilted the balance of power among the 
transitional institutions toward the presidency, an outcome that was at odds with the SCAF’s 
original plans as described in its Constitutional Declaration.  The Decrees hint at a political and 
legal theory to justify these changes.  In issuing the November 2012 Constitutional Decree, 
Mursi asserted that the transitional situation made constitutional review illegitimate443.  During 
this hiatus, the executive can act without any judicial review and it can issue its own 
constitutional decrees, which are authoritative interpretations of the transitional constitution.  
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The Constituent Assembly should be able to draft a new constitution without interference from 
the SCC.   
The Decrees produced a sharp reaction from the judiciary.  The ordinary judiciary 
organized protests and threatened to boycott the constitutional referendum.  In December 2012, 
the SCC briefly suspended its meetings in protest of Mursi’s Decree and the actions of Islamists 
demonstrators, who had surrounded the court building444.  There are several reasons for this 
response.  The Decrees concentrated power in the hands of the president.  The Egyptian military 
and judiciary denounced Mursi’s decree as an attack on Egyptian constitutionalism.  The Decrees 
removed any means for the courts to intervene in transitional politics.  The Decrees also asserted 
Mursi’s power to redesign the transitional institutions, posing a further threat to the courts.  As a 
result, the SCC and the ordinary judiciary vehemently opposed Mursi’s Decrees, especially the 
November Decree.   
The Egyptian judiciary’s response is more puzzling when compared with the Tunisian 
example.  The Tunisian Assembly system represents a much more far-reaching version of the 
system outlined in Mursi’s decree, that is the drafting of the new constitution by elected 
authorities without judicial oversight.  The Decree seems less threatening to minorities and 
established institutions than the open-ended constitutional hiatus in Tunisia.  From a purely 
political standpoint, the judiciary’s opposition to the Decrees seems like an overreaction.  The 
judicial role can help explain the thinking of the judiciary. 
 Given the conflicts between Mursi and the courts, it is surprising how quickly the crisis 
was resolved and how many concessions the judiciary was willing to make to Mursi.  By 
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December 2012, the judiciary agreed to supervise the constitutional referendum, and the draft 
Constitution was adopted.  Both of the Decrees state that they would expire upon the adoption of 
a permanent constitution.  The November Decree was only in effect for several weeks before the 
new constitution was adopted.  However, the judiciary ultimately accepted the 2012 
Constitution.  The SCC accepted the new Constitution as a valid source of law in its decisions 
from the first half of 2013445.   
 The judiciary’s truce with the Mursi government following the 2012 crisis requires some 
explanation.  The judiciary’s objections came down to two legal issues: the retroactive 
annulment of past legal decisions, and the possibility of a constitutional hiatus.  Both of Mursi’s 
Constitutional Decrees were intended to overturn past judicial decisions and to insulate the 
government from future judicial decisions.  Article 3 of the August 2012 Constitutional Decree 
reads, 
 
If the Constituent Assembly [tasked with drafting a new constitution] is prevented from doing its 
duties, the president can draw up a new assembly representing the full spectrum of Egyptian 
society mandated with drafting a new national charter within three months of the assembly's 
formation. The new draft constitution is to be put before a nationwide referendum within 30 days 
after it is written. Parliamentary elections are to be held within two months of the public’s 
approval of the draft constitution.446 
 
 
The phrase “prevented from doing its duties” likely refers to the possibility of dissolution 
of the Constituent Assembly by a judicial decision.  This approach limits the powers of the 
judiciary, but it also poses problems for the judicial role.  The judiciary accepts the authority of 
the constituent power to make constitutional rules.  It even accepts a super-constitutional or 
extra-constitutional power of the presidency and the military to commit sovereign acts.  
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However, the August 2012 Decree goes further.  The Decrees decide particular issues, in some 
cases reversing decisions already issued by the courts, rather than just listing constitutional rules.  
The Decrees suspend all judicial review of certain subjects.    
The November 2012 Decree amplifies these problems.  Article 5 of the November 2012 
Constitutional Decree read, “No judicial body can dissolve the Shura Council [upper house of 
parliament] or the Constituent Assembly.”447  Article 2 of the November 2012 Constitutional 
Decree reads, 
 
Previous constitutional declarations, laws, and decrees made by the president since he took office 
on 30 June 2012, until the constitution is approved and a new People’s Assembly [lower house 
of parliament] is elected, are final and binding and cannot be appealed by any way or to any 
entity. Nor shall they be suspended or canceled and all lawsuits related to them and brought 
before any judicial body against these decisions are annulled.  
 
 
Both of the articles limit judicial review.  Article 2 of the Decree also annuls past judicial 
decisions retroactively.   
 In the end, the judiciary seemed to give Mursi everything he demanded in the Decrees.  
The ordinary judiciary agreed to supervise the constitutional referendum.  The SCC accepted the 
2012 Constitution as a source of law.  However, the judiciary’s main objection was to suspension 
of judicial review and the retroactive cancellation of previous judicial decisions and the SCAF’s 
amendments to the Constitutional Proclamation.  Mursi yielded on these points, allowing the 
compromise to proceed.  This resolution to the crisis shows that the judiciary’s objections were 
about defending the judiciary’s idea of how the legal system should work as maintaining a 
balance of power between the judiciary and other actors.  The judiciary sided with its political 
adversary, the Mursi government, but defended the principle of legal continuity threatened by 
Mursi’s decrees. 
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Alternative 2. Extensive Amendments to the Constitutional Proclamation by the SCAF 
 
 The SCAF always retained the power to issue amendments to the Constitutional 
Proclamation.  The SCAF did use this power once during the transition.  It issued amendments to 
the Proclamation on June 2012, immediately following the election of Muhammad Mursi448.  
The SCAF’s June 2012 amendment increased the powers of the SCC, but the extended use of 
amendments or constitutional decree powers by the SCAF would undermine the status of the 
SCC, especially if the SCAF used these decrees to decide particular issues that arise during the 
transition rather than establishing general rules.  The SCAF could have used such amendments to 
decide some the issues that were addressed by the SCC’s rulings, such as the validity of the 
election of the House of Representatives and the Constituent Assembly.  Such an action would 
produce the same result, but it would make courts irrelevant to transitional politics.   
 At first glance, the SCAF’s June 2012 amendment seems similar to Mursi’s November 
2012 Decree.  Both of these documents were a unilateral claim on the power to redesign the 
transitional institutions, yet the judiciary accepted the SCAF’s Decree and opposed Mursi’s 
Decree.  The judiciary’s different responses to these decrees suggests a political explanation: the 
judges accepted the SCAF’s amendment but resisted Mursi’s Decree because they supported the 
military against the Muslim Brotherhood.  It also suggests a similar explanation based on the 
judiciary’s self-interest: the SCAF’s amendment increased the powers of the SCC, while Mursi’s 
Decree suspended judicial review.  The SCAF’s amendment also posed a danger to the courts 
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because it showed that the SCAF could change the interim constitution - the guarantor of judicial 
independence and the basis for all of the SCC’s decisions - at will.  
Still, the judicial role can explain why the judiciary responded differently to the decrees 
issued by the SCAF and Mursi.  The SCAF’s constituent power represents the ultimate veto of 
the military over the courts and any civilian government.  However, the SCAF’s Constitutional 
Proclamation and the June 2012 amendment were also a delegation of power by the military and 
a promise by the military to not intervene directly in politics.  As long as the SCAF limited its 
activity to occasional constitutional decrees, it did not threaten the existing legislative, executive 
and judicial institutions.  The Egyptian courts accept the exceptional use of the constituent power 
by the military, just as it accepts emergency rule, military courts and acts of sovereignty under 
Mubarak.  The SCC’s pre-2011 decisions include a well-developed definition of acts of 
sovereignty that leaves broad areas open to discretion by the executive and the military.  As long 
as these acts can be justified as exceptional, they are acceptable to the SCC449.  In theory the 
SCAF’s constituent decree power could be used to usurp the power of the courts, but in practice 
the SCAF’s decrees lef the basis of the court’s power intact.  The SCAF’s amendment left in 
place a list of fundamental rights protections and the mechanism of judicial review.  The SCAF’s 
amendment also did not decide a particular issue, but rather established a set of general 
principles for the courts to interpret and apply.  As a result, the amendment did not usurp the 
SCC’s role as an arbiter of constitutional cases.  In contrast, Mursi’s Constitutional Decree did 
address a particular case - the question of whether the Constituent Assembly could be dissolved 
by court order - and it blocked any further judicial decisions on this issue. 
 
Conclusion 
                                               
449 Brown (2006), Moustafa (2007) describe the SCC’s conception of acts of sovereignty.   
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 Ideas about the judicial role influenced the outcome of each of the turning points of the 
transition, including the drafting of the transitional documents in 2011 and later conflicts about 
the design of the transitional institutions in 2012 and 2013.  Ideas about the judicial role 
remained relatively stable throughout the transition, even as other actors radically redefined their 
own roles450.  The judicial role could influence the design of the transitional institutions through 
several mechanisms.  Numerous actors - judges, political parties, protestors, and the drafting 
bodies themselves - might accept these ideas as normatively valid.  Judges also saw these ideas 
as crucial to protecting their independence.  These actors could pressure the drafting bodies.  
During the later phase of the transition, these actors interpreted the formal powers in light of 
ideas about the judicial role.  These ideas describe the likely behavior of courts.  The drafting 
bodies could give the courts additional powers, but they could not force the courts to exercise 
these powers.   
Ideas about the judicial role acted as a real constraint on decision-makers.  This constraint 
trumped other considerations in both countries, including those posited by the alternative 
hypotheses.  The drafting bodies could not assign powers arbitrarily as suggested by the 
countermajoritarian hypothesis.  They chose from among several models, and even this choice 
was constrained by considerations of the judicial role. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
450 The Egyptian military avoided governing directly for decades before 2011.  The creation of the SCAF and the 
2013 coup broke with this tradition.  Tunisia created a highly parliamentary system during the transition and in the 
2014 constitution, which broke with a tradition of presidentialism going back to independence. 
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CONCLUSION:CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS, DEMOCRACY, AND 
AUTHORITARIANISM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
  
The dissertation has concluded that ideas about the judicial role account for the formal 
powers assigned to courts in the Tunisian and Egyptian transitions.  The chapters trace a two step 
process leading to this outcome.  Judicial activity before 2011 led to a set of ideas about the 
judicial role.  During the transitions, these ideas shaped the formal powers that the drafting 
bodies and transitional governments gave to the courts.  These ideas include a set of norms about 
how courts should act as well as a set of causal beliefs about how courts will act. 
Beyond the Egyptian and Tunisian cases, the dissertation has made three broader 
contributions.  First, it suggests a general theory of judicial power as the result of ideas about the 
judicial role.  Second, it suggests some general conclusions about the role of courts in 
democratization.  Third, the theory of judicial power explains the expansion of the formal powers 
of constitutional courts in several Arab Spring cases.    
 
1. Ideas, the Judicial Role and Judicial Power 
 
 The finding of the dissertation suggests a general approach to the study of judicial power.  
The approach emphasizes the two step process and the role of both ideas and legal practice.  The 
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chapters show how this two step process played out in Tunisia and Egypt, and they suggest that 
this same process could be at work in other cases.  This approach also has advantages in terms of 
methodology because it can distinguish between ideas as a justification or facade for political 
interests and ideas as a causal variable. 
 
From Judicial Practices to Ideas to Formal Powers 
 
 The dissertation addresses a classic question: is law an autonomous field or is it simply a 
tool of the powerful?451  The dissertation argues against the view that law is simply a tool, which 
appears in the countermajoritarian hypothesis.  In Egypt and Tunisia, the SCAF and the Ben 
Achour Commission could not design the courts however they wanted.  They were constrained 
by characteristics of the legal system itself.  Implicit in this argument is the notion that the 
ideational content of the law - norms, legal ideology, and expertise - has some impact on 
outcomes.  The dissertation favors this argument as well.  The question is how ideas come into 
being and how they have an impact on outcomes such as the content of laws and the design of 
legal institutions.   
Watson answers this question by arguing that legal change is almost always the result of 
intellectual activity by legal professionals, not political activity by rulers, and legal change is 
almost always the result of borrowing or transplantation from other legal systems, rather than 
government-led reform of the domestic legal system452.  The conclusion of the dissertation has 
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much in common with Watson’s legal transplant perspective.  The activity of legal professionals 
is essential to the creation of the judicial role, just as it is essential to the diffusion of legal 
transplants.  In both perspectives, law and judicial institutions are not simply the products of 
political authorities.  However, the dissertation expands the focus to include domestic politics453.  
The SCC is the result of the diffusion of the German model of constitutional review, and the 
Tunisian Constitutional Council is the result of the diffusion of the French model, but a broader 
set of actors beyond legal professionals must come to endorse ideas about the judicial role if 
these models can influence politics.  In Egypt, the SCC won over Islamists, secular civil society 
and the ordinary judiciary through its activity.  If the ideas about the judicial role had simply 
remained among an elite of legal professionals, the SCC and the practice of constitutional review 
may not have survived Egypt’s transition.  In Tunisia, the low level of activity by the 
Constitutional Council did not create a comparable level of support for constitutional review.  
Instead, the Administrative Tribunal’s apolitical administrative review proved more effective. 
This perspective has the advantage of addressing the unique characteristics of transitional 
periods.  Explanations such as the The diffusion of legal models and the interests of powerful 
actors can account for a lot of the variation in ordinary times454.  Transitions throw both of these 
explanations into doubt.  Institutions that were founded on a particular international model may 
play a very different role in transitions.  Powerful actors may no longer be able to shape the legal 
system.  Schmitter and O’Donnell consider transitions to be indeterminate periods in which the 
                                                                                                                                                       
sovereign political authority, but it also argues that a broader set of political actors, including civil society, political 
parties, and ordinary judges, influence the form that an international model takes in a particular national context.   
453 Hilbink (2012) argues that the hierarchical structure of the Chilean judiciary made it less susceptible to the new 
constitutionalism than the Spanish judiciary. 
454 Versteeg (2014) notes that the fundamental rights included in constitutions have converged on a single 
international model.  However, Ginsburg and Versteeg (2014) note that important differences remain among the 
powers given to constitutional courts.  
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voluntarist actions of can sway the outcome455.  With regard to the courts, this characterization is 
two extreme.  Of course, institutions do not remain unchanged during periods of political 
upheaval, but by focusing on the two steps, the hypothesis can suggest how the courts will 
respond to the transition. 
 
Ideas and Causation 
  
 The two step process addresses a methodological problem common to ideational 
explanations.  Goldstein and Keohane argue that an ideational model can be tested against the 
predictions of non-ideational model456.  Even if there is a difference between the predictions of 
these two models, the ideas might still be created to justify political interests.  If this is the case, 
ideas cannot be said to have a causal effect on political outcomes.  The connection between 
judicial practices and the judicial role addresses some of the common problems in ideational 
explanations.  If ideas can be shown to be the result of historical practices, then they are not 
simply a response to changing political circumstances.  In the cases, the choice of institutional 
model for the constitutional court is the result of contingent factors.  However, this choice led to 
a different form of judicial activity, which in turn produced different ideas about the judicial role.  
This history shows that ideas about the judicial role are stable before and after the revolution, 
even as political circumstances changed.   
 The cases also show the independence of ideas from political authorities.  The transitions 
saw the activation of ideas that previously had limited political importance or the use of ideas for 
new ends.  The Egyptian regime created the SCC, but it could have foreseen the influence of the 
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SCC’s practices on ideas about the judicial role or the influence of these ideas on the judiciary 
after 2011.  The activist role of the Egyptian judiciary was a problem for the Mubarak regime, 
but helped the military during the transition457.  The conclusion of the dissertation confirms the 
autonomy of law from political authority.  However, the two step process also shows the 
enduring influence of the authoritarian regime over the judiciary.  This legacy has implications 
for the process of democratization, which are examined below. 
 
2. Constitutionalism, Liberalization and Revolution 
 
Revolutions and Transitions 
 
The Arab Spring of 2011 showed that popular revolution remained a real possibility in 
the modern world.  The transitions literature did not reject the possibility of revolution but it did 
theorize a path to democratization that did not lead through revolution.  The elite pacts of 
Schmitter, O'Donnell and Whitehead and the ‘revolution according to legality at all steps’ of 
Arato fall into this category458. This approach has several implications for the process of 
democratization.  A lengthy process of liberalization could ease the eventual transition to 
democracy.  A country could have democratization and the rule of law at the same time.  
Democratization could be separated from the process of constitution drafting459. 
The transitions literature reflects a desire to avoid the practical and theoretical problems 
of revolution.  Early work on democratization left few options for countries not favored by 
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historical circumstances.  In part, this view reflects the small number of consolidated 
democracies before the middle of the twentieth century.  The civic culture approach emphasized 
the long term development of attitudes compatible with democracy in some societies460.  The 
organic path to democracy followed by countries such as Britain required centuries of benign 
political development.  Revolution was the only alternative path to democracy, but it posed 
theoretical and practical problems.  Theoretical issues center on the problem of creating a break 
with the old regime and institutionalizing a new regime without losing legitimacy.  The main 
practical problem is the possibility of violence that accompanies any revolution.  For Hannah 
Arendt, most democratic revolutions would be doomed to descend into terror, like the French 
Revolution.  The success of democratic revolution in America is exceptional, the result of strong 
local institutions461.  The success of democracy in post-war Europe and the third wave of 
democratization across the developing world allayed these fears.  By the 1990’s, observers 
would ask whether a new case of democratization, such as the Eastern European and South 
African cases, could fit in the transitions paradigm?  If not, the alternative was full revolution, 
civil war or a return to authoritarianism462. 
Several features of the Tunisian and Egyptian cases do not match the transitions 
paradigm and resemble the classic conception of revolution.  The 2011 revolutions brought down 
the dictators with remarkable speed.  Tunisia and Egypt had been liberalizing for decades, but 
there was no discernible authoritarian opening in the years and months before the uprisings.  
Moreover, the process of liberalization initiated by the Ben Ali and Mubarak regimes, of which 
the courts were a key part, did not necessarily help democratization.  Just because the courts 
were an agent of liberalization during the Mubarak era did not mean that they would be agents of 
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democratization after 2011.  In both countries, revolutionaries demanded the drafting of a new 
constitution.  They believed that democratization required constitutional change in the full sense, 
not just constitutional amendment or an elite pact463.  As a result of these characteristics, Tunisia 
and Egypt ended up with the classic revolutionary problem: in order to democratize, these 
countries had to suspend the constitutional order.  In both countries, this process unsettled state 
institutions far more than amendment of the existing constitution could have.   
 
The Problem of Authoritarian Constitutionalism 
 
As Moustafa argues, the protesters’ focus on constitution drafting is the result of 
characteristics of the old regime, which I label constitutional authoritarianism.464  The success of 
both transitions hinged on whether and how the new constitution was drafted.  Both Tunisia and 
Egypt were caught between a minimalist and a maximalist approach to the transition.  In the 
minimalist approach, conservatives or reformers could argue that the old regime was a 
dictatorship headed by an individual dictator.  Such an approach would suitable for an 
exceptional regime.  Constitutional authoritarian regimes have engaged in lengthy processes of 
institution building.  The flight of the dictator does not mean the end of authoritarianism.   
In the maximalist approach, revolutionaries could argue that the entire political and legal 
realm need to be reworked to rid it of the influence of the authoritarian regime.  Such an 
approach would be suitable for democratizing a non-constitutional or totalitarian regime, but 
naturally raised the prospect of violence.  As in totalitarian regimes, the influence of the 
constitutional authoritarian regime extends beyond politics into law and society, and the 
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maintenance of everyday legal order is closely tied to the broader system of authoritarianism.  
The constitution drafting process was so important to the Tunisian and Egyptian transitions 
because it provided a means to implement real institutional change without plunging the country 
into chaos. 
The characteristics of constitutional authoritarian regimes pose a dilemma for the 
transition.  The transition is a legal process dominated by the drafting of a new constitution.  
However, the transitional regime must be suspicious of existing legal institutions, which were 
created by the old regime.  The Tunisian and Egyptian transitional systems addressed these 
issues in different ways, which are outlined below. 
 
Revolution and Legal Positivism in Tunisia 
 
In the end, Tunisia found a way out of this dilemma, but Egypt did not.  Democratization 
succeeded in Tunisia because of factors besides the courts.  The prominence of the UGTT trade 
union, the moderation of Ennahda’s leadership and the absence of a politicized military are all 
potential factors.  There is a lot of truth to the view that the success of Tunisia’s transition is a 
“gift from heaven.”465  The courts could not make the Tunisian transition succeed, but they could 
have derailed the transition through the wrong kind of activity.  The legal system contributed to 
democratization in two ways.   
First, Tunisian courts helped democratization by not interfering in the political process.  
The deference of the Tunisian courts to the Assembly is not simply a failure to act, but instead 
the result of this carefully thought-out legal ideology.  In Tunisia, the basic elements of a 
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countermajoritarian and counter-revolutionary judiciary seemed to be in place.  The judges were 
holdovers from the Ben Ali era.  They opposed the Troika government and supported the secular 
ex-RCD opposition parties such as Nidaa Tounes.  Transitional politics gave courts, especially 
the Administrative Tribunal, the opportunity to intervene against the Troika government and the 
Assembly system.  Ideas about the judicial role and the nature of the Tunisian constitution were 
essential to the judiciary’s acceptance of the Assembly.   The judiciary’s acceptance of the 
Assembly was essential to the stability of the Tunisian transitional regime.  If the Tribunal had 
intervened in the 2013 crisis, it may have derailed the transition.  According to this argument, the 
Tunisian judiciary’s stance did not guarantee the success of the transition, but in a counterfactual 
where the judiciary adopted an activist approach, the failure of the transition would be likely. 
Second, individual legal professionals played a key role in the transition, even if they did 
not act through existing legal institutions.  Legal professionals were involved in partisan politics 
and the drafting of the transitional documents.  Yadh ben Achour, who served as a judge of the 
Constitutional Council from 1987 to 1992, is the most prominent example466.  The contribution 
of jurists was particularly important because the successful design of the Assembly system 
depended on a thorough understanding of the Tunisian legal system and the likely behavior of 
Tunisian courts.  Legal professionals also acted as public intellectuals.  Judges, lawyers and legal 
academics were involved in the development of ideas about the judicial role and its adaptation to 
the transition.  Tunisian judges articulated a legal theory that is at odds with the prevailing global 
trend toward the new constitutionalism.  Without these theories, the Ben Achour Commission 
could not have designed the Assembly system in a way that was compatible with the Tunisian 
legal system. 
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Authoritarianism and New Constitutionalism in Egypt 
 
 The dissertation does not conclude that the Egyptian courts were agents of the old regime 
or the military.  Even without direct control by the military, the courts still ended up acting as 
supporters of the old regime.  Ideas about the judicial role and the nature of the Egyptian 
constitution were essential to the judiciary’s pro-military stance during the transition.   
In Egypt, the constitution drafting process gave the courts the means to intervene in 
politics, and it threatened the established constitutional order that the courts wanted to preserve.  
The courts dissolved the Constituent Assembly and the House of Representatives.  The courts 
would not accept even a brief constitutional hiatus after Mursi’s November 2012 Constitutional 
Decree467.  Such a period of constitutional hiatus proved essential for democratization in Tunisia.  
That does not mean that the transition would have succeeded without the courts or that the courts 
could never accommodate themselves to a democratic regime.  There were alternative scenarios 
that could have led to democratization, but the courts and their conception of the judicial role 
were a factor working against democratization.  If the Egyptian judiciary had a different 
conception of its role, it is possible but not certain that a more democratic alternative may have 
taken hold.  If the courts had refrained from dissolving the House of Representatives and the 
Constituent Assembly, the transition may have been less contentious, although the conflict 
between the military and the Brotherhood would remain.  The Egyptian transitional system of 
2011 to 2013 could not exist without politically active courts holding a broad conception of the 
judicial role.  Courts were needed to decide disputes among the different transitional institutions, 
                                               
467 “English Text of Morsi’s Constitutional Declaration.” Ahram Online, 22 November 2012. 
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/58947/Egypt/Politics-/English-text-of-Morsis-Constitutional-
Declaration-.aspx 
274 
and it is likely that the military would not have created such a system if it could not count on the 
courts as allies.  Egypt could have ended up with the Turkish scenario of an opposition president 
who governs within limits imposed by the military.  If Ahmed Shafik had won the 2012 
elections, Egypt would qualify as an electoral democracy even if the military continued to 
dominate politics.  If there had been a procedure to remove Mursi without a military coup, Egypt 
might still qualify as an electoral democracy.  The military may have decided to rule directly 
until the adoption of a new constitution.  A military-drafted constitution may have set the stage 
for one of the scenarios outline above.  In any case, democratic consolidation was unlikely 
because of the expansive role of the military and the deep hostility between the military and the 
Muslim Brotherhood.  
The dissertation does not argue that ideas about the judicial role determined the success 
of the Tunisian transition or the failure of the Egyptian transition.  However, the processes 
identified by the judicial role hypothesis do have implications for democratization.  They also 
have implications for authoritarian regimes, which are examined in the next section. 
 
3. Judicialization after the Arab Spring 
   
This section considers what lessons authoritarian rulers might draw from the Egyptian 
and Tunisian cases and how they might use not just courts, but also judicial ideology, to bolster 
their rule.  Scholars have long associated legal positivism with authoritarianism468.  The case of 
Tunisia shows how legal positivism can cement democratization, and the case of Egypt shows 
how the new constitutionalism can cement authoritarianism.  Moreover, this lesson has not been 
lost on regimes considering legal reforms following the Arab Spring uprisings.  I argue that in 
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the reform cases of Morocco and Jordan, the regime adopted systems of a posteriori 
constitutional review on the Egyptian model in order to import ideas about the judicial role and 
the nature of the constitution that would protect these regimes against popular revolution.  I 
compare this explanation with two counter explanations for the reforms in Morocco and Egypt 
based on the countermajoritarian function of courts and the diffusion of international models.  
The veto exercised by constitutional courts would be of little use, especially without the support 
of judicial ideology.  Constitutional courts are the result of institutional diffusion, but the model 
is not the German Constitutional Court, but rather the Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt469. 
I outline the patterns of judicial reform after the Arab Spring.  I then suggest three 
explanations for this pattern: the constitutional court as countermajoritarian mechanism, as 
concession, and as proponent of legal ideology.  I show how this view might inform the 
decisions of authoritarian regimes to reform their legal systems.   
 
Reform and Judicial Review after the Arab Spring 
  
 The Arab Spring resulted in constitutional changes even in countries where the regime 
was not overthrown.  The final constitutions adopted by the revolution cases (Egypt and Tunisia) 
and by the reform cases (Morocco and Jordan) all granted additional powers to their 
constitutional courts. 
Ginsburg conceives of the formal powers of a constitutional court as consisting of five 
categories: access, effect, and the procedures for appointing judges, court size, and term 
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length470.  The most powerful court would have numerous formal powers and numerous means 
for different actors to access the court.  The powers of a constitutional court are the actions that 
the court can take, almost always including the power to declare legislation unconstitutional.  
Some courts can practice only a priori review of legislation.  Some can practice only a posteriori 
review of cases.  Some can do both.   
In order for a court to exercise its formal powers, a case must be brought to it by some 
other actors.  In general, the more ways a case can be brought to a constitutional court and the 
more actors that can do so, the greater the court’s level of access.  The French Conseil model was 
limited in the sense that it could practice only a priori review, but perhaps more importantly 
access to the council was strictly limited to members of the parliament, the president and certain 
government officials.  As a result, the Conseil could exercise its veto on legislation only when it 
had the support of at least some parts of the other branches.   
The last three categories deal with the appointment of judges to the constitutional court.  
Justices may be appointed by the executive, the legislative or by the constitutional court itself.  
Terms may be for only a few years or for life.  The justices may be required to be judges, 
lawyers or law professors, or they may be politicians without legal training.  The smaller the role 
of the political branches in appointments to the court, the longer the tenure of judges, and the 
more stringent the qualifications for judges, the greater the independence of the court from 
political pressures.   
A huge number of combinations and variations of these five categories is possible.  In 
practice, courts usually correspond to a particular model that is defined by a particular 
combination of these variables.  The French Conseil model is defined by low access, only 
government officials can forward legislation to the Conseil; medium effect, the Conseil can 
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exercise only a priori review; and the appointment of political figures rather than judges to the 
court.  The Kelsen model is defined by high access, ordinary citizens can appeal cases to the 
court; high effect - the court can exercise both apriori and aposteriori review; and the 
appointment of judges or law professors to the court471. 
Using these criteria, the formal powers of the constitutional courts of Egypt, Tunisia, 
Morocco and Jordan are outlined in the table below472. 
 
Table 4: Formal Powers of Constitutional Courts: 2011-2014, (access/effect/model) 
 Old Constitution Transition New Constitution 
Egypt high/high/Kelsen high/very high/Kelsen high/very high/Kelsen 
Tunisia low/medium/Conseil none high/high/Kelsen 
Morocco low/medium/Conseil N/A high/high/Kelsen 
Jordan low/medium/Conseil N/A high/high/Kelsen 
 
The formal powers of the constitutional court have increased from the pre-2011 
constitution to the present constitution in each of the four countries.  All of the countries have 
adopted some variation of the Kelsen court.  This shift has increased the powers of the courts - 
they can now conduct both abstract and concrete review.  It has also increased access to the 
courts - individual litigants and lower courts can appeal cases to courts that could previously 
only be accessed by high-ranking government officials.  In Egypt, the transitional Constitutional 
Decree, the 2012 Constitution and the 2014 Constitution have given the SCC an additional 
power of a priori review of electoral legislation.  The only exception to this trend is the 
                                               
471 See Kelsen (1942) and Sweet (1992) on these two models. 
472 “Morocco approves bill on Constitutional Court,” Middle East Monitor, 25 June 2014.  
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/africa/12359-morocco-approves-bill-on-constitutional-court 
“Law No. 15 of 2012 (Jordan) Issued on 16/06/2012 CONSTITUTIONAL COURT LAW,” Constitutional Court 
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dissolution of the Tunisian Constitutional Council in 2011.  The constitution adopted by the 
Assembly in February 2014 includes a constitutional court on the Kelsen model.     
 There is a clear pattern across all of these cases, regardless of whether the constitutional 
changes were the result of reform or revolution and regardless of whether the end result was 
democracy or authoritarianism.  What can explain these similar outcomes? 
 
Explaining Reform 
   
There are two major theories of reform: reform as a concession, and reform as a  
countermajoritarian mechanism473.  According to the first explanation, by granting a genuine 
concession to the opposition, the regime may hope to prevent further unrest in exchange for 
giving up some power.  Reforms might also be a facade intended to achieve the same effect as a 
concession without actually giving up any significant power.  Both of these variations focus on 
the impact of the reforms on public opinion.  A regime might institute reforms in order to boost 
its popularity and prevent an uprising before it happens.  An important implication of this theory 
is that the regime would create a court that corresponds to normative views held by the 
opposition.   
According to the second explanation, the regime might accept that some level of popular 
influence on the government is inevitable, even if it falls short of full democratization.  The 
regime may allow freer elections with a greater chance of the opposition gaining real power.  In 
this situation, the regime may create a constitutional court to limit the majoritarian effects of its 
                                               
473 The explanations draws on different literatures with different assumptions.  The first explanation assumes that 
states establish judicial review in order to comply with norms.  Ackerman (1993) emphasizes the importance of the 
American model in the diffusion of judicial review.  The rights provisions of constitutions have converged.  
Versteeg (2014).  The second explanation assumes that judicial review can genuinely affect political outcomes.  
Ginsburg (2003) emphasizes the countermajoritarian aspect of judicial review in newly democratic regimes.   
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electoral reforms.  This explanation makes sense only in certain political circumstances: there 
must be a real possibility of a democratically-elected legislature passing legislation contrary to 
the interests of the elite.  This explanation focuses on the actions that courts might take after the 
regime has given up some power to democratic institutions.  
The experience of Tunisia, and especially Egypt, since 2011 suggests a third explanation.  
The events of 2011 have shown that popular uprisings can overthrow the leaders of even 
entrenched regimes.  The events of 2011-2014 have shown that such uprisings are only the 
beginning of a lengthy process of transitional or constitutional politics that can either consolidate 
democracy, as in Tunisia, or allow the revival of the old regime in a new form, as in Egypt.  
From the perspective of authoritarian rulers, the outcome in Egypt suggests a strategy to use 
courts to deflect pressures for democratization.  The Egyptian case shows that courts can guide a 
transition towards outcomes that are favorable to the old regime.  In the event of a democratic 
revolution, courts can side with the old regime or the revolutionaries.  If judges accept the 
Egyptian view of the judicial role, they are more likely to act against a revolutionary democratic 
regime in the name of legal continuity.  Each of these explanations is examined below. 
 
Reform as Concession 
 
For the regime, establishing a constitutional court may be relatively costless way to 
deflect criticism from the opposition.  The extent to which the establishment of either the 
Moroccan or the Jordanian constitutional court represents an actual delegation of power by the 
regime remains to be seen.  The courts are closely tied to the monarchy in both countries.  Judges 
are drawn from an elite social class that is unlikely to initiate radical change.  On the other hand, 
the courts could deliver some real reforms, like the SCC did in Egypt in the 1990’s and 2000’s. 
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The explanation implies that the regime will create a court based on the model that the 
opposition considers appropriate.  The adoption of a posteriori review by the Jordanian and 
Moroccan regimes is compatible with this implication.  The opposition could see the 
constitutional court as a protector against abuses by the government.  A posteriori review seems 
particularly suitable for such protection because it allows individuals to bring challenges against 
laws and government action.  The Jordanian and Moroccan courts could also be the result of the 
diffusion of the global model represented by the German Constitutional Court.  The opposition 
may hope that the new constitutional courts will launch a rights revolution like the German 
Constitutional Court, the Hungarian Constitutional Court, or other constitutional courts 
exercising a posteriori review.   
The Jordanian and Moroccan cases are part of a larger global trend.  Constitutional 
review has spread around the world since World War II.  As Ginsburg and Versteeg note, new 
democracies, transitional regimes and liberalized authoritarian regimes have been the growth 
area for constitutional review over the past several decades.  Jordan and Morocco fit into this 
broad category of regimes.   The Kelsen model exemplified by the German Constitutional Court 
has become the most popular, surpassing the French Conseil model or the American Supreme 
Court474.  The creation of the new constitutional courts in Jordan and Morocco may be the result 
of international norms diffusion described by Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, although Ginsburg and 
Versteeg reject this explanation475.  If there is an international consensus in favor of a posteriori 
review, the Jordanian and Moroccan regimes may adhere to these norms to placate the domestic 
opposition and international opinion. 
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Reform as Countermajoritarian Mechanism 
 
Constitutions and constitutional review can be useful to regimes or elites anticipating a 
transition to majority rule because a constitutional court can block actions taken by elected 
institutions476.  The dissertation rejected this explanation for transitional constitutional review, 
but it might apply better to the provisions of the final constitution. 
The countermajoritarian account of reform faces some problems in explaining the 
outcomes in these four countries.  In theory, either model of constitutional review could check 
the elected institutions effectively.  In Ginsburg’s schema, the Kelsen model is more powerful 
because more actors are able to access the court.  However, Ginsburg’s and Hirschl’s 
explanations do not really apply to a situation where a genuine transition to majority rule is 
unlikely.  Despite the 2011 protests, neither Jordan nor Morocco would fit into this category.  
Even if they did, their constitutional reforms were not initiated by a multi-party legislature or 
constituent assembly, so Ginsburg would predict that they would adopt a weak form of 
constitutional review477. 
The challenges faced by the Jordanian and Moroccan regimes are different from those 
imagined by Ginsburg.  In Ginsburg’s theory, a democratically elected legislature may pass laws 
that threaten the interest of the old regime or elites generally.  Jordan and Morocco instead face 
the possibility of an open-ended transition lasting several years, like what occurred in Egypt 
from 2011 to 2013.  During such a period, popular protest and constitutional change are the main 
threats to the regime, not legislation.  As a result, constitutional review of legislation would be of 
limited use.  The countermajoritarian (or counter-revolutionary) function of a constitutional court 
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in a transitional situation does not really depend on its formal power to overturn legislation.  The 
findings of the dissertation suggest that only changes to the judicial role can make constitutional 
courts an effective counter-revolutionary actors.  The next section outlines evidence that regimes 
have also drawn this conclusion. 
 
Legal Ideology, Judicial Activity and Reform 
 
 The concession explanation gives little insight into why actors consider constitutional 
courts desirable and how this notion spread throughout the Arab World.  The judicial ideology 
explanation argues that the regime wants the constitutional court to promote ideas as well as veto 
legislation.  There are three sets of evidence in favor of this explanation.  First, the new 
constitutionalism is theoretically compatible with authoritarianism.  Second, the mechanism 
outlined in the dissertation can be used intentionally by regimes.  Third, the pattern of diffusion 
fits better with the legal ideology explanation than the concession explanation. 
 
Legal Positivism, New Constitutionalism and Institutional Reforms 
 
 In the modern world, regimes can choose from two broad legal ideologies: legal 
positivism and the new constitutionalism.  Both of these ideologies have implications for the 
judicial activity, the sources of law and the structure of legal institutions.  Legal positivism 
emphasizes deference of judges towards legislative authority.  It emphasizes positive law or 
legislation over other sources of law, such as human rights, international norms, precedent or 
custom.  At an extreme, legal positivism rejects any form of constitutional review.  The French 
Conseil model is supposed to mitigate the problems that constitutional review poses for legal 
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positivism.  The new constitutionalism emphasizes an active role for judges in interpreting and 
challenging legislation.  It emphasizes human rights and international norms over positive law.  
The new constitutionalism demands some form of constitutional review.  Hirschl and Hilbink 
equate the rise of new constitutionalism with the expansion of constitutional courts around the 
world478. 
Scholars often assume that authoritarian regimes prefer legal positivism.  An autocrat 
who controls the legislative power presumably wants judges to rigidly enforce legislation.  Even 
in cases such as Chile, where the regime promulgated a constitution and gave the supreme court 
a power of constitutional review, it is assumed that the regime intended a rigid, literal reading of 
the constitution479.  The new constitutionalism emphasis on rights, international norms and 
judicial review of legislation seems to be at odds with authoritarianism480. 
The finding of the dissertation puts this choice in a different light.  Leaving aside the 
question of democratization, authoritarian regimes are rarely all-powerful legislators.  In Egypt 
for example, the will of the regime does not overlap completely with legislation.  Egypt has 
inherited an enormous quantity of legislation that is not the work of a single regime.  On the 
other hand, every Egyptian constitution, with the partial exception of the 2012 constitution, has 
been the work of a president and a small circle of experts481.  In the competitive authoritarian 
regimes of the Arab World, the legislature is often the institution most susceptible to anti-regime 
influence.  In a transitional situation, the opposition may take control of the legislature and other 
elected offices, while barely touching the ‘deep state’ of the military, police, bureaucracy, and 
judiciary.   
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Legal positivism recognizes the authority of a new regime to rewrite the laws of an old 
regime.  The supremacy of legislation poses a danger to regimes or elites facing a democratic 
transition.  The 2012 crisis in Egypt is an example of how an ideology of constitutionalism can 
serve the interests of a non-democratic regime482.   
 
Using Judicial Activity to Propagate Ideas 
 
The Tunisian example shows that in a transitional period, a power of constitutional 
review can only be effective if it is accompanied by an expanded conception of the judicial role.  
The case of Egypt shows that an elite legal institution like the SCC can over time propagate a 
new set of legal ideas through the judiciary and the broader society.  The mechanism of the 
judicial role hypothesis has important implications for authoritarian regimes.  Legal culture is not 
fixed.  It can be influenced by the regime through judicial institutions and judicial activity. 
The model chosen by the Jordanian and Moroccan regimes - a posteriori review - is 
compatible with this explanation.  Both apriori and aposteriori review can act as 
countermajoritarian institutions.  As chapter 6 shows, a posteriori review has advantages for 
propagating legal ideas.  A broad set of actors, including civil society and the ordinary judiciary, 
are involved in a posteriori review, whereas only the court and elite political figures are involved 
in apriori review.  These actors adopt the ideology underlying constitutional review through their 
participation in it.  A posteriori review also favors ideas linked to the new constitutionalism 
rather than legal positivism.  Although both kinds of review can address fundamental rights, the 
involvement of civil society in a posteriori review tends to emphasize fundamental rights as the 
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most important part of constitutional review483.  In such systems, the constitution and the 
constitutional court become linked to the higher law of fundamental rights, a key component of 
the new constitutionalism. 
  
Diffusion of a Model  
 
 The concession theory suggests that regimes adhere to international models of 
constitutional review in order to enhance their image with the opposition.  The models that most 
interest regimes may not be global but rather regional.  Scholars have noted Egypt's role as a 
center for the diffusion of legal ideas and institutions to the rest of the Arab World484.  Before 
2011, the example of the SCC showed that a constitutional court could coexist with an 
authoritarian regime.  The revolutions of 2011 showed why such a court might be useful to the 
regime. 
Authoritarian regimes have adapted to a different set of challenges in different time 
periods.  The strategies that they have employed have been influenced by the international 
context.  In the 1950's and 60's, rulers responded to the wave of coups in the region by coup 
proofing their militaries.  Lust links the rise of electoral authoritarianism to the economic crisis 
that hit the region starting in the 1980's485.  The events of 2011 have shown that popular 
uprisings can overthrow the leaders of even entrenched regimes.  The events of 2011-2014 have 
shown that such uprisings are only the beginning of a lengthy process of transitional or 
constitutional politics that can either consolidate democracy, as in Tunisia, or allow the revival of 
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the old regime in a new form, as in Egypt.  The Moroccan and Jordanian regimes would likely 
see the Tunisian and Egyptian regimes as comparable to themselves.  State collapse comparable 
to Libya or Syria is unlikely in either Jordan or Morocco, but popular protest comparable to 
Tunisia or Egypt did occur in both Morocco and Jordan from February to June 2011486. 
The timing of the reforms in Jordan and Morocco is clearly related to the events in Egypt 
and Tunisia.  The rulers of these countries portrayed these reforms as their own Jordanian and 
Moroccan 'springs.'487  Morocco created its new constitutional court in 2011 as part of the 
constitutional amendments adopted on July 1, 2011.  A law reorganizing the Moroccan 
Constitutional Council into a constitutional court exercising a posteriori review was passed in 
June 2014.  Although these reforms had been discussed for a long time in Morocco, the protests 
in 2011 gave them greater impetus488.  Jordan created its constitutional court by organic law on 
June 6, 2012489.   
The content of the reforms reveal influences from Jordan and Morocco’s history, as well 
as the experience of Tunisia and Egypt in the Arab Spring.  Some of the reforms had been 
introduced before during past eras of liberalization by the Moroccan and Jordanian regimes.  
Both regimes have a long history of manipulating the electoral arena by banning opposition 
parties or by cultivating a loyal opposition490.  The removal (or scapegoating) of a prime minister 
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has been a familiar tactic of the Jordanian regime and other monarchies491.  These reforms had 
long been part of the tool kit of the Moroccan and Jordanian regimes.  On the other hand, there 
was no history of a posteriori constitutional review in either Jordan or Morocco before 2011.  In 
this area, it is plausible that the example of a posteriori review in Egypt formed the basis of the 
reforms in Jordan and Morocco.   
 
Conclusion 
  
 The finding of the dissertation suggests a general approach to the study of judicial power 
and several specific hypotheses.  The two step mechanism of the judicial role hypothesis is 
applicable to any transition.  By tracing a process from the activity of courts under authoritarian 
regimes to the growth of a conception of the judicial role, it should be possible to gain some 
insight into the likely status of courts during and after the transitions.  Judicial activity under the 
old regime produces ideas about the judicial role which shape the formal powers of courts during 
and after the transition.   
The judicial role hypothesis also suggests hypotheses linking the institutions of a 
posteriori concrete constitutional review, the ideology of new constitutionalism, an expansive 
conception of the judicial role and expanded formal powers after the transition.  These 
hypotheses can be tested in any case that had constitutional court exercising a posteriori 
constitutional review before it undergoes a transition.  Such cases are rare, but they will likely be 
more common as a result of the global diffusion of a posteriori constitutional review and the 
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endurance of constitutional authoritarian regimes.  The Tunisian and Egyptian cases offer insight 
into this kind of transition. 
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